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PART ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
What is the self? Each of us knows the meaning of this 
term until we are asked to define it. It is only then that 
we realize that to give an accurate account of the self is 
"the most difficult of philosophic tasks." 1 James 
struggled with the problem of the self in a number of works 
that spanned his entire philosophical career. His radical 
experiential approach to the problem of the self is still 
being studied and interpreted by scholars today. No teaching 
of James, however, has been more subject to misunderstanding. 
The philosophical literature surrounding James' theory 
of the self continues to grow both in size and diversity. 
Each interpreter of James tends to see his own James. 
Interpretations of James' doctrine of the self have run the 
gamut from those which insist he denies the existence of the 
self to those which maintain he believes in a substantial 
self. There are those who feel that James identified the 
self with the physical body and still others who are 
convinced that he has reduced it to the present fleeting 
pulse of consciousness. Amongst Jamesian scholars, there 
exist little agreement concerning the essense of his theory 
of the self. John Dewey once argued that James was moving 
1
william James, The Principles of Psychology, 3 Vols. 
ed. F. Burkhardt (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), 
I, p. 220. (Hereafter - Principles) 
1 
2 
towards a behavioristic account of the self. 2 Milic C~pek 
insists, however, that James rejected the behavioristic 
interpretation of the self. 3 James Edie has recently tried 
to demonstrate that James was really developing a 
phenomenlogical approach to the problem of the self. 4 In 
response to the growing phenomenological interpretation of 
James, Andrew Reck has argued that James was steering a 
middle course between Phenomenology and Behaviorism in his 
treatment of the self. 5 As if the confusion created by 
these conflicting interpretations wasn't enough, John Shea 
has contributed to the controversy by arguing that James 
offered numerous theories of the self that he never bothered 
to reconcile. 6 As a whole, the literature on the Jamesian 
self reflects the enormous amount of ambiguity and complexity 
which is present in James' writings concerning the self. It 
is James' own confusing richness that has spawned such 
diverse disciples. 
2John Dewey, "The Vanishing Subject in the Psychology 
of James," Journal of Philosophy, 37 (1940), pp. 589-599. 
3Milic Capek, "The Reappearance of the Self in the Last 
Philosophy of William James," Philosophical Review, 62 (1953), 
p. 526. 
4James Edie, "The Genesis of a Phenomenological Theory 
of the Experience of Personal Identity: William James on 
Consciousness and the Self," Man and World, 6 (Summer, 1973) 
pp. 293-312. 
5 John Shea, "The Self in William James," Philosophy 
Today, 17 (Winter, 1973), pp. 319-327. 
3 
Although the recent revival of interest in the 
philosophy of William James has been mainly due to the 
efforts of those thinkers who emphasize the phenomenological 
and existential character of his thought, James has been the 
subject of interest for a variety of philosophical camps. 
James' Principles of Psychology has always managed to draw 
the admiration of thinkers of different philosophical 
persuasions. Ludwig Wittgenstein and Edmund Husser!, for 
example, were both influenced by this work. In the case of 
the Principles of Psychology, one of the reasons for James' 
ability to draw the attention of diverse philosophical 
schools is his employment of two distinct methods of 
psychological research: (1) the method of introspection and 
(2) the experimental method. Because of this double strain, 
James attracted the attention of behaviorists like Dewey and 
Mead who warmly greeted his experimental method as well as 
the admiration of phenomenologists like Husser! and Merleau-
Ponty who were greatly impressed by the rich and penetrating 
phenomenological descriptions gained by his introspective 
method. Dewey viewed James' dual methodology as constituting 
11 two incompatible strains in the Jamesian psychology, 11 and he 
noted that 11 the con£ lict between them is most mar ked in the 
case of the sel£." 7 This mixing of methodologies is 
surely no small factor in the growing number of disparate 
interpretations of the Jamesian self. 
7Dewey, £E· cit., p. 598. 
4 
To this mass of interpretations I now add my own view 
of the Jamesian self. My interpretation has been assisted by 
the insights of James Edie, 8 Hans Linschoten, 9 John 
WildlO and Bruce Wilshire. 11 These scholars have each 
contributed important insights regarding the existential and 
phenomenological orientation of James' thought especially 
with regards to consciousness and embodiment. These 
commentators however, unlike myself, view the Jamesian self 
as totally objective. None argues as I do that the Jamesian 
self is a unique and irreducible temporal process that flows 
beyond the subjective-objective dichotomy. Furthermore, none 
of their treatments of the Jamesian self takes fully into 
account the whole of James' thought on the self. They have 
mainly focused upon James' treatment of the self in chapter ten 
of the Principles of Psychology. Although this is the main 
source for James' thought on the self, it should not serve as 
the sole source for understanding James' long and continuous 
struggle to grasp the meaning of personal existence. 
8James Edie, £E· cit. 
9Hans Linshoten, On the Way Toward a Phenomenological 
Psychology: The Psychology of William James (Pittsburgh: 
Duquesne University Press, 1968). 
10John Wild, The Radical Empiricism of William James, 
(New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc. 1969). 
11Bruce Wilshire, William James and Phenomenology: A 
Study of "The Prineiples of Psychology," (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1968). 
5 
This study has two main objectives. First, it will be 
shown that there is present in James' writings a conception 
of the self which has not yet been fully explored by any 
Jamesian scholar. Second, it will be argued that this 
Jamesian account is one of the most thorough and honest 
accounts of that mysterious part of reality we call the self. 
The Jamesian account of the self that will be presented 
and defended in this essay is not one that James fully 
developed or one that he unambiguously adhered to throughout 
his philosophical career. It is nonetheless the only 
consistent account of personal existence that can be 
constructed from all his valuable but loosely organized 
insights concerning consciousness and selfhood. It is also 
the one account of selfhood that is in agreement with the 
entire philosophical thrust of James' writings. In 
elucidating what James must have held given his explicit 
principles and insights, but did not always fully or clearly 
express, it will be necessary at times to amend and or 
further develop some features of James' account. Although 
some aspects of James' account are in need of 
supplementation, this supplementation is mainly a matter of 
extending and refining James' own principles and drawing out 
their interconnections and their necessary implications_. 
Finally, this interpretation of the Jamesian self is the only 
one that leads to a wider, richer and more accurate portrayal 
of personal existence than is found in the traditional 
6 
alternative views. 
It will be argued that there can be found in James' 
writings a development of a single unified theory of the self 
according to which the self is best described as Self-
Constituting-Historical-Existence, and as such the self's 
existence entails the togetherness of a subjective and an 
objective dimension and their continuous interdependence. I 
say "can be found" because there is so much ambiguity and 
complexity in James' writings on the self that this theory is 
never clearly laid out nor totally developed by James. It 
will be shown that according to this theory, the self should 
be regarded as a subjective-objective temporal being, whose 
existence can be symbolized as follows: I ,ME. Here the 
"I" stands for the present subjective pulse of thought and 
the "ME" stands for that aggregate known as the objective 
self. The arrows represent the continuous mutual influence 
between these dimensions. It will be demonstrated that the 
Jamesian self is this process as a whole and that it is only 
within this process that there is found and "I" and a "ME". 
Evidence will be given to show that James' writings as a 
whole support this interpretation more than any other. 
Finally, an appraisal of the Jamesian theory will be offered 
in which it will be compared to four major alternative 
theories. 
We will explore James' conception of the self in the 
following manner: First, James' reasons for rejecting the 
7 
traditional alternative theories will be analyzed to see what 
they suggest regarding James' positive doctrine of the self. 
second, the main features of the Jamesian self will be 
outlined in the form of an initial rough sketch. Third, the 
objective dimension of the Jamesian self will be examined in 
detail. Fourth, the subjective dimension of the Jamesian 
self will be thoroughly investigated. Fifth, the full-self 
and the relationship of its two dimensions and the problem of 
self-identify will be discussed and sixth, the Jamesian 
theory of the self will be appraised by comparing it to four 
traditional alternative conceptions of the self with regard 
to its treatment of four fundamental experiential features of 
personal existence. 
A DESCRIPTION OF THE MAIN PARTS OF THIS STUDY 
In part two, James' critique of traditional theories of 
the self will be examined. This critique should provide us 
with important clues regarding the main outlines of the 
Jamesian self. I am proceeding in this manner because James 
is clearest about what he rejects. The often overlooked 
novelty of James' approach to the self is more readily 
apparent when one examines his treatment of the 
Spiritualists, Associationists, Transcendentalists and 
Behaviorists. His treatment of these four views points out 
the inadequacy of any interpretation of the Jamesian self 
which views James as a member of any of these four 
philosophical groups or interprets him in terms of categories 
borrowed from these systems of thought. Because of the 
complexity of James' theory of the self, and its special 
affinities with all of the above views, it is important to 
understand right from the start that James is breaking new 
ground here, and this is what we intend to establish in this 
section. The critique represents our first set of clues on 
the way to understanding the Jamesian self, and it must be 
held fast to if we are to avoid misinterpreting his more 
complex and ambiguous positive doctrine of the self. An 
understanding of James' reasons for rejecting these 
conceptions of the self should be helpful in clarifying the 
meaning of the Jamesian self. It should be kept in mind that 
this section is not concerned with demonstrating the real 
8 
9 
inadequacy of these alternative theories of the self. The 
primary concern of this section is rather to explore exactly 
what James rejects and why he rejects it, so that we can use 
this information to clarify the meaning of the self he 
accepts. 
In the third part of this study, we will present a 
rough sketch of the main features of the Jamesian self. The 
purpose of this section is to p~ovide the reader with an 
initial understanding of the Jamesian view of personal 
existence that subsequent sections will analyze in greater 
detail. Here we will explain what is meant in claiming that 
the self has two dimensions and enjoys a unique way of being 
that I call, self-constituting-historical-existence. 
In part four we will focus on James' treatment of the 
objective dimension of the self. Here our discussion shall 
concern the "ME" aspect of the self as opposed to the "I" 
aspect. To avoid misunderstanding here, it should be noted 
that our present separate treatment of the two dimensions of 
the self should not be taken as an indication that James 
believed that they existed separately. He did not. This 
section and the following section actually prepare the way 
for part six in which the self is shown to be an irreducible 
phenomenon involving the togetherness of its dimensions. The 
main concern of part four, however, will be the objective 
dimension of the self. Here we will investigate the three 
principal constituents of the empirical self (material, 
10 
social, and spiritual). We will discuss the unity of that 
aggregate which we all recognize as the empirical "ME". In 
this regard, James' views concerning the functions of the 
body and the role of care in the formation of a unified self 
will be carefully explored. In this section we will show 
that the objective self is neither a mere manifestation of a 
true hidden self nor is it exhaustive of that reality known 
as the self. 
In part five the subjective dimension of the self will 
be explored. Here, we will focus on James' theory of 
consciousness with special attention devoted to its unity, 
temporality and activity. We will argue in this section that 
there actually exists for James an "I" dimension of the self, 
and that the subject of experience is far from vanishing (as 
Dewey claimed). It will also be argued that this subjective 
dimension of the self is primarily a process of caring. 
The concrete full self will be the focus of attention 
in part six. Here the interdependence of the dimensions of 
the self will be discussed. This will involve exploring the 
historical character of the full self with emphasis upon both 
the spontaneity and the sedimentation of personal existence. 
Here "spontaneity" refers to the subject's active 
constitution of the "ME" in the present. Here 
"sedimentation" refers to the influence exerted by one's past 
objective selfhood on one's present subjectivity. Our aim in 
this section is to show that the Jamesian self is this 
11 
subjective-objective temporal process itself taken as an 
irreducible whole. The identity that this self enjoys will 
then be explored. Part seven will be devoted to a discussion 
of the merits of the Jamesian theory of the self. Here we 
will be comparing the Jamesian account of the self to four 
alternative views with regards to their treatment of four 
fundamental experiential features of personal existence. 
These features are: care, temporality, agency and sociality. 
we will also discuss certain objections that have or can be 
raised regarding the Jamesian self. The aim of this section 
is to show the superiority of the Jamesian theory in 
accounting for more of the experiential features of selfhood 
with a minimum of metaphysical assumptions. 
At the end of this study, there will be a brief summary 
of our major findings as well as a discussion of the 
significance of our results for both the philosophical 
community and the world at large. 
PART TWO 
JAMES' CRITIQUE OF THE TRADITIONAL THEORIES OF THE SELF 
In this part of the study we shall examine James' 
critique of traditional theories of the self. Our hope is 
that this will provide us with important clues regarding the 
main outlines of the Jamesian self. Here we shall be 
discussing James' treatment of the Spiritualists, 
Associationists, Transcendentalists and Behaviorists. 
Knowledge of the reasons why James rejects a self that is an 
automaton, or a bundle of perceptions, or an inactive soul or 
a transcendental ego is knowledge that should prove useful in 
clarifying the meaning of the Jamesian self. our main goal 
in this section is not to argue for the real inadequacy of 
these alternative theories of the self. our main concern 
here is rather to explore exactly what James rejects and why 
he rejects it, so that we can use this information to clarify 
the meaning of the self he accepts. we are taking this 
approach because James is more clear about what he rejects 
than what he embraces. This part of the essay will point out 
the inadequacy of any treatment of the Jamesian self which 
equates it with any of the above four philosophical 
approaches to personal existence. 
12 
A. THE CRITIQUE OF THE SPIRITUALISTS 
James says at one point that the soul theory seems to 
offer the line of least logical resistance in our efforts to 
account for the experience of selfhood. The Spiritualist's 
explanation is ultimately rejected by James, when he finds it 
to be an unnecessary hypothesis to account for the 
experienced continuity of the stream of consciousness. James 
sees no need to suppose any other agent than a succession of 
perishing thoughts which have the power of appropriation with 
regard to the past thoughts. The soul is not only 
unexperiencable; it is superfluous. James regarded the soul 
as a scientifically worthless concept because it does nothing 
to explain psychological phenomena. The term "soul" was for 
James nothing but a "theoretic stop-gap." The term simply 
creates a place and reserves it for "a future explanation to 
occupy.n 12 This "future explanation" is what this study is 
all about. 
James had little faith in the use of unexperienced 
entities to account for our personal existence. He clearly 
saw the major weakness of the Scholastic theory of the soul 
which dates back to Plato and Aristotle. To state that my 
stream of experience inheres in an unexperienced substance is 
according to James telling me nothing new about this stream. 
12
wiliiam James, A Pluralistic Universe ed. F. Burkhardt 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), p. 95. 
13 
14 
From this notion of inherence, what can we deduce? James 
feels that the spiritualists' account provides us with 
nothing but the same stream repeating itself with a 
mysterious transcendental support. 
The principal reason for James' dissatisfaction with 
the substantial soul hypothesis is that it guaranteed for the 
subject a greater degree of unity than the facts of personal 
existence support. James was familiar with numerous cases of 
mental breakdown and multiple personalities which suggested 
to him that there was a passing principle of unity working 
itself out, with perhaps various degrees of success and 
failure throughout one's life. our "experienced identity" in 
life does not testify to the absolute unity that has been 
talked of since the time of Plato. James felt that such 
conceptions of human identity go beyond the available 
evidence. 
James is aware of the major arguments for the existence 
of the soul but he finds them all weak and inconclusive. One 
of the main arguments for the existence of the soul has been 
that the material brain cannot be the agent of thought which 
is immaterial and which is capable of taking cognizance of 
immaterial objects. James agrees that the great difficulty 
is in understanding how a thing can cognize anything. He 
adds, however, "This difficulty is not in the least removed 
by giving to the thing that cognizes the name of sou1." 13 
13P . . 1 I 328 r~nc~p es, , p. . 
15 
James does not believe one must adopt a materialistic 
conception of mind if one rejects the soul. In James' theory 
the subject of experience is neither the soul nor the brain~ 
it is the present perishing pulse of thought. "Even if the 
brain could not cognize universals, immaterials or it 'self'" 
says James "still the "Thought" which we have relied upon in 
our account is not the brain, closely as it seems connected 
'th 't " 14 Wl 1 • The "I" of experience is a remembering and 
appropriating Thought incessantly renewed. 
One of the sources for the popularity of the soul 
theory is the wish for immortality. The Christian concept of 
judgment and punishment after death lends support to the soul 
theory. James finds little merit in these practical reasons 
for believing in the soul's existence. For James the only 
immortality that would be worthy of the name is one that 
would involve a consciousness continuous with what we have 
experienced in this life. An imperishable simple soul 
substance does not guarantee this. Here James supports 
Locke's view that the mere survival of one's soul substance 
is not equivalent to the survival of one's self which is what 
we normally mean by immortality. By itself the concept of 
the soul does not provide the type of immortality that we 
cherish. 
Although James rejects the notion of a substantial soul, 
he does not hesitate to use the term soul in some of his 
14 Ibid., I, p. 328. 
16 
works. In The Varieties of Religious Experience, he speaks 
of the soul frequently. James is not really being 
inconsistent here. It must be adm~tted, however, that James 
employs the term soul in a loosely descriptive manner that 
tends to solicit charges that he is betraying his position 
adopted in the Principles of Psychology. Phrases like 
"attitudes in the soul" and "the sick soul" seem to suggest a 
belief in a substantial soul. The truth is, however, that 
James purposely leaves vague the meaning of the term "soul" 
in The Varieties of Religious Experience and insists upon no 
specific understanding of the term. He even formally warns 
the reader of this fact. "When I say 'Soul'," writes James, 
"you need not take me in the ontological sense unless you 
prefer to." 15 James is actually adopting here the same 
attitude towards the soul that he took earlier in the 
Principles of Psychology which is that the soul can be a 
viable option only to a believer through an act of faith 
alone. There James wrote, "If I ever use it [the term soul] 
it will be in the vaguest and most popular way. The reader 
who finds any comfort in the idea of the soul, is however, 
perfectly free to continue to believe in it •••• n 16 Had 
these warnings of James been heeded, he would not have been 
viewed by some critics as vacillating with regards to the 
soul. 
15
william James, The Varieties of Religious Experience 
(1902, New York, Modern Library, 1936), p. 192. 
l6p . . l r1nc1p es, I, p. 332. 
A SUMMARY OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS CRITIQUE 
what clues can be gathered from this critique regarding 
James positive doctrine of the self? James critique of the 
Spiritualist's position suggest the following points: 
(1) The self is something which is totally experienceable. 
( 2) The self is something which is dynamic and mutable. 
(3) The self is not a spiritual substance. (4) The self is 
not that physical mass called the brain. (5) The self is 
perhaps perishable. 
17 
B. THE CRITIQUE OF THE ASSOCIATIONISTS 
James felt that it was their atomistic assumptions 
regarding experience that made it impossible for the 
Associationists to develop a viable theory of the self. 
James accuses Hume and his followers of not being genuine 
empiricists. A genuine empiricists, James feels, describes 
the phenomena just as they appear. If the Associationists 
had done this, they would have realized that our experience 
is not of atomistic pure sensations, but always of things 
that are fringed by all sorts of relationships. Having 
chopped up experience into a chain of distinct existences, 
Hume tried in vain to account for our experience of personal 
identity. Fully aware of his own failure here, Hume 
confessed in the appendix of his Treatise of Human 
Nature " ••• this difficulty is too hard for my 
understanding. I pretend not, however, to pronounce it 
insuperable. Others, perhaps ••• may discover some hypothesis 
that will reconcile these contradictions." 17 
Hume's failure to provide an adequate account of self 
identity stems from the fact that he was unable to reconcile 
or renounce the following theories: (1) All our distinct 
perceptions are distinct existences and (2) the mind never 
perceives any real connection among distinct existences. The 
17
navid Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Selby Rigge 
Edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951), pp. 635-636. 
18 
19 
Associationist's view fails because it refuses to accept 
either the unification of ideas in the conscious field or the 
immanence of the recent past in the present. James, however, 
accepts both and continues from there. 
Although James applauded Hume's rejection of the soul 
substance, he did not look favorably upon Hume's view of 
consciousness as a succession of unitary ideas with no real 
relationship to each other. James feels that Hume failed to 
see that there is something other than the two extreme 
alternatives of pure unity and pure separateness. He points 
out that Hume was as equally extreme as the spiritualists 
that he rejected. James writes, 
As they say the Self is nothing but Unity, 
unity abstract and absolute, so Hume says it is 
nothing but Diversity, diversity abstract and 
absolutei whereas in truth it is that mixture of 
unity and diversity which we 1~urselves have already found so easy to pick apart. 
For James the unity of the parts of the stream is just 
as "real" a connection as their diversity is a real 
separationi both connection and separation are ways in which 
the past thoughts appear to the present thought. In looking 
for more than this, in seeking an impression that remains 
always present and invariably the same, Hume revealed that he 
too had not freed himself from that "Absolutism which is the 
19 great disease of philosophic Thought." The real tie that 
18 Ibid., I, p. 333. 
19Ibid., I, p. 334. 
20 
aume sought in the train of perceptions, but couldn't find, 
James found realized in the present appropriating pulse of 
thought. 
James points out that followers of Hume such as John 
Mill tend to avoid confronting the problem of how 
consciousness comes to be aware of itself if it is only a 
train of independent thoughts. "As a rule," says James, 
"Associationists writers keep talking about 'the mind' and 
about what 'we' do; and so, smuggling in surreptitiously what 
they ought avowedly to have postulated in the form of a 
present judging Thought, they either trade upon their 
reader's lack of discernment or are undiscerning 
themselves." 20 
20 Ib1'd., I 336 , p. . 
A SUMMARY OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS CRITIQUE 
what does James' critique of the Associationists 
suggest regarding his own positive doctrine of the self? It 
shows first of all that James himself is not in the same camp 
with Hume with regards to the self. This is an important 
point for a number of interpreters of James have failed to 
notice the difference between Hume's chain of unrelated ideas 
and James' stream of appropriating Thoughts. James' pulses 
of Thought are active forces while Hume's ideas are simply 
inert contents. James' pulses of subjectivity unite through 
continuous appropriation to form a single stream while Hume's 
ideas are incapable of uniting. It is indeed true that James 
too speaks of a chain of Thoughts, but this is in no way 
equivalent to Hume's chain of ideas. With Hume there is 
nothing that makes these ideas a real chain, while with James 
the present active pulse of consciousness with its act of 
appropriation makes possible the continuous existence of the 
chain which is more aptly described as a stream. "My present 
Thought," writes James, "stands thus in the plenitude of 
ownership not only de faato~ but de jure~ the most real owner 
there can be, an all without the supposition of any 
'inexplicable tie' but in a perfectly verifiable and 
phenomenal way."21 
In addition to the above, the critique of the 
21P . . 1 341 r1nc1p es, I, p. . 
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Associationists indicates: (1) the Jamesian self is not a 
fiction or a mere logical construction or simply the pronoun 
•1., (2) the Jamesian self is mutable, and (3) the Jamesian 
self is an active force in the world. 
C. THE CRITIQUE OF THE TRANSCENDENTALISTS 
The Transcendentalist's view of the self was strongly 
attacked by James. He regarded Kant's account of the 
transcendental ego as "ineffectual and windy." 22 James 
rejected the Kantian account for he saw no value in empty 
constructs that are not tied to any concrete, empirical 
manifestations. Furthermore, Kant's ego was simply not 
active enough for James. James notes that unlike the soul, 
the transcendental ego does not intend, select or judge for 
its function is a purely logical one of maintaining that 
there is an "I" which is regarded as a transcendental 
condition for the possibility of experience. James views the 
Kantian ego as a barren form of consciousness with no 
properties so that we cannot tell "whether it be substantial, 
nor whether it be immaterial, nor whether it be simple, nor 
whether it be permanent." 23 It has no properties; nothing 
flows from it and so James calls it "simply nothing." 24 
James points out that even if Kant's belief in the 
original chaotic manifold were correct, the process of 
synthesis is not the least bit explained by claiming it is 
the work of the transcendental ego. James writes, 
22 Ibid., I, p. 345. 
23Ibid., I, p. 343. 
24 Ibid., I, p. 345. 
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Phrase it as one may, the difficulty is always the 
same: the Man* known by the One. Or does one 
seriously thin he understands better how the knower 
"connects" its objects when one calls the former a 
transcendental Ego and the latter a 'Manifold of 
Intuition' than when 2gne calls them Thought and Things respectively? 
James adds that the best vehicle of knowing and the 
best grammatical subject for the verb "know" would be one, if 
possible, from whose other properties the knowing could be 
deduced, and if such a subject couldn't be found "the best 
one would be that with the fewest ambiguities and the least 
t • n26 preten 1ous name. Given such guidelines, Kant's 
transcendental ego is a rather weak candidate for the title 
of "the vehicle of knowing." 
James points out that if one views the transcendental 
ego as an agent and not simply as an a priori form of 
consciousness, transcendentalism "is only Substantialism 
grown shame-faced, and the Ego only a 'cheap and nasty' 
edition of the soul." 27 In this case, all the arguments 
James gave for rejecting the Spiritualist's position would 
apply with equal force to the Transcendentalists' account of 
the self. The connection of things in our knowledge is not 
explained by making it the deed of an agent whose essence is 
25Ibid., I, p. 344. 
26 Ibid., I, p. 344. 
27 Ibid., I, p. 345. 
25 
self-identity and who transcends time. James feels that the 
agency of phenomenal thought coming and going in time is just 
as easy to understand. He regards the present pulse of 
thought which is an event in time as the only thinker which 
the facts require. There is simply no need for Kant's 
extraempirical and preexisting subject and its categorical 
equipment. 
A SUMMARY OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS CRITIQUE 
what can we gather regarding James' conception of the 
self from his criticism of Kant? There are, I believe, three 
clues present here regarding James' positive doctrine of the 
self. (1) The self is primarily an agent in the world and 
not simply the source of the unity of consciousness. (2) The 
self exists totally in time. (3) The self is an empirical 
reality. 
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D. THE CRITIQUE OF THE BEHAVIORISTS 
Behavioristic interpretations of the self are quite 
popular today. This approach to the self is not, however, a 
new phenomenon. In 1879 James published an article entitled 
"Are we Automata?" In it James launched a strong attack 
against certain behaviorist of his day who believed man was a 
automaton. According to the "automaton theory," 
consciousness is a simple epiphenomenal accompaniment of the 
neural processes whose course is strictly determined by the 
laws of the physical world. This was not the last attack 
launched by James against the behaviorists of his day. He 
continued to criticize materialistic conceptions of personal 
existence throughout his philosophical career. Despite this 
fact, there are some behaviorists who insist on reading 
behavioristic implications into his own thought and claiming 
him as one of their own. It will be shown here why this is a 
misinterpretation of James. James' criticism of the 
behavioristic approach to the self should also prove useful 
in clarifying the meaning of James' positive doctrine of the 
self. 
One of the objections that James had against a 
materialistic conception of the self was that it seemed to 
conflict with Darwin's theory of evolution, a theory which 
the behaviorists themselves claimed to support. James argues 
that the proponents of the automaton theory can not account 
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for consciousness' superfluous and logically unjustifiable 
presence if it simply accompanies the real work of the brain 
and the nervous system. James also notes with regards to 
evolution that the Automaton Theory can not explain why the 
efficiency of the reaction of the organism increases with 
decreasing automatization. If the Behaviorist's account is 
the correct one, the opposite of this should be the case in 
the evolution of life forms. James argues here that 
increasing instability of the reaction of the organism would 
be the natural consequence of the growing complexity of the 
nervous system where no set response is associated with any 
external stimulus. In the highly complex human world for 
example the stimulus is never exactly repeated. Since 
automatized association is the sole explanation accepted by 
the behaviorists, they are in no position to account for the 
fact that in evolutionary terms the efficiency of the 
reaction of the organism increases in spite of its decreasing 
automatization of fixed responses to the environment. 
Another reason James offers for rejecting the 
behaviorist account of the self has to do with the phenomena 
of pain and pleasure. There exist enormous correlations, 
statistically speaking, between pleasure and action 
beneficial to the human self and also between pain and action 
harmful to the human self. These correlations cannot be 
accounted for by behaviorists who deny psycho-physical 
interaction. James writes, 
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But if pleasure and pains have no efficacity one 
does not see (without such a priori rational harmony 
as would be scouted by the "scientific" champions of 
the Automaton Theory) why the most noxious acts, 
such as burning, might not give a thrill of delight, 
and the most 2Hecessary ones, such as breathing, cause agony. 
A third reason given by James for not adopting a 
behavioristic view of the self is one's own experience of 
activity and feeling of effort. In an article titled "The 
Feeling of Effort" James states, 
There is a feeling of mental spontaneity, opposed in 
nature to all afferent feelings; but it does not, 
like the pretended feeling of muscular innervation, 
sit among them as among its peers. It is something 
which domina29s them all, by simply choosing from 
their midst. 
According to the supporters of the Automaton Theory, 
the feeling of activity and hesitation are like any other 
feelings lacking efficacy and thus involve no biological 
advantage which could be preserved by natural selection. 
Yet, as in the case of pain and pleasure the particular 
distribution of feelings of activity remains an utterly 
unaccountable coincidence for these behaviorists. They are 
not able to explain why it is that consciousness of activity 
decreases in direct proportion as automatization of the 
28 Ibid., I, p. 146. 
29James, "The Feeling of Effort," in Collected Essays 
and Reviews (New York: Russell and Russell, 1969), p. 204. 
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response increases and vice versa. Anyone who has had to 
make an important decision knows how agonizingly intense 
consciousness becomes as indecision grows. Why is there this 
correlation if man is an automaton? According to James these 
correlations like those spoken of earlier all point to the 
same conclusion and that is that we are not automata. 
In addition to the three reasons discussed above, James 
also rejected a behavioristic conception of the self on 
pragmatic grounds. In a 1908 article for "The Philosophical 
Review" James showed the unsatisfactory character of the 
behaviorist view of the self by employing the ficticious idea 
of an "automatic sweetheart." Here James argues convincingly 
that a robot sweetheart completely identical to a real maiden 
except lacking in consciousness would not be a satisfactory 
sweetheart for any person. James points out that even if the 
robot behaved in all ways like the perfect mistress, she 
would not do as a sweetheart. "It" would not do, for in the 
case of the "sweetheart" outward treatment is valued 
primarily as an expression of the accompanying consciousness 
believed in. "Pragmatically, then, belief in the automatic 
sweetheart would not work," says James, "and in point of 
fact no one treats it as a serious hypothesis." 30 Here 
James is emphasizing the fact that the belief or denial of an 
efficacious consciousness really leads to different practical 
and emotional attitudes. It does make a difference 
30James, The Meaning of Truth, ed. Fredson Bowers and 
Ignas K. Skrupskelis (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1975), p. 103n. 
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whether I am viewed as a spontaneous and conscious being or 
as a machine. Some followers of Descartes enjoyed torturing 
animals in order to prove that they took the denial of 
consciousness in animals seriously. James realizes that the 
denial of an efficacious consciousness in man could lead to 
even more dreadful consequences. Although the pragmatic 
argument offered here does not directly deal with the 
validity of the automaton theory, it does illustrate the 
absurd and perhaps dangerous consequences that would follow 
if it was regarded by the world as a serious hypothesis. 
Nonetheless, James was also aware of the difficulties of 
the interactionist view. In the Principles of Psychology he 
admits that we can form no positive image of the way in which 
a thought may affect the material brain. He regarded this 
issue as " ••• the ultimate of ultimate problems •••• " 31 He 
noted, however, that since the time of Hume the concept of 
causation itself has been subject to critique, so that it is 
inconsistent to dogmatically deny mental causation while 
holding for physical causality. He writes, "As in the night 
all cats are gray so in the darkness of metaphysical 
criticism all causes are obscure." 32 Although he 
recognized the obscurity surrounding the notion of mental 
causation, he still believed that the evidence against the 
automaton theory was very strong. In the Principles of 
Psychology he finally comes to state, 
31 James, Principles, I, p. 177. 
32 Ibid., I, p. 178. 
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The conclusion that it (i.e. consciousness) is 
useful is, after all this, quite justifiable. But, 
if it is useful, it must be so through its causal 
efficaciousness. I, at any rate (pending 
metaphysical reconstruction not yet successfully 
achieved), shall have no hesitation in using t~3 
language of common-sense throughout this book. 
In his last works, a Pluralistic Universe and Some 
problems of Philosophy, James was even less hesitant about 
embracing the interactionist view. Here our efforts and 
activities are taken at their face value and accepted as 
genuine ingredients of the real world, a world that involves 
the continuous emergence of novelty which the automaton 
theory so completely ignored. 
Despite all the arguments that James put forth against 
the mechanistic view of the self there are still some 
interpreters of James who feel he really affirmed only a 
"behavioral self." John Dewey, for example, has argued that 
the "behavioral self" is the only self which James intended 
to maintain. 34 Dewey's position was motivated in part by 
James' loose and unguarded expressions in an article titled 
"Does Consciousness Exist?" This article does not really 
deny consciousness as some behaviorists believe but rather 
maintains the inseparability of consciousness from its 
content. In other words, it simply declares that there is no 
transcendental entity lurking behind concrete mental states. 
33 Ib1'd., I 147 , p. . 
34 Dewey, £E· cit. 
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This is quite different from the behavioristic denial of the 
concrete mental states themselves. What should not be 
forgotten is that not long after this rather ambiguous 
article James declared in A Pluralistic Universe the reality 
of the full self grounded in the dynamic solidarity of 
concrete mental states. 
It was probably James' emphasis upon the body in his 
theory of the self that motivated some to view him as a 
behaviorist. No one realized the break-through that he had 
achieved. The body that James emphasized was not the 
materialistic body of physiology but the body which 
Phenomenology later called the lived-body. 
It should also be noted that James' famous theory of 
the emotions which contained behavioristic aspects probably 
motivated some to interpret his theory of the self as 
behavioristic. If one examines James' theory of the emotions 
carefully, however, he will discover that it does not entail 
a behavioristic conception of the self for it doesn't deny 
consciousness or its activity, rather it simply insists that 
emotions involve a bodily component. In other words, the 
physical expression of certain emotions is a necessary part 
of our experience of those emotions, i.e., but for the body 
these emotions would not be. 
In this matter Robert Ehman and I are in agreement. In 
his article on James' theory of the self Ehman states, 
t 
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There is perhaps nothing in James that has been more 
radically misinterpreted than his account at this 
point, and he has often been taken as a mere 
materialist. However, there is in, fact no 
materialism here, no denial of thought or emotion, 
but simply the observation that we are unable to 
grasp these as purely psychical, as nonbodily. For 
James, the acts of thought and feeling are felt as 
bodily acts: and the body is felt as a vehicle of 
consciousness. When James asserts that the 'acts of 
attending, assenting, negating are felt as movements 
in the hea~ 5 • the term "as" ought to be taken literally. 
The main thrust of James' entire philosophical thought 
points in the opposite direction of behaviorism, and if he 
were writing today, its direction would remain unchanged. In 
today's society people who experience themselves as 
automatons are regarded as in need of psychiatric care. Why 
don't we also regard theories that seek to describe persons 
as automatons as pathological? According to James, the 
experience of oneself as a person is primary and prior to any 
scientific difficulties regarding how such an experience is 
possible or how it is to be explained. In this regard, James 
would agree with R. D. Laing that the theory of man as a 
person "loses its way if it falls into an account of man as a 
machine or man as an organismic system of it-processes.n 36 
35Robert R. Ehman, "William James and the Structure of 
the Self," New Essays in Phenomenology, ed. J. Edie (Chicago: 
Quadrangle Books, 1969), p. 262. 
36 R. D. Laing, The Divided Self, (Baltimore: Penguin 
Books, 1959), p. 23. 
A SUMMARY OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS CRITIQUE 
What does James' critique of the Behaviorists suggest 
regarding his positive doctrine of the self? It indicates 
at least four points regarding the Jamesian self: (1) 
oespite James' rejection of the soul substance, the self is 
not to be equated with the physical body. (2) The self 
involves a consciousness which is efficacious. (3) The self 
is a source of novelty. (4) A theory of the self should not 
ignore how this notion functions in one's everyday life and 
the conc~ete value it carries there. 
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A SUMMARY OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ALL FOUR CRITIQUES 
Let us now summarize what James' criticism of 
alternative theories indicates concerning the type of self he 
would accept. As a whole, all four critiques point to a 
Jamesian self that is: (1) active and efficacious, (2) 
within time, hence historical, (3) not exclusively material 
but involving concrete mental states or pulses of thought, 
(4) changing, never absolutely identical with what it was 
and, (5) experiencable but perhaps not all at once for it may 
be like Husserl's physical object revealing itself only 
perspectively. 
In our pursuit of the meaning of the Jamesian self, we 
will keep in mind these five clues. They should prove 
helpful in removing some of the ambiguity surrounding his 
positive statements concerning the self. On those occasions 
where James' loose statements invite varying interpretations 
of his positive doctrine of the self, I believe we should 
keep in mind what he has already clearly rejected and why he 
has rejected it. we will be referring to points made in this 
section as our argument unfolds for a particular 
interpretation of the Jamesian self. 
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PART THREE 
THE JAMESIAN SELF: AN INITIAL SKETCH 
There is present in the writings of William James a 
unique conception of the self. According to this theory the 
self enjoys a special way of being that is quite different 
from that of a "thing" and is perhaps best described as self-
constituting-historical-existence. In this part of our study 
our aim is to offer the reader a rough outline of the 
Jamesian self which we will be analyzing and arguing for in 
greater detail in the subsequent sections of this essay. 
What makes the being of the self so special, so 
different from that of a thing? This whole study is 
devoted to answering this question. But one should note 
immediately that unlike any "thing" the self has both an 
objective and a subjective dimension. It is this fact that 
the Jamesian theory of the self fully respects. 
In the Principles of Psychology, James summarizes his 
findings on the self in the following way: 
we may sum up by saying that personality implies the 
incessant presence of two elements, an objective 
person, known by a passing subjective Thought and 
recognized as continuing in time. Hereafter, let 
us use the words ME and 37for the empirical person 
and the judging Thought. 
37P ' . 1 I 350 r1nc1p es, , p. . 
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The exact meaning of this statement and others like it 
lies at the very heart of this essay. When James says that 
personality implies the incessant presence of two elements, 
there ought to be no doubt that he is claiming that both 
elements are essential constituents of the self. A self is 
never merely an empirical person (ME), and it is also never 
merely a judging thought (I). A self is neither of these 
elements for it is both at once. This is what James means 
when he says that personality implies "the incessant 
presence" of not one but "two elements." The self is being 
described here by James as an ambiguous being, one that is 
simultaneously both subjective and objective. This is the 
feature of the Jamesian self that his commentators have for 
the most part ignored or misinterpreted. 
James Edie, for example, takes the position that James 
developed a non-egological theory of consciousness according 
to which a distinction is made between consciousness (viewed 
as the non-personal condition of all objectification) and the 
self (viewed as merely a priviledged object of 
consciousness). 38 Bruce Wilshire shares Edie's view here. 
38James Edie, "The Genesis of a Phenomenological 
Theory of the Experience of Personal Identity: William James 
of Consciousness and the Self," Man and World, 6, pp. 322-338, 
(Summer, 1973). 
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Wilshire writes, "Rather he [James] has begun a 
reinterpretation of consciousness: we are not to speak of 
consciousness, but instead of 'sciousness', because all that 
is given is Object, or things just as they are known, and not 
thought itself.• 39 Although Jamesian statements can 
certainly be gathered in support of this interpretation, it 
must be regarded as a basic misinterpretation of James' 
position on the self. Far from not talking about 
consciousness, James talks of a personal, efficacious 
consciousness repeatedly in the Principles and throughout 
nearly all his philosophical works. If one listens carefully 
to what he does "speak of," it is clear that he regards 
consciousness as being personal and a felt dimension of the 
self which is simultaneously and irreducibly both objective 
and subjective, both an individual and an agent, both known 
and knower. The textual evidence for this interpretation 
will be given in the subsequent pages of this study. It 
should be noted now, however, that James offers us a non-
egological theory of consciousness only in the sense that 
there is no permanent ego behind or above the concrete stream 
of consciousness which supports it and serves to unify it. 
This view does not mean that James believes that 
consciousness is an anonymous function or that the self does 
39w·1 h' 1 s 1re, £E· cit., p. 136. 
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not include consciousness. It means rather that the Jamesian 
self is a subjective-objective process constituted in and 
with the flux of the stream of experience. 
Patrick Dooley is in agreement with me concerning James' 
position on the artificial separation of self and 
subjectivity. Dooley seems to recognize the fact that 
chapter nine of the Principles which deals with the stream of 
thought is just as important to an understanding of the 
Jamesian self as the chapter which follows it that is devoted 
exclusively to the self. Dooley writes, 
For James, it makes no sense to talk of thoughts or 
experiences apart from the self; experiences and 
thoughts are only personal. Since the states of 
consciousness we study are parts of personal selves, 
our discussion of the first characteristic of the 
stream of consciousness beiarnes a discussion of 
James' theory of the self. 
The quotation cited on page 37 is not the only place 
where James depicts the self as a subjective-objective 
process. Such descriptions are found throughout his 
writings. He also begins his account in Psychology, Briefer 
Course, by stating: 
Whatever I may be thinking of, I am always at the 
same time more or less aware of myself, of my 
personal existence. At the same time it is I who am 
aware; so that the total self of me, being as it 
were duplex, partly known and partly knower, partly 
object and partly subject, must have two aspects 
40Patrick K. Dooley, Pragmatism as Humanism: The 
Philosophy of William James (Chicago: Nelson Hall, 1974), p. 28. 
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discriminated in it, of which for sh~ltness we may 
call one the Me and the other the I. 
what James here refers to as aspects of the self, I call 
dimensions of the self. The self has both a subjective 
dimension and a objective dimension and these dimensions are 
interdependent. The self is strictly speaking neither of its 
dimensions but always both at once. In other words the self 
is this total process as an irreducible whole. This is why 
James refers to the "Me" and the "I" as "aspects" of the 
self. The self is a unique form of being in that it has both 
a subjective aspect and a objective aspect. This is 
reflected in the fact that the self unlike anything else in 
experience is both the "knower" and the "known." 
The claim that the self is both subjective and objective 
may appear unusual and puzzling and yet is not the self 
exactly that, unusual and puzzling? Is not the self really 
quite unique among all of the objects that occupy our 
thought? It may be that a faithful description of the 
essential uniqueness of the self leads to a recognition of 
its ambiguous nature, that it ~ in fact a subjective-
objective being, that it truly is subjectivity incarnate. 
There is a natural tendency among both philosophers and 
psychologists to reduce the self to the status of a mere 
object. Since our experience deals almost exclusively with 
objects, it is only natural to approach our own existence as 
if l't too was purely objective. Even those who recognize the 
41william James, Psychology, The Briefer Course, 1892. 
2nd ed. (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1895), p. 176. 
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reality of consciousness tend to continue to treat the self 
as if it was no different from any other object in 
experience. The following example is given in order to 
clarify the mistake that occurs when the self is viewed as a 
purely objective being. Imagine two traffic light poles 
standing at opposite corners of a busy intersection. A basic 
description of one of these traffic light poles may be said 
to apply equally to the other. Now imagine that one of these 
is miraculously given the gift of consciousness so that it is 
aware of itself and its surroundings. Now can we still claim 
that a basic description of one of these traffic light poles 
applies equally to the other? Can we take the position that 
there now exists only a minor difference between the two 
poles and that this difference can be described in the 
following manner: One traffic light pole is now aware of 
itself as a traffic light pole while the other is not? Such 
a view is, of course, a monumental understatement of the 
transformation that has occurred at this intersection. It is 
a misunderstanding stemming from the belief that self-
awareness is an extrinsic feature that does not affect the 
essential nature of what the awareness is of. This fact 
tends to be ignored in theories of the self. James realizes, 
however, that awareness including self-awareness must be 
regarded as an essential part of the being that is aware. 
The self is a great deal more than its objective 
manifestations in experience; just as, our one traffic light 
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pole is now a great deal more than its neighboring traffic 
light pole. The point we are emphasizing here is this: 
subjectivity itself is also a dimension of the self and is 
not simply the means by which the self is grasped. The 
Jamesian theory of self takes this fact fully into account. 
But even if awareness, including self-awareness, could 
be regarded as a nonessential trait, we must remember that 
for James consciousness is a great deal more than simple 
awareness. For James, consciousness is primarily a selective 
force. It is because of this teleological character of 
consciousness that James places consciousness at the core of 
the self rather than treats it as the means by which we 
become aware of a separate entity called the self. 
Concerning this point Ellwood Johnson comments, "The 
expression 'stream of impulsive thought' is the closest James 
carne to a solid definition of the human self. There is, 
inherent in this expression, the principle that 'will is 
identity.' Whatever it is in consciousness that focuses, 
selects, attends is the individuality of the person." 42 
What does it mean to claim that the self is not totally 
and purely objective? It means, among other things, that no 
particular object is in and of itself necessarily a self or a 
part of a particular self. A body viewed as a physiological 
42Ellwood Johnson, "William James and the Art of 
Fiction," The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 30 
(Spring 1972), p. 286. 
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mass is not even intrinsically a part of a self. If a body 
is regarded as a part of a particular self, it is because 
there is present a consciousness that cares for it. we do 
not care for our bodies because we identify ourselves with 
them, rather we identify ourselves with them because we care 
for them. Thus, even the core of one's objective self is 
constituted as such by a caring attitude of the present pulse 
of subjective thought. It is care which personalizes all the 
elements that constitute the self. 
To deny that one's body is in and of itself personalized 
does seem strange. One is tempted to reply, "If I am 
anything, I am my body." One is also tempted to view James' 
position here as being Platonic. This last temptation should 
be avoided, however, for James is not denying that the body 
comes to form a part of the self or that a self is always an 
embodied self. James is simply claiming that a living body 
per se does not constitute a self, that more is required for 
a self than the existence of a body. In the case of severe 
brain damage, for example, a body may be kept alive by our 
modern, marvelous medical machines for days after its 
personhood had vanished forever. The body does have a 
central and vital role to play in the Jamesian theory of the 
self, but this physiological mass is nonetheless not 
intrinsically personal. It is care which personalizes the 
body, and it is this subjectivized-body which comes to form 
the core of the self. 
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That no particular object is intrinsically personalized 
stems from the fact that the self is not purely objective nor 
purelY subjective. The "I" and the "Me" are only dimensions 
of the self and exist as an "I" and a "Me" only within that 
whole subjective-objective temporal process which is the 
self. The present pulse of thought is an "I," i.e. is 
personalized, only because it cares for and takes a peculiar 
interest in certain of its ejects which thereby becomes its 
"Me." If this did not occur, it would simply be a present 
pulse of anonymous experiencing or what James refers to as 
pure experience. Pure experience is something we can't 
really conceive for being selves we are only familiar with 
ordinary experience which always tends to be personal. The 
objects which come to form one's "Me" are also non-
personalized until they are cared for by the present pulse of 
subjectivity. In short, an "I" and a "Me" can only exist in 
union, that is, only within the subjective-objective temporal 
process which is the self. The "I" and the "Me" are 
dimensions of the self and can have no existence apart from 
that irreducible whole which is the self. The "I" and the 
"Me" can be regarded as abstractions in the sense that they 
are insofar as they are in union. 
The relationship that exists between the dimensions of 
the self is not unlike that relationship that exists between 
space and time in Einstein's Relativity Theory. According to 
Einstein, neither space nor time can exist without the other. 
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our experience is always of space-time. It is impossible, 
saYS Einstein, to conceive of space except against the 
background of time and in terms of it and vice versa. There 
reallY exists neither space nor time, but only space-time. 
one might also say that there exists neither an "I" nor a 
"Me," but only "I"< ,"ME" according to James. 
"I"~"ME" is a kind of shorthand that is meant to 
indicate the process which is the self. Personal existence 
is more complex than even this formula suggests but for the 
time being it can serve as a rough representation of the 
dynamic nature of that irreducible totality known as the 
self. The being which this formula is meant to symbolize we 
shall call self-constituting-historical-existence. This name 
has been chosen because it emphasizes certain essential 
features of selfhood. The self helps to determine its own 
mode of existence and is thus to a certain extent self-
constituting. The word helps here is meant to indicate 
that the self is also formed under the influences of the 
situation within which it acts. The self is historical in 
the sense that it has an accumulative existence for it always 
brings a past to bear on a present. Of course this past is 
always an interpreted past, i.e., a past seen from the 
perspective of the present pulse of subjectivity. The term 
existence refers to the fact that the self does not have 
the being of a thing. A thing simply is or as Heidegger 
would say, it is merely "present-at-hand" or "ready-to-hand." 
This is not so in the case of the self, for it stretches 
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itself out through time by projecting its future in the 
present in light of its past, and this is what we mean here 
by the term existence. To emphasize all these essential 
traits of its being, I have labeled the Jamesian self, self-
constituting-historical-existence. 
In an article titled "A Jamesian Theory of Self," James 
Bayley made the following observation concerning the 
constitution of the self: "More than half a century before 
sartre claimed that human existence precedes human essence, 
James argued that the self is a human creation whose nature 
can be uncovered only by examination of human action. The 
self is what it is known as, or found to be, in 
practice." 43 Unfortunately after this excellent start 
Bayley then proceeds to give a behavioristic reinterpretation 
of the Jamesian self along similar lines begun by Dewey in 
his, "The Vanishing Subject in the Psychology of James ... 44 
It is puzzling to see this kind of comparison to Sartre 
followed by the comment, "'Selfing' is something an organism 
does, just as are breathing and digesting. The self, for 
James, is a doing, not a being." It will become clear in the 
subsequent pages of this study that the self is truly self-
constituting and not merely a "human creation" in the sense 
that it is an organism's adaptation to its environment. 
43James E. Bayley, "A Jamesian Theory of Self" 
Transactions of the Charles Peirce Society, Vol. 12 (Spring 
1976), p. 149. 
44 Dewey, £E· cit. 
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we will now take a brief look at each of the dimensions 
of the self. We will cover both dimensions in greater detail 
in subsequent chapters. Our present aim is to provide the 
reader with an initial rough sketch of the Jamesian self 
before commencing our detailed analysis and argumentation in 
the following sections. 
The objective dimension of the self is the sum total of 
objects for which a particular consciousness has a special 
caring interest. These objects become personalized through 
care. Theoretically, any object can become part of one's 
objective self by creating excitement of an unusual kind in 
the stream of consciousness. There is, however, great 
agreement among people regarding the kinds of objects that do 
in fact enter the field of the personal. 
The objective dimension of the self can be divided into 
three main areas: the material me, the social me, and the 
spiritual me. The material me is composed of all those 
physical objects towards which consciousness takes a special 
caring attitude. The physical body tends to form the nucleus 
of the material me. The social me includes all of those 
images that we believe others carry of us. Much more than 
•sticks and stones," names can hurt because of this social 
character of the self. There is finally the spiritual me 
which actually is not spiritual at all, but is rather one's 
own concrete acts of consciousness taken reflexively as 
objects. These three "me"s together form the objective 
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dimension of the self. The body, according to James, is not 
onlY the central factor in the material me, it lies at the 
core of the whole objective self and serves as its dominant 
source of unity. James discovers in fact, that every object 
that makes up the objective dimension of the self is related 
in some way to that priviledged object called the body. 
Although the objective dimension may be analyzed into three 
•me"s, a self is never purely material or purely social or 
purely spriritual. A self is always material, social, and 
spiritual all at once. We shall examine the objective 
dimension more fully later on, but let us now take an equally 
brief glance at the subjective dimension of the self. 
The present passing pulse of thought is the subjective 
dimension of the self. It is the present caring and acting 
part of the self. It is also the self as knower as opposed 
to the self as known. According to James, the title of "I" 
is passed along by each perishing pulse of thought to its 
successor. This appropriation by each pulse of thought of 
its predecessor makes possible the continuity of the 
subjective dimension and the self as a whole. There is no 
absolute identity in the subject. There is, however, an 
ideal or functional identity established in the subjective 
dimension, in that each present pulse of thought carries the 
title of "I" and functions as an enduring ego. James 
describes this view by borrowing an illustration from Kant. 
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Each thought is thus born an owner, and dies owned, 
transmitting whatever it realized as its Self to its 
own later proprietor. As Kant says, it is as if 
elastic balls were to have not only motion but 
knowledge of it, and a first ball were to transmit 
both its motion and its consciousness to a second, 
which took both up into its consciousness and passed 
them to a third, until the last ball held all that 
the ~Sher balls had held, and realized it as its 
own. 
The nature of this mysterious act of appropriation will 
be examined more fully later on. The point we want to make 
clear here is that for James, the subjective dimension of the 
self is not a body, or a soul, or a transcendental ego, but 
is rather the perishing present pulse of thought itself. It 
should be noted early that one should not let the temporary 
character of acts of consciousness blind one to the crucial 
functions they perform. A comparison with our present view 
of matter might help here. In the area of nuclear physics, 
it is held that there are subatomic particles that exist for 
only a small fraction of a second and these temporary 
entities are viewed as vital to the very existence of 
matter. Why may not the same situation prevail in the mental 
world? The exaggerated importance of permanence has been the 
Plague of Western Philosophical Thought. This is perhaps no 
more evident than in its treatment of the self. We have a 
direct acquaintance with our temporary pulses of thought. 
Perhaps we ought to make sure that these fleeting realities 
4SP . . l r1nc1p es, I, p. 322. 
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can't do the job before we start attributing the work to 
unexperienced entities. James feels they can do the job. 
Later, we will explore more fully how the present pulse of 
thought functions as the subjective dimension of the self. 
Let us now return to our discussion of the whole self. 
The concrete full self involves both of the dimensions 
described above. The self exists as the whole irreducible 
subjective-objective temporal process. Like most of us, 
James uses the term self in various ways, sometimes to 
designate parts of the self and sometimes the whole of the 
self. Despite this, James makes it clear often enough that 
the only real self is the whole self, i.e., this subjective-
objective existence taken as an irreducible whole. 
The dimensions of the self are interdependent, i.e., 
they have a relationship which is reciprocal. The present 
pulse of subjectivity in caring for certain objects 
constitutes the "Me." we will let "I"~"ME" symbolize this 
phase of the process. This constitution of the "Me" does not 
occur in a vacuum. There are many forces influencing the 
creation and conservation of one's objective self. One of 
the major influences here is one's past constituted "Me"s. 
The past constituted "Me"s having been appropriated by the 
present "I," exert an influence on the "I"'s present 
constitution of the "Me." This influence is mainly on a 
subliminal level and "I"f--"Me" symbolizes this phase of the 
Process. Thus, we have a single continuous process that can 
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be roughlY represented by the formula "I~"Me." I say 
roughlj[ represented because the process is in actuality 
-even more complicated than this formula suggest. Until we 
discuss the whole process in detail, however, this formula 
•I·~"ME" can serve as a kind of shorthand for the dynamic 
relationship which exist between the dimensions of the self. 
The ingredients of each of the dimensions are changing, but 
the relationship between the dimensions remains constant. 
The objects that compose the "ME" are fluctuating, and the 
stream of thought itself is a constant flux. Amidst this 
change, the self continues to exist and remain relatively 
stable as a rainbow persists with a certain stability through 
the flux of sunshine and rain. But unlike a rainbow the self 
is not an illusion. On the contrary it is the reality that 
we are closest to and the one reality in terms of which all 
other things are judged to be real or unreal. We call this 
dynamic process, which each of is, self-constituting-
historical-existence for this title does not simplify or 
overlook the vague and ambiguous nature of our existence. 
Such a view of the self does not provide the absolute 
identity that we tend to associate with the self. James 
believes, however, that if we reflect on the history of our 
individual existence, we do not find anything like the 
absolute identity of the pure ego that many of us had assumed 
existed. We find instead, that change and growth are real 
features of the self. I am, for example, no longer the 
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infant I was, and I am not yet the senile invalid I may 
become. According to James, the self is that mixture of 
identity and diversity that we all recognize as forming a 
part of our existence. 
James believed that John Locke had taken a step in the 
right direction when he treated personal identity as the 
identity of which we are conscious, the experience that 
"makes a man be himself to himself." 46 To James, "the 
importance of Locke's doctrine lay in this, that he 
eliminated 'substantial' identity as transcendental and 
unimportant, and made of 'personal' identity (the only 
practically important sort) a directly verifiable empirical 
phenomenon. Where not actually experienced, it is not." 47 
Unfortunately Locke didn't appreciate the full significance 
of his own analysis and retreated back to the substantial 
soul. James, however, realizing fully the breakthrough that 
Locke had made, saw no need to bring in any unexperienced 
entity to account for one's experienced self-identity. As 
Ralph Barton Perry has pointed out, the significance of this 
step lies in the fact that the self takes its place within 
46 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding 
Book II, chap. XXVII, 10. 
47
william James, "Person and Personality," Johnson's 
Universal Cyclopaedia, (1895), VI, p. 539, cited by Ralph 
Barton Perry in In the Spirit of William James, p. 86. 
54 
f . t k . 48 the field o 1 s own now1ng. 
The Jamesian conception of the self that I have sketched 
bere in this section in a rough fashion may appear at first 
glance to portray the self as too mysterious and too 
complicated. James was, however, simply dedicated to 
describing the self as it presents itself in experience. 
James never had a fondness for overly complicated 
explanations and in this regard he was highly critical of 
Kant. He did, however, have a fondness for being totally 
faithful to what is revealed in experience. It was this 
later fondness that resulted in his complex conception of the 
self. He could not ignore the fact that the self presents 
itself as not having the transparent being of a thing. We 
have a natural tendency to treat the self as a thing because 
experience mainly deals with things. We have a similar 
problem with time. This tendency to treat the self as a 
"thing" has led to various reductionistic approaches to the 
self which have tried to reduce it to the body, or the soul, 
or a combination of these two. On the other hand, James 
tried to be faithful to all the experiential features of 
selfhood which together suggest that the self exists in a 
manner quite different from that of a "thing." It is the 
uniqueness of personal existence itself which led to James' 
complex conception of the self. 
48 Ralph Barton Perry, In The Spirit of William James 
(Bloomington, Indiana University Press 1958), p. 86. 
55 
It is important to note here that this interpretation of 
Jaroes' theory of the self happens also to be the kind of self 
that was suggested by his four critiques. All that James 
found lacking in the alternative views of the self can be 
found here in the Jamesian self we have been describing. 
This self is: (1) active and efficacious, (2) historical, 
(3} possessing both objective and subjective aspects, (4) 
mutable and (5) experiencable. 
Although this Jamesian view of the self may appear 
initially as rather strange, it is actually in agreement with 
and is supported by our everyday commonsense views on 
selfhood. we usually do not view the self as being simply 
the physical body, but we also do not view the self as being 
non-bodily. we usually do not view the self as being just 
the present acting pulse of thought, but we also do not view 
this as being outside of the self. We usually do not view 
the self as being simply all of those images that we think 
others have of us, yet we recognize that these images have a 
huge role to play in our experience of selfhood. We usually 
think of the self as something which has more than a 
momentary existence and yet something which is capable of 
change and growth. All of these common opinions regarding 
the self suggest the Jamesian self that we have described 
above as self-constituting-historical-existence. I am not 
here suggesting that we ought to embrace this Jamesian 
conception of the self because it is in agreement with common 
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sense. I am now rather making the more humble claim as 
sishoP Berkeley once did in behalf of his own theory, that 
thiS theory is not as strange and as anti-commonsense as it 
might initially seem. This point will become even more 
apparent in the following sections where this Jamesian 
account of the self will be analyzed and evaluated in greater 
detail. 
PART FOUR 
THE OBJECTIVE DIMENSION OF THE SELF 
Most everything that one is tempted to call "his" tends 
to form a part of the objective dimension of the self. James 
describes the objective self in a very broad manner. One's 
objective self consists of all the objects that one cares 
for. What is called the "ME" is simply a field of care, and 
it can include one's body, past mental activity, clothes, 
house, family, reputation, work, etc. 
One's "me" is never a stable, isolable, self-identical 
thing. It manifests itself differently in different 
contexts. Much more than a body, the objective self is a 
fluctuating material. The objective dimension of the self is 
found by James to be a single network or field composed of an 
interrelated plurality of selves. It does not come fully 
developed. The objective self is constructed in time through 
a process in which care is attached to phenomena which 
generate an intense interest. The body tends to be the first 
object of care but slowly the field of care expands to 
include other objects which have the power to produce in a 
stream of consciousness excitement of a certain peculiar 
sort. Together these objects form the complex field known as 
the objective self. This self-field can be analyzed into 
three distinct areas: (1) the material me, (2) the social 
me, and (3) the spiritual me. The material me refers first 
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to the body which is its central part and then to clothes, 
immediate family, home and other physical objects of care. 
The social me refers to the images that we think others have 
of us, and there are as many social selves as there are 
individuals or groups of people who know us and whom we think 
carrY an image of us in their minds. The spiritual me 
indicates one's inner or subjective being which James calls 
the "home of interests." 49 
49 
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A. THE MATERIAL ME 
The body lies at the core of the material me. "My own 
£od_y" says James "and what ministers to its needs are 
thus the primitive objects, instinctively determined, of my 
egoistic interest." 50 Each of us seem to have a natural 
fondness for our body, clothing, family, friends and the 
objects that we make and own. These items tend to constitute 
in varying degrees one's material me. we have a propensity to 
identify ourselves with these objects to such a degree that if 
one of them is destroyed, we experience a "shrinkage of our 
personality, a partial conversion of ourselves to 
nothingness." 51 
James is making the amazing claim here that his material 
me transcends his physical body. At first glance it appears 
to be a rather strange claim and yet it seems after careful 
analysis to be supported by our common experience of 
selfhood. This expansive view of the material me is, for 
example, able to account for a number of facts of human 
behavior where the welfare of one's own body is subordinated 
to other concerns. Why is the artist willing to endure an 
impoverished existence for the sake of his art? Or why is 
the miser ready to sacrifice everything for the sake of his 
50 Ibid., I, p. 308. 
51 Ibid., I, p. 281. 
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gold? The facts of personal existence suggest that the 
material me does not simply lie under the skin. My total 
material me extends well beyond the boundaries of the 
biological sciences. One's material me is actually a "field" 
of objects centered in the body, stretched out around it in 
space and time. I actually am this whole field united 
through care. 
In a Pluralistic Universe, James descri·bes his expansive 
view of the self in the following manner: 
My present field of consciousness is a centre 
surrounded by a fringe that shades insensibly into a 
subconscious more •••• What we conceptually identify 
ourselves with and say we are thinking of at any 
time is the centre; but our full self is the whole 
field, with all those indefinitely radiating 
subconscious possibilities of increase that we can 
only feel w!2hout conceiving, and can hardly begin 
to analyze. 
The items that compose my material me are all objects of 
natural preference or are associated with such objects. They 
are things that tend to be related to the most vital 
interests of the organism. There exists a natural propensity 
to protect one's body, to care for one's parents, wife and 
children, to find a home and improve it and to make and 
collect things of value. We come to identify ourselves with 
these cherished things. We do it to such an extent that an 
52
william James, A Pluralistic Universe, ed. F. Burkhardt 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), p. 130. 
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attack upon any of them is taken to be as an attack upon 
one's person. You laugh at my attire and you are laughing at 
me. MY child's misdeeds are my shame. You don't appreciate 
my artistic creations and you are ignoring me. Moreover, 
when any of these cherished objects of one's material me 
disappears, one feels a shrinkage of self. James writes, 
•our father and mother, our wife and babes, are bone of our 
bone and flesh of our flesh. When they die, a part of our 
very selves is gone." 53 All the ingredients that go into 
forming one's material me create in one the same feeling of 
care with variations only in intensity. 
Normally, the objects of care that come to compose one's 
material me belong to a special narrow range of things, 
nevertheless in principle any object is a possible candidate 
through care. One might argue that the admission that 
anything could become a part of the self constitutes a 
reductio ad absurdum of the Jamesian view of self. 
Would James admit a baseball team as a possible constituent 
of a self? He would have to, but even though he did, he 
would not be admitting to a reductio. A self that included a 
baseball team would be regarded as strange, but it would 
still be a self for it is an object's power to generate care 
rather than its other characteristics that mark it as part of 
a self. One may at this point argue that though James 
PDsition is not a reductio ad absurdum it is nevertheless 
counter-intuitive. But is it really counter-intuitive? Is 
53James, Principles, I, p. 280. 
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it any more counter-intuitive than the alternatives argued 
against it? Is it really any less implausible to claim that 
the self is a spiritual substance?, or a transcendental ego?, 
or a physical mass? or a packet of memories? From one 
perspective a theory of the self that allows for the 
possibility of a sports team becoming part of a self appears 
ridiculous and yet from another perspective, for example, the 
first person perspective of the sports fan, such a view seems 
not at all at odds with one's lived experience of the field 
of the personal. Does not the enthusiastic sports fan come 
to identify with his team? Isn't his team's victory his 
victory, and his team's defeat his defeat? On a cold 
December Sunday in 1963 the Chicago Bears won the National 
Football League Championship, and this event had no bearing 
whatsoever on my material well being, and yet I was ecstatic 
over it. Why was I so affected by this team's good fortune? 
The answer is quite simple. I had become so intensely 
involved with the Bears that year that they came to form a 
part of my selfhood. I felt ecstatic that Sunday long ago 
because their victory was my victory. If one reflects deeply 
upon one's own personal existence, James' field conception of 
the self does not appear at all counter-intuitive. My 
material me truly transcends the boundaries of my physical 
body. It is this form of transcendence and not the Kantian 
kind that distinguishes the field of the personal from that 
of both the merely physical and the merely organic. 
B. THE SOCIAL ME 
The social ME refers to the recognition we get from 
others. Since you exist in your social relations, you have 
as many different social selves as there are distinct groups 
of persons about whose opinion you care. You are the various 
roles you adopt in your family, your profession and in the 
different organizations of which you are a member. As one 
moves from one social setting to another, there seems to 
occur changes in one's behavior and character. We present, 
for example, a different self to our employees than we do to 
our children. "Properly speaking," says James, "a man has 
as many social selves as there are individuals who 
recognize him and carry an image of him in their mind." 54 
James should have added here after the word "who, n n that he 
thinks" for all social selves are really what we feel others 
think of us and not necessarily what they do in fact think of 
us. James does, however, makes this point clear in other 
passages. 
We identify ourselves with the mental portraits that we 
suspect others are carrying of us to such an extent that we 
feel hurt when these images are tarnished in any way. We do 
it to such a degree that one is tempted to claim that we live 
Primarily in the hearts and minds of others. For some, this 
very notion actually removes some of the sting of death. 
54 Ibid., I, pp. 281-282. 
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There have been many an artist who has labored without 
recognition with the hope that some future generation would 
come to appreciate his genius. All this points to the fact 
that the self is not a monad or as Sartre would say not just 
a being-for-itself but also a being-for-others. 
we often don't appreciate the real importance of these 
images that we think others have of us until we are rejected 
by a friend or especially by a lover. It is mainly on such 
occasions that we realize just how much our very self is 
w.rapped up in these images. A rejected lover contemplates 
suicide because he feels that a good part of himself is 
already dead and gone. James describes this special social 
self in the following manner: 
The most peculiar social self which one is apt to 
have is in the mind of the person one is in love 
with. The good or bad fortunes of this self cause 
the most intense elation and dejection --
unreasonable enough as measured by every other 
standard than that of the organic feeling of the 
individual. To his own consciousness he is not, so 
long as this particular social self fails~o get 
recognition, and when it is regggnized his 
contentment passes all bounds. 
One's honor is another kind of social self. It refers 
to one's image in the eyes of his fellow colleagues. It 
measures how well one lives up to a particular standard of 
conduct associated with one's station in life. It is this 
social self that tends to discourage soldiers from crying, 
55Ibid., I, p. 282. 
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professors from writing trashy novels, and priests from going 
to the race track. This social self is often referred to as 
"club-opinion." James notes that it carries a great deal of 
force in everyday life. "The thief must not steal from other 
thieves; the gambler must pay his gambling debts though he 
pay no other debts in the world." 56 
The significance of this particular social self called 
honor was recognized recently in our political history. In 
pardoning President Nixon, President Ford argued that the 
loss of his honor would be more punishing to former President 
Nixon than any prison sentence. The argument found 
acceptance only among those who recognized the importance of 
this particular social self in one's being as a person. The 
true significance of it is perhaps only fully recognized by 
those who have experienced at one time a fall from grace. 
John Locke was also familiar with the significance of 
this particular social self called honor. He states in his 
Essay, 
Solitude many men have sought and been reconciled 
to; but nobody that has the least thought or sense 
of a man about him can live in society under the 
constant dislike and ill opinion of his families and 
those he converses with. This is a burden too heavy 
for human sufferance: and he must be made up of 
irreconcilable contradictions who can take pleasure 
in company and yet be insensibs7 of contempt and 
disgrace from his companions." 
56 IbJ.'d., I 283 ' p. . 
57 John Locke, Essay, book II Ch XXVIII, sec. 12. 
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The importance of the social ME in the experience of 
selfhood should not be underestimated. Many a man has 
sacrificed his bodily existence for the sake of preserving 
hiS image in the minds of his comrades. The much talked 
about "peer pressure" indicates the enormous influence of a 
particular social ME on one's behavior. In a recent popular 
poll of the greatest fears of man, it was found that "fear of 
death" lagged far behind "fear of public speaking." This 
suggests that most of us are often more concerned about our 
social ME than our material ME. We tend to preserve at all 
cost the positive images that we think others have of us for 
they form a huge part of our experience of selfhood. This is 
why so many of us are ready to risk bodily harm in defense of 
our good name when someone attacks us merely with words. 
The social character of the Jamesian self has been 
ignored for the most part or treated very briefly by Jamesian 
scholars. 58 Even John Dewey who held that selves have no 
existence save for environing conditions failed to note in 
his interpretation of the Jamesian self that for James the 
"environing conditions" are primarily social in character. 
While Dewey stressed the organic specification of the "Self 
of selves," he did not attend to the social specification 
58The two most notable exceptions to this are John 
Wild, The Radical Empiricism of William James, op. cit. and 
Henry S. Levinson, Science, Metaphysics and the Chance of 
~lvation: An Intrepretation of the Thought of William 
~ames (Dissertation series - American Academy of Religion; 
no · 2 4 ) 19 7 8 . 
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that occurred in the very same paragraph of the Principles 
£f psychology: " ••• the innermost of the empirical selves 
of a man is a Self of the social sort ...... 59 As we shall 
make clear in part seven of this study, the social feature of 
the Jamesian self is no less fundamental than its agency or 
its temporality. No self, in James' view, is devoid of 
social significance. 
In James' writings, the social me is recognized as a 
vital part of the objective self. All of us have a need to 
be noticed and noticed with admiration and approval. This is 
why total isolation is often considered the worst form of 
punishment. The images that we believe others have of us do 
indeed constitute a considerable part of our feeling of 
selfhood. We are to a great extent the roles that we assume 
in society. Nevertheless, for James the objective self is 
not merely social in nature for there is beside the social 
ME, a material ME and a spiritual ME. It is to the spiritual 
ME that we must now turn. 
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C. THE SPIRITUAL ME 
The third area of the objective dimension of the self is 
what James calls the spiritual self. The term is quite 
misleading for the spiritual ME is not a spiritual substance 
at all but is rather what we experience when we try to catch 
our mental activity in process. The spiritual ME for James 
is one's psychic powers or dispositions taken concretely. To 
be more precise, it is one's past subjectivity viewed as an 
object. It is not the principle of personal unity, the pure 
I, and it is not the soul. 
James describes the spiritual ME as "the self of all the 
other selves," "the sanctuary within the citadel" and "the 
innermost center within the circle." It presents itself as 
an active element of experience. James writes, 
It is what welcomes or rejects. It presides over 
the perceptions of sensations, and by giving or 
withholding its assent it influences the movements 
they tend to arouse. It is the home of 
interest ••• It is the source of effort and attention, 
and the plac5 0from which appear to emanate the fiats 
of the will. 
A certain ambiguity surrounds James' description of the 
Spiritual ME. On certain occasions, he seems to be 
identifying the spiritual ME with the "I" or subject of 
experience. For James, however, the spiritual ME is not the 
60
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subject of experience, and such a view is really a 
misinterpretation of the Jamesian self motivated in part by 
James uncautious description of the spiritual ME. We must 
keep in mind that James began his discussion of the spiritual 
ME by stating unambiguously, "By the Spiritual Self, so far 
as it belongs to the Empirical Me, I mean a man's inner or 
subjective being, his psychic faculties or dispositions, 
taken concretely; not the bare principle of personal Unity or 
•pure' Ego, which remains to be discussed." 61 
we should also not forget that he began his chapter on 
the self by stating, 
The constituents of the Self may be divided into two 
classes, those which make up respectively - (a) the 
material Self; (b) the social Self; <g~ the 
spiritual Self; and (d) the pure Ego. 
These words of James make it clear that the spiritual 
self is not the same as the subject of experience. The two 
classes which James refers to here are (1) the empirical self 
made up of (a) the material ME (b) the social ME and (c) the 
spiritual ME and (2) the pure Ego which is subjectivity 
itself. These two classes are what we refer to as the 
objective and subjective dimensions of the self. 
The spiritual ME is part of the empirical self and as 
such 1' t · · 1 b · · 1s ent1re y o ]ect1ve. It is an object for the 
present pulse of consciousness and is not itself the present 
61 Ibid., I, p. 283. 
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pulse of consciousness. Past pulses of consciousness can be 
grasped as objects by a reflective act of the present pulse 
of consciousness. These past acts of consciousness are all 
part of the spiritual ME and the objective dimension of the 
self. The present pulse which is doing the reflecting is on 
the other hand not an object and not part of the spiritual 
self as yet, but is presently functioning as the subjective 
dimension of the self. One might say that the spiritual ME 
is a collection of the past "I's" for the present "I." A 
transformation occurs, however, to the "I" as it recedes into 
the past and becomes a mere object for a new "I." In this 
process it ceases to function as an "I." Thus, when we grasp 
it in reflection, we are not really grasping the "I" at all 
for the present subject of experience remains by its very 
nature beyond our grasp. Our predicament is like that of 
grasping a snowflake to examine its intricate structure. 
With the grasp it ceases to be a snowflake and becomes 
something else, a drop of water. The same is true of 
subjectivity. In objectifying it, we transform it. The 
spiritual ME is objectified subjectivity as the drop of water 
is a melted snowflake. 
As the function of all objectification, consciousness is 
itself necessarily pre-objective. As the indispensable 
subjective condition for all objectification, it is itself 
beyond objectification and remains always the pre-reflective 
awareness "that," which is the experiential condition of all 
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·refleXive awareness of "what." James writes, 
The present moment of consciousness is thus, as Mr. 
Hodgson says, the darkest in the whole series. It 
may feel its own immediate existence -- we have all 
along admitted the possibility of this, hard as it 
is by direct introspection to ascertain the fact --
but nothig~ can be known about it till it be dead 
and gone. 
The above facts become very important when James goes on 
to discover that the spiritual ME is mainly a feeling of 
embodiment. Some interpreters of James believing that the 
spiritual self is the subject of experience feel that James 
has reduced the subject to the physical body and that he is 
really presenting a behavioristic view of the self. What 
James is saying here, however, is that subjectivity manifest 
itself objectively in reflection as an embodied 11 I 11-ness. In 
other words, in reflection the body is felt as the vehicle of 
consciousness. Consciousness is not denied and James is no 
materialist. 
Failure to note and appreciate James' distinction 
between the spiritual me which is specified primarily in 
terms of bodily movement and the 11 I 11 which is specified 
exclusively in terms of the present pulse of consciousness 
has fostered behavioristic interpretations of the Jamesian 
self and charges that James was a materialist. John Dewey 
and James Bayley, for example, have each emphasized what they 
regard as the behavioristic character of James' account of 
63 Ib1"d., I 323 , p. . 
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64 the self. Even George Santayana failed to recognize the 
breakthrough that James had made. Santayana wrote in his 
review of the Principles "Professor James ••• has here outdone 
the materialists themselves." 65 
Now that we have made clear that the spiritual ME is not 
the present subject of experience, let us examine more 
closely James' positive description of it. We pointed out 
above that it is our psychic power or dispositions taken 
concretely in reflection. It is what we feel when we try to 
catch our own subjectivity in introspection. In 
introspection, James finds that it is difficult for him to 
discover any purely spiritual element. In his efforts to 
catch the source of effort and attention, he finds himself 
grasping some corporeal event occuring mostly in his head. 
James writes, 
Whenever my introspection glance succeeds in turning 
round quickly enough to catch one of these 
manifestations of spontaneity in the act, all it can 
ever feel distinctly is some bodily pro~gss, for the 
most part taking place within the head. 
Let me repeat, what is involved here is no denial of 
thought or emotions, but rather the more modest claim that we 
are unable to grasp these in reflection as being nonbodily or 
64 Dewey, op. cit., and James Bayley, "A Jamesian 
Theory of Self," Transactions of the Charles Peirce Society, 
Vol. 12, pp. 148-165, (Spring, 1976). 
65 George Santayana, Atlantic Monthly, 67 (April 1891), 
p. 555. 
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completely psychical. The body is always felt as the vehicle 
of consciousness. 
Andrew Reck shares this view. Although he recognizes 
that James' analysis of the spiritual self returns to the 
bOdY for its primary meaning, he points out that this does 
not mean that James is embracing a reductive behaviorism. 
Reck notes that there remains in James' account two foci. 
The present passing thought is the first focus. The 
experienced-body which always accompanies thought is the 
second focus. "The passing Thought is the self as thinker. 
The Body is the self as the object of all physical and mental 
processes." 67 In other words, selfhood entails two 
inseparable dimensions for the self is an irreducible 
subjective-objective temporal process. 
In his own introspective glance James discovers vague 
feelings of something more than the experience of 
embodiment. Is this vague feeling the feeling of 
subjectivity itself? At this point James leaves it an open 
question. He writes, 
••• there is an obscurer feeling of something more~ 
but whether it be of fainter physiological 
processes, or of nothing objective at all, but 
rather of subjectivity as such, of thought become 
'its own object,' must at present remain an open 
question ••• Farther than this we cannot as yet go 
clearly in out8 analysis of the Self's constituents. 
67 Reck, £E· cit. p. 311. 
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In the above quote we find a hint of his later claim 
that although we can't have "knowledge about" we can have a 
feeling of or "knowledge by acquaintance" of our own 
subjectivity. He leaves the issue an open question here 
because his discussion now is of the empirical self only 
i.e. the self that we can have "knowledge about" and not mere 
"knowledge by acquaintance." In saying "Farther than this we 
cannot as yet go" he is suggesting there will be a deeper 
penetration of this issue when he comes to discuss the 
subjective dimension of the self. 
But here in his discussion of the objective dimension of 
the self James is exploring the structure of the lived-body 
in a way that anticipates the work of Merleau-Ponty 
in The Phenomenology of Perception. It was not the body of 
physiology, the mere mass of matter extended in space, that 
James saw as forming the spiritual me. It was rather the 
moving, living conscious body which James regarded as the 
spiritual ME. The body of physiology creates less of that 
peculiar interest we described earlier, and so forms a part 
only of the material ME and does not belong to what James 
calls "the sanctuary within the citadel" i.e. the spiritual 
ME. We must now take a closer look at this spiritualized-
body to see how it functions as the heart of the entire 
objective dimension of the self. 
D. THE ME AS A FIELD OF CARE CENTERED IN THE LIVED-BODY 
The material ME, the social ME and the spiritual ME 
together form a single unified field which we call the 
objective dimension of the self. At the center of this self-
field is the lived-body. James found that though the various 
"ME"s which form the objective dimension of the self are not 
all reducible to my physical body, each does carry as part of 
its meaning a reference to my lived-body. He writes, 
••• each human mind's appearance on this earth is 
conditioned upon the integrity of the body with 
which it belongs, upon the treatment which that body 
gets from others, and upon the spiritual 
dispositions which use it as their too1, 6~nd lead it either towards longevity or destruction. 
James believes that one's body can never be perceived as 
just another object of consciousness. We know it first of 
all by "direct sensible acquaintance." 70 It is never felt 
as an isolated thing. "Never is the body felt all alone, but 
always together with other things." 71 The body lying at 
the center of the self's objective dimension is never 
experienced apart from the experienced-world. This lived-
body is inseparably linked to the lived-world. In all this, 
James anticipates the work of the French phenomenologist 
Merleau-Ponty. 
69 Ibid. , I, P· 307. 
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James insists that the body is concomrnitantly 
experienced with every object of experience, and it is that 
object in terms of which other objects are themselves located 
and objectified with respect to one another and with respect 
to the subject of experience. For James, the body is the 
core of experience and the origin of reality. He writes, 
The world experienced (otherwise called the 'field 
of consciousness') comes at all times with our body 
as its centre, centre of vision, centre of action, 
centre of interest ••• The body is the storm centre, 
the origin of co-ordinates, the constant place of 
stress in all that experience-train. Everything 
circles round it, and is felt from its point of 
view. The word 'I' then is primarily ' 2noun of position, just like 'this' and 'here'. 
James notes that words like 'here' 'now' and 'this' 
imply a systematization of things with references to a focus 
of action and interest of the subjectivized-body. "Where the 
body is 'here'; when the body acts is 'now'; what the body 
touches is 'this'; all other things are 'there' 'then' and 
'that' ." 73 
For James, a thing is viewed as real when it is known in 
a fringe of relationships, the main one being a practical 
relationship to one's body. If an object is so fringed, it 
is regarded as part of the same world inhabited by one's 
body. We believe in the reality of an object when we feel 
that the object belongs to the past, present or future of the 
72 James, Essays in Radical Empiricism, ed. F. Bowers 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), p. 86n. 
73Ibid. 
77 
same spatial-temporal field as our body. This view put forth 
in the Principles of Psychology later became a central 
feature of James' pragmatic theory of meaning and truth. 
James maintains that some awareness of the body 
accompanies all awareness. There is always some nonfocal 
awareness of one's body. Since the body is in the fringe of 
all experiences, there is always a marginal prereflective 
continuous sense of personal existence. 
There are at least six reasons why James regards the 
body as the objective center of the Self-Field: (1) the self 
of selves, i.e., the spiritual self is discovered to be 
primarily the experience of embodiment: (2) all the selves 
whether material, social or spiritual carry as part of their 
meaning a reference to the body: (3) the body is that 
persistent object in the field of experience which makes the 
judgment of self-identity possible: (4) the body is required 
for the appropriation of past acts of consciousness: (5) the 
body is the first and also the most intimate and the most 
interesting object in the whole field of care known as the 
ME: (6) the wider self is built up around and knitted to the 
body and other objects tend to become interesting 
derivatively through it. 
Some of these reasons we have already touched upon and 
the others we will discuss in detail when we deal with the 
concrete full self and the constitution of the ME. For now 
we merely want to make it clear that for James the body 
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serves as the center of the objective dimension of the self. 
Although we can't over emphasize the importance of the 
bOdy, we must nevertheless keep in mind that it occupies only 
the center of the self-field which is irreducible to it or to 
anything else. This self-field is a field of objects that 
are related by being cared for. The objective dimension of 
the self is simply the totality of the cared-for. We must 
also remember that the cared-for exist as cared-for only by 
virtue of th~ caring. Caring is a function of the present 
pulse of subjectivity. A self is the irreducible unity of 
these subjective and objective dimensions. We must not, 
therefore, stop our analysis of the Self (as many have) with 
our description of the field of care and the function of the 
body. 74 We must also examine the caring for the caring 
itself is not something outside the self but is perhaps the 
most personalized part of the self. A Self is the dynamic 
unity of the caring present and the cared-for. It is that 
totality that we represent symbolically as I< ~ME and which 
~ call Self-constituting-Historical-Existence. It is to the 
caring-present that we must now turn. 
here. 
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PART FIVE 
THE SUBJECTIVE DIMENSION OF THE SELF 
our focus now shifts to that aspect of the self that is 
often referred to as the subject of experience. In our 
investigation of the subjective dimension of personal 
existence we will be exploring James' theory of consciousness 
with special attention devoted to its unity, temporality, 
activity and its caring character. 
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A. THE FIVE TRAITS OF THOUGHT 
James believes that the first fact that all psychologists 
111ust accept is "that thinking of some sort goes on."
75 
James uses the word thinking here to cover all forms of 
consciousness. In his exploration of how thought goes on, 
James discovers that it has five fundamental characteristics. 
It is personal, changing, sensibly continuous, cognitive and 
selective. He writes, 
(1) Every thought tends to be part of a personal 
consciousness. (2) Within each personal 
consciousness thought is always changing. (3) 
Within each personal consciousness thought is 
sensibly continuous. (4) It always appears to deal 
with objects independent of itself. (5) It is 
interested in some parts of these objects to the 
exclusion of others, and welcomes or rejects -
choose, 6from among them, in a word - all the while. 
James' chapter on the stream of thought in the 
Principles of Psychology is perhaps just as important for a 
correct understanding of the Jamesian self as his subsequent 
chapter that deals exclusively with the self. Interpreters 
of James' conception of the self tend, however, not to give 
sufficient emphasis to this chapter that deals with the 
nature of consciousness. To ignore this chapter, however, is 
75P ' . 1 I 219 r1nc1p es, , p. . 
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to ignore our best clues regarding the subjective dimension 
of the Jamesian self. 
THE FIRST TRAIT OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
what does James mean when he states, "Every thought tends 
to be part of a personal consciousness?" This first trait of 
thought means primarily that no thought has an isolated 
existence and each thought belongs with only certain other 
thoughts. The thoughts I have belong with other thoughts 
that I have and the thoughts that you have belong with other 
thoughts that you have. Between individuals there is no 
sharing of pulses of subjectivity. James insists that the 
existence of personal selves can not be doubted by any 
psychology for the universal fact is not "thoughts exist" but 
"I think". Each single thought always forms a part of an 
individual personal consciousness. It is absurd to talk of 
thoughts apart from the self. Even so called subconscious 
thought is not really a case of nonpersonal thought for such 
modes of consciousness are either on the fringe of the main 
self or they belong to secondary selves. Every thought is 
owned. The basic fact of subjectivity is not thought or this 
thought or that thought but "my thought." 77 The law of 
consciousness is "absolute insulation and irreducible 
Pluralism. n 78 
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James believes that the ultimate source of the notion of 
personality lies with the stream of thought. To refuse to 
personifY the stream of thought would be foolish for it is 
already personified. James feels that the biggest error a 
psychology can commit is to interpret the stream of thought 
in a reductionist manner so as to steal from this stream its 
personal quality. My thinking is not merely one of the many 
activities that I perform. I am my thinking. I exist 
through it and when it ceases irretrievably so do I. "I 
think therefore I am," is true because this thinking is to a 
great extent what I am, and yet I am even more than this. I 
am more because I am a being that has both a subjective and 
an objective dimension. 
The subject of experience is not something behind the 
stream of thought like a soul or transcendental ego. James 
insists that the present segment of the stream of thought 
functions as the subject. Here is the "I" of experience, and 
besides this present pulse of thought, there is no other "I" 
nor is there a need for one. 
The precise meaning of the first trait of thought will 
not be made totally clear until we have completed our 
explanation of the Jamesian self. When James discusses this 
first fundamental characteristic of the stream of 
COnsciousness, he also warns the reader that what he means 
When he says consciousness always tends to be personal will 
not become clear until he has finished his analysis of the 
Self. 
THE SECOND TRAIT OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
constant change is the second fundamental characteristic 
of consciousness. This second trait of thought does not mean 
that there is no duration to mental states. To say that 
thought is constantly changing means for James that no mental 
state once gone can return and be identical with what it was 
before. The same pulse of consciousness never returns 
although the same object may come back repeatedly. James 
rejects Locke's notion of mental atoms for there is no proof 
at all that we ever encounter the same thought twice. James 
subscribes to a temporalist conception of consciousness 
according to which it is a constant flux. He sees no 
evidence for the static atoms of thought and feeling of the 
associationists. The intentional activity of feeling, 
thinking, desiring, etc. is never exactly the same on two 
different occasions even if it is dealing with the same 
object on these occasions. 
The principal reason James rejects the notion of a 
recurring mental state is that he feels experience is 
transforming us constantly and thus our mental reaction to 
any thing is a function of our entire experiential history up 
to that point in time. The significance of this fact will 
become prominent when we come to discuss the historical 
character of the self. continuous change in consciousness is 
thus related to the ever present influence of accumulative 
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sedimentation of experience within consciousness. A thing 
once experienced, such as a statue, is never experienced 
exactly the same when it is encountered again, for one's 
initial encounter will influence how one experiences it when 
it comes again. An object is always experienced within a 
context and any previous experiences of it forms a part of 
this context. James writes, 
Every thought we have of a given fact is, strictly 
speaking, unique, and only bears a resemblance of 
kind with other thoughts of the same fact. When the 
identical fact recurs, we must think of it in a 
fresh manner, see it under a somewhat different 
angle, apprehend it in different relations from 
those in which it last appeared. And the thought by 
which we cognize it is the thought of it in those 
relations, a thought suf7~sed with the consciousness 
of all that dim context. 
The same object is being thought of at different times by 
pulses of consciousness that are not the same. James regards 
the notion of a permanently existing idea which keeps 
returning to consciousness as being as mythical as the Jack 
of Spades. This second trait of thought will become 
important later on in our discussion of the role of the sense 
of sameness in the experience of selfhood. The sameness that 
we encounter is always the sameness of the object and not the 
sameness of the acts of consciousness. James declares, 
" ••• it would certainly be true to say, like Heraclitus, that 
we never descend twice into the same stream." 80 
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THE THIRD TRAIT OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
consciousness does not reveal itself as chopped up in 
bits. It doesn't appear in reflection as a chain of thoughts 
but rather as a stream of thought. In the following words 
James expresses the third trait of consciousness: "Within 
each personal consciousness, thought is sensibly 
continuous." 81 This character of thought means two 
things. It means. first of all, even in the case of time-
gaps, the consciousness before the gap is felt as belonging 
with the consciousness after the gap and both are viewed as 
parts of the same self. Secondly, it means that there are no 
absolutely abrupt changes in the quality of consciousness 
from one moment to the next. 
Like time itself consciousness is continuous. James 
believes this fact is often missed because one tends to treat 
the thoughts themselves as if they were the same as the 
things of which the thoughts are aware. The acts of thought 
which are subjective facts are very different from the 
objects that they manifest. James states, 
The things are discrete and discontinuous: they do 
pass before us in a train or chain, making often 
explosive appearances and rending each other in 
twain. But their comings and goings and contrasts 
no more break the flow of the thought that thinks 
them than82hey break the time and the space in which they lie. 
Blibid., I, p. 231. 
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Between the thought of one thing and another thing there 
iS no fissure in consciousness. Consciousness involves 
besides substantive states, transitive states which are the 
transitional states for consciousness as it goes from 
focusing upon one thing to focusing upon another. James 
points out that the transition is as much a part of 
consciousness as a joint in a bamboo is a part of the bamboo 
and not a break in the wood. 
James believes that there is no break in consciousness 
because there is always an awareness of the recent past in 
the present pulse of consciousness. For example, one never 
experiences thunder pure, for there is always the awareness 
of the previous silence and thus what one really experiences 
is "thunder-breaking-upon-silence-and-contrasting-with-
it."83 Because of this continuous retention of the recent 
past in the present pulse of consciousness, there is never 
any absolutely abrupt changes in the quality of consciousness 
from one moment to the next. 
This third trait of consciousness means that one has not 
only an awareness of things but also feelings of relations, 
most of which are unnamed. James believes there exist 
feelings of "and," "if," "but" and "by" but we tend to 
overlook these transitive states of consciousness in favor of 
the objects that these relations connect. Our language with 
its bias towards the substantive parts makes it easy to 
ignore our anonymous transitional states. James reminds us, 
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however, that namelessness is compatible with existence. 
surrounding every image, there is always a vague 
consciousness of the sphere to which it is intended to 
belong. These transitive states are what gives meaning and 
direction to the stream of consciousness as it moves from 
attending to one thing to another. 
Feelings of relations of transition and feelings of 
relations of tendency are often ignored because our knowledge 
of them is a knowledge by direct acquaintance rather than a 
knowledge about and because we have no precise names to cover 
each of their kind. James wants to reinstate the vague to 
its proper place in our mental life. He writes, 
This is all I have to say about the sensible 
continuity and unity of our thought as contrasted 
with the apparent discreteness of the words, images, 
and other means by which it seems to be carried on. 
Between all their substantive elements there is 
'transitive' consciousness, and the words and images 
are 'fringed,' ~id not as discreet as to a careless 
view they seem. 
The unity of consciousness that results from a process of 
continuous appropriation is a real unity. James insists that 
all the pulses of consciousness melt into each other like 
dissolving views. "Properly they are but one protracted 
consciousness, one unbroken stream." 85 
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THE FOURTH TRAIT OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
"Human thought appears to deal with objects independent 
of itself; that is, it is cognitive, or possesses the 
-~nction of knowing." 86 This is how James describes the 
fourth character of thought. This trait of consciousness 
entails two things: (1) the thought and its object are not 
one and the same and (2) the thought itself is the thinker. 
James does not regard thought and feeling as total 
opposites. "From a cognitive point of view, all mental facts 
are intellectious. From the subjective point of view, all 
are feelings." 87 Both feeling and thought are cognitive 
for both reveal the world. "Acquaintance-knowledge" is given 
through feelings and "knowledge-about" is given through 
thoughts. James believes that knowledge by acquaintance is 
our main access to the real world. He writes, 
All elementary natures of the world, its highest 
genera, the simple qualities of matter and mind, 
together with the relations which subsist between 
them, must either not be known at all, or known in 
this d~Wb way of acquaintance without knowledge-
about. 
James sees knowledge by acquaintance as constituting our 
main reality for two reasons: first, it signifies access to 
86 Ib;d., I 262 ... , p. . 
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our most primitive contact with the world, and secondly, all 
knowledge-about must ultimately refer back to this original 
relation to the world which is disclosed in knowledge-by-
acquaintance. 
This conception of knowledge-by-acquaintance plays an 
important role in the Jamesian theory of the self. The 
present pulse of subjectivity which functions as the "I" only 
feels its existence, it has no knowledge-about with regard to 
itself. With his two types of knowledge, James can thus 
confidently assert the reality of the present "I" while still 
maintaining that it is the "darkest in the whole series" for 
we lack knowledge-about it. 
In his treatment of this cognitive trait of 
consciousness, James points out that it is wrong to believe 
that the reflective consciousness of self is required by the 
cognitive operation of thought. Here James' conception of 
consciousness is in agreement with the view of Sartre 
presented in The Transcendence of the Ego. Consciousness 
according to Sartre is only non-positionally aware of itself 
in the present moment, although past moments of consciousness 
may be made into an object of knowledge through reflection. 
Both James and Sartre reject the notion of a permanent ego 
that dwells in consciousness as its source. There is no 
permanent subject of experience that lies behind 
consciousness. There is only the present pulse of 
consciousness which continuously functions as the "I". 
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Although James finds no evidence for a belief in a 
permanent ego that lies behind consciousness and makes 
consciousness of objects possible, he does believe that one's 
bOdY is continuously felt on the fringe of one's conscious 
field and there is also a vague feeling of the pulse of 
subjectivity itself. So we must be careful here in our 
understanding of James. He is not declaring that one is at 
times lacking a self. On the contrary, James insists that 
one has a continuous awareness of one's own existence but 
this is knowledge by direct acquaintance which is quite 
different from knowledge-about the self which is gained 
through reflection. 
Two more important points that James makes in his 
discussion of the cognitive character of consciousness are as 
follows: (1) the object of each thought is all that the 
thought thinks, exactly as the thought thinks it, and (2) no 
matter how complex the object, the thought of it is one 
undivided pulse of consciousness.89 
When one states "Columbus discovered America in 1492," 
James believes that the object of consciousness is not 
"Columbus" or "America" but is rather the entire sentence 
"Columbus-discovered-America-in-1492." This is the actual 
constitution of the thought. To treat one of its substantive 
elements as the object of consciousness is to falsify the 
thought. "Columbus" might be the topic of this thought, but 
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it should not be regatqed as the object. James recognizes 
the fact that there are time-parts when having this thought 
but he insists there are in the thought no parts 
corresponding to the object's parts. "Whatever things are 
!bought in relation" says James, "are thought from the outset 
!n a unity, in a single pulse of subjectivity, a single 
E?ychosis, feeling, or state of mind." 90 
The above statement is significant for our understanding 
of the relationship between the dimensions of the self which 
we shall soon be exploring in depth. James' position here 
indicates that no matter how complex the objective dimension 
of the self, the subjective dimension remains always a single 
pulse of subjectivity. For all the numerous elements of the 
material me, spiritual me, and social me there is one single 
active and irreducible "I" to which they belong. 
THE FIFTH TRAIT OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
The fifth character of thought refers to the freedom and 
activity of the subjective dimension of the self. It is also 
this trait of consciousness which plays a major role in the 
constitution of the objective dimension of the self. For 
James, consciousness is primarily a selecting agency. James 
describes the fifth trait of consciousness in the following 
manner: "It is always interested more in one part of its 
~ject than in another, and welcomes and rejects, or chooses, 
!!l the while it thinks." 91 
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James believes that consciousness is constantly selecting 
according to its own interest at the time. This selection 
occurs not only in cases of deliberations of the will, but in 
every experience that we have. In every act of perception, 
there is always accentuation and emphasis, and this is the 
work of the selectivity of consciousness. The formation of a 
conceptual order has its basis in the acts of selective 
attention. "Focalization, concentration of consciousness," 
says James, "are of its essence." 92 He writes, 
Out of what is .in itself an undistinguishable, 
swarming continuum, devoid of distinction or 
emphasis, our senses makes for us, by attending to 
this motion and ignoring that, a world full of 
contrasts, of sharp accents, 9~f abrupt changes, picturesque light and shade. of 
For James things themselves are simply a collection of 
sensible qualities which are of interest to consciousness for 
practical or aesthetic reasons and to which we give 
substantive names. The essence of a thing is also grounded 
in the selective attention of consciousness. Essences are 
not Plato's eternal Forms, rather they are simply 
"teleological weapons" that we employ to get a handle on the 
given of experience. Guided by its own ends, consciousness 
determines which sensations shall be regarded as real and 
Valid. James writes, 
92Ibid., I, pp. 381-382. 
93 Ibid., I, p. 274. 
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The mind, in short, works on the data it receives 
very much as a sculptor works on his block of 
stone. In a sense the statue stood there from 
eternity. But there were a thousand different ones 
beside it, and the sculptor alone is to thank for 
having extricated this one from the rest. Just so 
the world of each of us, however different our 
several views of it may be, all lay embedded in the 
primordial chaos of sensations, which gave the me9~ 
matter to the thought of all of us indifferently. 
James believes that the selective action of consciousness 
is most obvious in the area of ethics. In discussing the 
choice that consciousness makes in the field of ethics, James 
rejects Schopenhauer's notion that with a given fixed 
character only one reaction is possible under given 
circumstances. James says that Schopenhauer forgets that in 
the case of moral decision, what is being decided _is the very 
structure of one's character itself. In significant ethical 
situations, the question is not merely what action shall I 
now take but also and more importantly, what being shall I 
now choose to become. This view of self transformation plays 
a vital role in James' discussion of sudden religious 
conversions in The Varieties of Religious Ex~rience. 
James believes that to a great extent we choose our "ME." 
The specific character of the objective dimension of the self 
is determined by the selectivity of consciousness. James 
notes that there is great similarity in a general way 
94 Ib1.'d., 277 I I p. . 
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concerning the selections that each human consciousness 
makeS. There is a strong concensus concerning what in 
experience functions as things and what are their essences. 
aut James then describes one mode of conscious selection in 
h "concensus never occurs." whic a James is here referring to 
the selectivity of consciousness that is involved in forming 
one's objective self. He writes, 
There is, however, one entirely extraordinary case 
in which no two men ever are known to choose alike. 
One great splitting of the whole universe into two 
halves is made by each of us; and for each of us 
almost all of the interest attaches to one of the 
halves; but we all draw the line of division between 
them in a different place. When I say that we all 
call the two halves by the same names, and that 
those names are 'me' and 'not me' 
respe95ively, it will at once be seen what I 
mean. 
James could not have stated it any clearer that one's 
•ME" is formed through the selective activity of 
consciousness. The nature of this self constituting process 
will be discussed more fully in the next section. We must 
now examine the temporal structure of the subjective 
dimension of the self. All five characters of the subjective 
dimension of the self owe their existence to the retentional-
Protentional structure of consciousness or what James calls 
the "specious present." It is what makes consciousness a 
stream. 
95 Ib1.'d., I 277 278 , pp. - . 
B. APPROPRIATION AND TEMPORALITY 
James believes that self-identity, like the identity of 
ObJ'ect of consciousness, rests on the power of anY 
consciousness to cognize the same object. For James, the 
sense of sameness forms the basis of the experience of 
(identical) things including those things which come to 
1 "ME n canpose one s • This sense of sameness is in turn 
grounded on the retentional-protentional character of 
consciousness, i.e., in the temporality of consciousness. It 
is this temporal structure of consciousness that allows for 
the lived appropriation of each pulse of consciousness by its 
successor. 
As we noted above, two of the traits of consciousness are 
that it is constantly changing and sensibly continuous. In 
James' chapter on time, these two characteristics of thought 
are further explained. There is a persistent stream of 
consciousness despite the transitions due to the fact that 
the present pulse of subjectivity appropriates its 
predecessor and projects its successor. Without this 
Operation we would be unable to speak of a stream of 
consciousness. "The knowledge of some other part of the 
!!ream, past and future, near or remote," says James, "is 
!!ways mixed in with our knowledge of the present thing." 96 
96 Ib1'd., I 571 , p. . 
95 
96 
James realizes that the experience of sameness would be 
impossible if our perception of time was simply an awareness 
of a succession of now points. He believes that the present 
moment is not a point of timei it has thickness. He writes, 
In short, the practically cognized present is no 
knife-edge but a saddle-back, with a certain breadth 
of its own on which we sit perched, and from which 
we look in two directions into time. The unit of 
composition of our perception of time is a 
duration, with a bow and a stern, a9 7it were, a 
rearward and a forward-looking end. 
This doctrine of the temporal fringe of consciousness was 
not confined to James' Principles of Psychology. On the 
contrary, it makes its appearance in a number of his works. 
In A Pluralistic Universe he writes, "If we do not feel both 
past and present in one field of feeling, we feel them not at 
all." 98 In Essays in Radical Empiricism he declares that 
the identity of each personal consciousness is based on the 
fact that each new experience has past time for part of its 
'content•.99 James regards the temporal fringe as the 
everlasting peculiarity of the life of consciousness. 
James' "specious present" makes possible both reflection 
and the sense of sameness, both of which are required for 
self-consciousness. It is the retention of the recent past 
in the lived-present which provides our immediate link with 
the past and gives to us the possibility of reflection upon 
97 IbJ.'d., I 574 ' p. • 
98 James, Pluralistic Universe, p. 128. 
99 James, Essays in Radical Empiricism, p. 64. 
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the past stream of experience. The sense of sameness which 
requires the experience of duration also has the lived-
present as its foundation. James noted that a succession of 
experiences is in itself not yet an experience of the 
succession. According to James, the past, to be experienced 
as "past," must be experienced together with the present and 
during the present moment. Thus, the sense of sameness 
requires the temporal fringe. James states, 
These lingerings of old objects, these incomings of 
new are the germs of memory and expectation, the 
retrospective and the prospective sense of time. 
They give that continuity to conscious~00s without 
which it could not be called a stream. 
A discussion of James' theory of the temporality of 
consciousness naturally leads to a discussion of his theory 
of the appropriation of consciousness. It is due to the 
temporal fringe of consciousness that appropriation of the 
recent past is possible. James admits that common sense 
seems to demand for the "Subject" a more real unity than the 
appropriating thought provides. The present thought seems to 
~orne already owning the past thoughts and this suggests 
something like an Arch-Ego which transcends and yet controls 
the entire stream of consciousness. James calls this the 
•never-lapsing ownership" feature of consciousness and he 
believes it can be accounted for without an "Arch-Ego" and 
lOOP . . l r1nc1p es, I, pp. 571-572. 
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without the thought that is the present owner being 
substantially indentical with the thought that was the past 
owner. According to James, there is a continuous 
transmission of ownership such that the title of a collective 
self is passed from one thought to another. The present 
thought is not substantially identical with the preceding 
thought but he does inherit his title of "I" in such a way 
that the past self is always owned by a title that never 
lapses and is constantly being transmitted. James writes, 
Each pulse of cognitive consciousness, each thought 
dies away and is replaced by another. The other, 
among the things it knows, knows its own 
predecessor, and finding it 'warm', in the way we 
have described, greets it, saying: "Thou art mine, 
and part of the same self with me." Each later 
thought, knowing and including thus the thoughts 
which went before, is the final owner - of all that 
they contain and own. Each thought is, thus born an 
owner and dies owned, transmitting whatever it 
reali~ed as 1bis Self to its own later propr1etor. 
The body plays a vital role in this process of 
appropriation. Since the present pulse of subjectivity has 
no knowledge about itself in the present moment, its 
appropriations are projected onto the lived-body which always 
forms a non-focal part of its present object. 102 The past 
stream of consciousness is thus appropriated to the body by 
the present pulse of consciousness with its temporal fringe. 
The body is the kernel to which the past and future 
101 Ibid., I, p. 322. 
102Ibid., I, p. 323. 
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dimensions of the self are appropriated by consciousness. 
of all of James' interpreters, A. J. Ayer gives the most 
elaborate analysis of James' theory of appropriation. Ayer 
is correct in emphasizing the crucial role this process plays 
in personal identity. Nevertheless, Ayer is wrong in 
reproaching James for ignoring the role the body plays in the 
experience of personal identity. According to Ayer, James 
onlY employs the experience of embodiment to account for 
one's present feeling of selfhood. He claims that James does 
not rely on the body in his account of how experiences which 
occur at different times are assigned to the same self. Ayer 
thus concludes, "It is, therefore, to this process of 
appropriation and not the construction [of the body] that he 
looks for the source of personal identity." 103 On this 
point Ayer is mistaken. For James self-identity involves 
both the functional identity of consciousness and the 
constituted identity of the objective self of which the body 
is the core. Moreover the body according to James is 
involved in the process of appropriation itself which is 
responsible for the functional identity of consciousness. 
James' analysis of the subjective dimension of the self, 
then, returns to a discussion of the body, the core of the 
objective dimension of the self. This does not mean that 
James is developing a reductive behavioristic theory of the 
self. It means rather the inseparability of the subjective 
103 h 0 . . f . ( F A. J. Ayer T e r~g~ns o Pragmat~sm, San 
rancisco: Freeman, Cooper & Company, 1968), p. 254. 
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and the objective dimensions of the self. Neither dimension 
iS reduced to the other for there remains for James two 
foci. First, there is the pulse of thought which perishes 
immediately. Second, there is the experience of embodiment 
which is a constant accompaniment of thought. The body 
provides the continuity required for the continuous 
appropriation of one's past mental life and so it serves as 
the objective core of the self. 
C. THE EXISTENCE OF THE "I" AND ITS ACTIVITY 
Do we have an "I" that really exists and is it a real 
agent? After having discussed the five traits of 
consciousness, its temporality, and its acts of self 
appropriation, it should be clear that the answer to both 
questions is yes. There is no substantial soul and there is 
no pure ego, but there is nonetheless an "I" which exist and 
acts. In discussing the selective character of consciousness 
we have already touched upon the activity of the "I". Now we 
must decide if this selectivity means the "I" is truly 
efficacious and the self exists as a real agent in the world. 
Many interpreters of James have regarded the Jamesian 
self as something totally objective. John Dewey was one of 
the first to view James in this light in his article "The 
Vanishing Subject in the Psychology of James." Dewey argues 
that certain passages in the Principles of Psychology suggest 
a reduction of the "subject" to a vanishing point save as 
"subject" is identified with the organism. He concludes his 
article, however, with these words which seem to support our 
~sition on the Jamesian self: 
Nevertheless the dualism reappears, for he still 
assumes that a "passing thought" must be there as the 
knowing subject. Hence after recurring to his 
doctrine that "'perishing' pulses of thought" are 
what know, he makes what on the face of it looks like 
an extraordinary compromise between the "pulse ~04 thought" as ! and the "empirical person" as ME. 
104 John Dewey, 2£· cit., p. 598. 
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This "extraordinary compromise" is what this essay is all 
about. This is precisely what the self is, an extraordinary 
compromise. It is that alleged impossibility which Sartre 
called pour-et-en-soi. For Sartre it is man's impossible 
goal, while for James, it is what each of us already is. 
Each of us is an extraordinary compromise of spontaneity and 
sedimentation. 
James' denial of a permanent substantial subject should 
not be regarded as denying the existence of the "I". The "I" 
exists in the only way an "I" can exist, that is, as the 
present pulse of subjectivity. Each perishing pulse of 
thought functions as an "I" and so the "I" is a reality and 
not just a word or something ideal. 
James admits that the "I" viewed as the thinker, as that 
to which all the concrete features of the objective self 
belong and are known, seems to suggest "a permanent abiding 
principle of spiritual activity identical with itself 
wherever found.• 105 If it wasn't for the reality of 
perishing pulses of consciousness, James points out that we 
would be required to posit an abiding principle, absolutely 
one with itself. Once the reality of passing states of 
consciousness is recognized, however, there is no need to 
believe that the thinker posesses such substantiality and 
permanence. James argues that a functional identity is the 
only sort of identity in the thinker which the facts 
105James, Psychology, Briefer Course (Riverside 
New Jersey: Macmillan Publishing Co. Inc., 1962), p. 202. 
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indicate. He writes, 
Yesterday's and today's states of consciousness have 
no substantial identity, for when one is here the 
other 1s 1rrevocably dead and gone. But they have a 
functional identity, for both know the same objects, 
and so far as the by-gone me is one of those 
objects, they react upon it in an identical way, 
greeting it and calling it mine, and opposing it to 
all the other things they know ••• Successive 
thinkers, numerically distinct, but all aware of the 
same past in the same way, form an adequate vehicle 
for all the experience of personal unity and 
sameness which we actually have. And just such a 
train of s~0gessive thinkers is the stream of mental states •••• 
What all this means is that the "I" exists, but its 
existence is temporary. Through continuous acts of 
appropriation it has, however, a functional identity with all 
the "I"s that preceded it and all the "I"s that will come 
after it. Each pulse of consciousness in its turn will 
function as the subject of experience before passing this 
title to its successor. An "I" which is transitory may seem 
strange to one who believes in the absolute permanent 
identity of the self, but a non-transitory I seems just as 
odd to one who believes in the spontaneity of the self and 
its ability to change and grow. James, needless to say, was 
a firm believer in the latter. 
Following Dewey's lead some Jamesian scholars treat 
James• perishing pulses of thought as merely tools for the 
106
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real subject of experience- the body. 107 These 
interpreters of James assume that if he denies the soul and 
the transcendental ego, he must affirm the body as the 
subject of experience. But in truth the Jamesian subject of 
experience is the present passing thought, and this is why he 
refers to it as the "I". Since the subject of experience has 
been generally regarded by philosophers as something more or 
less permanent, it is easy to understand their hesitancy to 
view the perishing pulse of consciousness as the subject. 
For James, however, the temporary nature of the pulse of 
consciousness does not make it any less real or any less 
active or any less worthy of the term "I". It only appears 
as an unworthy candidate for the term "I" to those who still 
imagine a more permanent "I" like a soul or a transcendental 
ego. James believes his less permanent "I" is better able to 
account for self-becoming and growth and moreover this "I" is 
experiencable. 
In the Psychology, Briefer course James points out that 
the "I" is a much more difficult subject of inquiry than the 
ME. By the "I" James means "that which at any given moment 
is conscious ... lOS The "I" is the Thinker. James then 
ponders the question, what is the thinker? He writes, 
c't ~-
Is it the passing state of consciousness itself, or 
is it something deeper and less mutable? The 
passing state we have seen to be the very embodiment 
of change. Yet each of us spontaneously considers 
107
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that by 'I', he means something always the same. 
This has led most philosophers to postulate behind 
the passing state of consciousness a permanent 
Substance or Agent whose modification or act it is. 
This Agent is the thinker~ the 'state' is only its 
instrument or means. 'Soul', 'transcendental Ego', 
'Spirit', are so1~§ny names for this more permanent sort of Thinker. 
After examining the grounds for admitting a more 
permanent agent then the present pulse of consciousness James 
concludes " ••• we had better cling to our passing 'states' as 
the exclusive agents of knowledge~ •••• " 110 James' reasons 
for taking this position are simple: ( 1) We have no 
experience of any of these alleged "more permanent agents" 
and (2) A "more permanent agent" is not needed to account for 
the facts of our mental life or our sense of personal 
identity. 
For James then the present pulse of consciousness is the 
Thinker and even though this "I" lacks knowledge-about 
itself, it does feel its own immediate existence. 111 This 
present pulse of conscious life is a genuine reality. It may 
be the "darkest in the whole series" but this doesn't mean 
that it cannot feel prereflectively its own existence in the 
very act. Unless the present pulse of subjectivity was so 
aware of itself, it would be unable to appropriate past 
segments of consciousness and view them as warm and intimate. 
109Ibid. 1 p. 196. 
110Ibid. 1 p. 200. 
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consciousness has a non-positional and pre-reflective 
awareness of itself, and so it contains an intrinsic self 
relatedness. The positional awareness of the ME is made 
possible by the non-positional self awareness of the "I". 
It is true that James was critical of the Kantian notion 
that self-consciousness is essential to consciousness. 112 
This does not mean, however, that James is denying that 
consciousness has a non-positional or pre-reflective 
awareness of itself. James simply means that consciousness 
need not objectify itself in knowing its objects. In other 
words, we live through out subjectivity and so directly feel 
it, and even though we may lack "knowledge-about-it" we 
always have knowledge of it by direct acquaintance. 
Some of James• phenomenological disciples tend to ignore 
James' position here. They prefer to read into James the 
transcendental subjectivity of Husser!. John Wild is one of 
James• phenomenological interpreters, however, who recognizes 
the fact that for James consciousness is pre-reflectively 
aware of itself. Wild writes, 
from 
For him James , the passing, present thought knows 
itself directly by acquaintance in the very act of 
knowing and choosing. For the transcendentalist, 
there is no such self-knowledge by direct 
acquaintance. My knowing and choosing can be known 
only as objects, or appearances, by a transcendental 
self that is never united with them. Hence as James 
says: 'the only pathway that I can discover for 
bringing in a more transcendental thinker would be 
to deny that we hiY3 any direct knowledge of the 
thought as such.' 
112 Ib1.'d., I 264 ' p. . 
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A pulse of consciousness is not an object. As Sartre 
pointed out it is not a thing. It is like nothing else. It 
baS its own unique mode of being. It is not simply nothing 
but is rather that reality which we feel most directly. 
since all our knowledge-about deals with objects, it is 
difficult to even discuss that which is the condition of all 
objectification but is itself never an object. One can only 
saY be feels it directly or knows it by direct acquaintance. 
If there is someone who doesn't feel thought going on, we 
can't convince him otherwise. James, like Descartes, takes 
the position that he directly feels his thinking activity and 
if others are like him, they too will feel it. James regards 
this as "the most fundamental of all the postulates of 
psychology. " 114 Even in his famous essay "Does 
Consciousness Exist?" James does not really reverse his 
position on this point as Dewey and others have claimed. 
There James simply denies that consciousness is some kind of 
•thing" or "entity." James writes, "That entity is 
fictitious, while thoughts in the concrete are fully 
real." 115 
In this matter Patrick Dooley and I are in agreement. In 
response to Dewey's claim that James' doctrine of the self 
amounts to an incipent biological behaviorism, Dooley writes, 
114P .. 1 I 185. '• r1nc1p es , p. 
115 James, Essays in Radical Empiricism, p. 19. 
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Undeniably these strains exist in the Principles, 
especially in the sections treating the cephalic 
movements as biological adjustments. However, James 
himself does not deny the existence of the I, the 
thinker. James' concern is to avoid the separation 
of the act of consciousness (I) from its content, 
which is experienced in terms of biological 
adjustment. The thinker is not a timeless, 
transcendental ego but thought in a given time and 
place. James repudiates both the transcendental ego 
and the soul for neither is experienced nor required 
to explain knowing and personal identity. 
Nonetheless he does not go so far as to equate 
thought with116series of behavioral 
adjustments. 
other Jamesian scholars, while not denying James' belief 
in consciousness, have nevertheless placed his pulses of 
thought outside the self preferring to view it as a neutral 
stream of experience. Bruce Wilshire treats James' notion of 
consciousness in this manner. 117 Such an interpretation of 
James conflicts with his explicit position regarding the 
first trait of thought, i.e. that it is personal. In 
refutation of the view that James separates the self from 
consciousness, I offer the following words of James: 
The universal conscious fact is not 'feelings and 
thoughts exist,' but 'I think' and 'I feel' •••• A 
French writer, speaking of our ideas, says somewhere 
in a fit of anti-spiritualistic excitement that, 
misled by certain peculiarities which they display, 
116Patrick Dooley, 2£· cit. pp. 35-36. 
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we 'end by personifying' the processing which they 
make, -- such personification being regarded by him 
as a great philosophic blunder on our part. It 
could only be a blunder if the notion of personality 
meant something essentially different from anything 
to be found in the mental processing. But if that 
processing be itself the very 'original' of the 
notion of personality, to personify it cannot 
possibly be wrong. It is already personified. 
There are no marks of personality to be 
gathered aliunde, 1fRd then found lacking in the train of thought. 
The above quotation suggest to me that though Wilshire 
maY consider it a blunder to regard consciousness as personal 
and a real dimension of the self, James does not. This "fit 
of anti-spiritualistic excitement" is in any case not 
attributable to James. James believes that the quest for a 
nonempirical principle of selfhood only becomes necessary if 
we make the blunder of reducing the stream of consciousness 
to a neutral stream devoid of intrinsic self-relatedness. 
This mis-reading of James may stem from the fact that the 
self has been traditionally treated as if it were a thing 
(material or spiritual or both). To place the present pulse 
of consciousness outside the self is, however, to make the 
self totally passive and all thought anonymous. James is, 
however, adament about viewing the self as active and viewing 
consciousness as personal. James' present pulse of 
consciousness is thus not simply that by which the self is 
apprehended and thus something external to it but rather it 
is the subjective dimension of the self. To isolate 
consciousness from the self is to abolish what James regards 
118 
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as the most distinguishing characteristic of the self, 
purposeful action. The self is for James primarily an 
individual agent, and it is this because one of its 
dimensions is subjectivity or consciousness. 
The self that James describes is one that is active in 
space and time. It is a "fighter for ends" and the source of 
effort, attention and will. A spontaneous, initiating self, 
a self that acts on its own, means a self which is no mere 
object of thought. It suggests a dynamic self which has both 
an objective and subjective dimension. 
Far from "vanishing" the Jamesian subject is not only 
real~ it is also quite active. James believed that personal 
activity is a genuine and irreducible fact. He rejected the 
static pure ego of Kant in order to affirm an active and 
temporal subject. This position of James was not fully 
adopted until after the Principles of Psychology. In his 
later works, James was unambiguous in his affirmation of the 
creative character of self agency. In Essays in Radical 
Empiricism, James concluded that personal activity is 
"just what we feel it to be, just that kind of conjunction 
which our own activity series reveal." 119 
James regards the very essence of consciousness as being 
discrimination. Selective attention is present in all 
perception. Consciousness is forever emphasizing and 
choosing certain features of its object to focus upon. It is 
119James, "The Experience of Activity," Essays.in 
~dical Empiricism, pp. 93-94. 
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always partial, interested, discriminitive and evaluative in 
character. The self is always active because there is always 
·a single pulse of spontaneous selective attention functioning 
as the "I". 
consciousness is not only partial and selective, it is 
for James efficacious. The discriminating selection of 
consciousness does not operate merely on a theoretical level 
but actually affects the course of events in the world. 
James regards the materialists' conception of a superfluous 
consciousness as irrational. Consciousness is no mere 
spectator. Consciousness is always active and embodied. 
we have already discussed James' criticism of the 
automaton theory of the self which treated consciousness as a 
mere epiphenomena. The critique shows that he was familiar 
with all the problems associated with the belief in the 
causal efficacy of consciousness. In his earlier writings, 
James maintained that the issue of determinism couldn't be 
settled on a purely theoretical level. During this period, 
he made a personal choice of indeterminism mainly because of 
ethical considerations. In his later works the activity of 
consciousness is, for James, just as real as the objects 
which it knows. 
As we pointed out earlier, James argues for the efficacy 
Of consciousness on the following grounds: (1) That it is 
directly experienced {ala Descartes). (2) It is the only 
way to account for the enormous correlations between pleasure 
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d beneficial activity and between pain and detrimental an 
activity. (3) It is the only way to account for the enormous 
correlations between the feeling of effort and non-automatic 
responses. 
James did not pretend to be able to explain how 
interaction between consciousness and matter occurs. He 
didn't believe like Descartes that it could be explained in 
terms of the laws of classical mechanics. He knew that his 
~rase "the finger of consciousness" was only a metaphor 
containing no explanatory insight regarding interaction 
~tween the mental and the physical. He did believe, 
nonetheless, that the existing evidence did favor 
interactionism. As for explaining it, James stated: 
That, when the idea is realized, the corresponding 
nerve-tracts should be modified, and so de proche 
en proche, the muscles contract, is one of those 
harmonies between inner and outer worlds, bef~2o 
which our reason can only avow its impotence. 
James admitted we can form no positive image of just how 
a volition affects the cells of the brain. He feels, 
however, that this is no reason to deny causality between the 
mental and the physical. He points out that even though we 
don't have a clear understanding of causality between 
Physical objects we don't reject this type of causality. 
Despite our lack of understanding it, James goes on in the 
120 James, "The Feeling of Effort," Collected Essays 
~Reviews, p. 216. 
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principles of Psychology to point out that the 
-circumstantial evidence points toward the efficaciousness of 
consciousness. He concludes that the belief in it is 
justified by the facts and asserts that the automaton theory 
must give way to the theory of common sense. 121 
In his chapter on the Will in the Principles of 
~ychology, James continued to argue for the efficacy of 
consciousness. Here he illustrated the issue by portraying 
the conflict between a natural inclination and an ideal 
motive as being a battle between a powerful sensual factor 
and a weak ideal force. By itself the ideal motive had no 
chance of overcoming the powerful influence of the sensual 
opponent unless it was supported by personal effort, which 
was an independent factor derived from conscious energizing. 
Symbolizing effort as E, propensity as P, and ideal motive as 
I James wrote: "But the E does not seem to form an integral 
part of the I. It appears adventitious and indeterminate in 
advance." 122 James goes on to contrast our experience of 
making such an effort with our strength, intelligence, and 
other character traits and he concludes: "But the effort 
seems to belong to an altogether different realm, as if it 
were the substantive thing which we are, and those but 
externals which we carry." 123 
121 
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Later in his article "The feeling of Effort" James stated 
hiS position more forcefully. Here he declared the feeling 
of mental spontaneity to be "psychic effort pure and simple," 
and be regards it as "the inward gift of our selfhood." 124 
In his final works, A Pluralistic Universe and Some 
problems of Philosophy, James unhesitantly affirmed the 
-
efficacy of consciousness. Here he spoke of "the everlasting 
coming of novelty into being" 125 that interactionism 
implies. In these works, he treated our activities and 
efforts as genuine ingredients of reality and part of the 
continuous emergence of novelty in the universe. In his 
president's Address before the American Psychological 
Association in December of 1904, James stated, 
I conclude then that real effectual causation as an 
ultimate nature, as a category, if you like, of 
reality, is just what we feel it to be, just that 
kind of 1z~njunction which our own activity-series reveal. 
124 James, "The Feeling of Effort," Collected Essays 
and Reviews, p. 2:04. 
125 James, Some Problems of Philosophy, p. 149. 
126 James, Essays in Radical Empiricism, p. 93. 
D. CARE AS AN ESSENTIAL TRAIT OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
care is of the essence of consciousness and lies at the 
oore of selfhood. Without care there is no self at all. 
selfhood centers around the feeling of care. When this goes, 
so does the self. Where there is total indifference, there 
is no self. 
According to James, our acts of caring are not our own 
because we care for them. This caring itself has no need of 
a principle to make it our own. It is in relation to these 
pulses of feeling and interest that all else becomes our 
own. Since we exist and live through these subjective acts, 
they are our very self in a way nothing else is for they are 
warm and intimate in a manner in which nothing else is. For 
James, caring is the basic mode of self-appropriation, and 
the present pulse of subjectivity functions as the "I" 
because it is primari~y a present pulse of care. As Patrick 
Dooley points out James' acceptance of the present pulse of 
consciousness as the thinker is "grounded in the empirically 
given selective character of consciousness." 127 
The immediate interest or care is for James the real 
meaning of the word "my." "Whatever has it," says James, "is 
!2 ipso a part of me." 128 James is here challenging the 
127Patrick Dooley, ~· cit., p. 42. 
128Jarnes, Principles, I, p. 308. 
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vieW that we must first conceptionally recognize something as 
our own before we can take an interest in it or care for it. 
self-love and self-feeling have no need of a prior conceptual 
awareness of a pure ego. The objects which forms one's ME 
are judged to be our own because we care for them, we don't 
care for them because we judge them to be our own. Things 
don't become a part of one's ME because of some deliberate 
inference; they have a direct and prereflective relation to 
the subjective dimension of the self which cares for them. 
All the things which have the power to produce in the stream 
of consciousness excitement of a peculiar sort form a part of 
. 
one's me and these objects tend to be the kind that affect 
one's welfare and image in the minds of others. 
The mark of the presence of mind according to James is 
purposeful action. The positing of ends and fighting for 
them indicates the presence of consciousness. In the purely 
physical world there are no final causes. Final causes are 
the fruit of consciousness. The given implies no state of 
affairs other than itself. It is only through an evaluation 
of the given in light of some non-existent future state of 
affairs that the given state of affairs can become an 
intuition that motivates one to act. This envisioning of a 
non-existing future state as desirable is possible because 
consciousness is essentially that which cares. Nothing else 
in the physical universe has this property. Consciousness is 
an intentional activity and its intending is based upon its 
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caring. James regards this selectivity of consciousness as 
•one thing which it does, sua sponte, and which seems an 
original peculiarity of its own; •••• "l29 
one way in which consciousness influences behavior is by 
selecting what is present to the individual. The efficacious-
ness of consciousness is rooted in attention, and it is 
interests {practical, aesthetical, ethical and religious) 
that directs consciousness' selective attention. This 
selectivity based on interests is present in all conscious 
states. It operates in sensation, perception, conception, 
reasoning, belief, emotion as well as in voluntary action. 
This continuous selectivity of consciousness based on its 
interests is possible because consciousness is primarily a 
caring process. Choosing occurs always in terms of what is 
regarded as valuable, i.e. what is cared for. This means 
that if an essential trait of thought is its selectivity, 
another primordial trait must be that it cares. Care is what 
the present pulse of subjectivity always is. For James 
consciousness is caring. Here lies the basis for Andrew 
Reck's correct observation that for James will is the generic 
form of all the specific modes of consciousness - attention, 
conception, etc. 130 
What does consciousness care for? The answer to this 
question is that it cares for certain of its objects and 
through this care these objects become its objective self. 
129 James, "Are We Automata?" Mind, 4 (1879), p. 9. 
130 Andrew Reck, £E· cit., p. 307. 
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consciousness cares for its "ME." To be more precise, the 
•I" cares for its "ME" for the present pulse of consciousness 
in caring is already functioning as the "I." It is this 
caring feature of the present pulse of consciousness which 
•akes of it an "I," that is without care there would be only 
an anonymous stream of experience. 
There are many things which interest consciousness and 
which it selects to focus its attention on, but these are not 
all things which consciousness cares for and for which it has 
an intense and enduring interest. In other words, not every 
object that consciousness entertains becomes an element of 
its "ME." Nevertheless, all that is interesting to 
consciousness is so through its relation to what 
consciousness cares for. In other words, the basis of all 
selectivity by consciousness is care. In point of fact 
consciousness cares for the body and those things that are 
intimately related to the body, and together these objects 
form the entire objective self. If consciousness didn't care 
in this way, the body, and with it consciousness, would soon 
cease to exist. James writes, 
Unless our consciousness was something more than 
cognitive, unless it experienced a partiality for 
certain of the objects, which, in succession, occupy 
it~ ken, it c~~ld not long maintain itself in 
ex1stence •••• 
131 James, Psychology, Briefer Course, p. 193. 
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Although the present pulse of consciousness feels its own 
immediate existence, it has no knowledge-about itself and 
thus what it cares for at the moment is not itself but rather 
certain of its objects. In caring for these objects, it 
creates a "ME" and sustains itself in existence as an "I." 
Although past segments of consciousness can be made into an 
object of care, the present pulse of consciousness does not 
have to be made into an object of care for it to be our own 
for the self exist and lives through this process of caring. 
James believes that each object that forms a part of the 
self does so through the medium of care. He holds that this 
is true even of that special object called the body. Through 
care, one's body is part of one's very self. Caring is what 
personalizes the body. According to James one doesn't care 
for one's body because he identifies with it, but rather he 
identifies with it "because he loves it." 132 Our bodies 
lie in our objective field -- "they are simply the most 
interesting percepts there." 133 He notes that what happens 
to our bodies causes in us emotions and tendencies to action 
that are more habitual and energetic than any which are 
excited by any other objects. Although the body always tends 
to be an object of care, James insist that what is the target 
of the caring act is not determined a priori but is solely a 
question of fact. He writes, 
132James, Principles, I, p. 304. 
133Ibid. 
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The phenomenon of passion is in or1g1n and essence 
the same, whatever be the target upon which it is 
discharged; and what the target actually happens to 
be is solely a question of fact. I might 
conceivably be as much fascinated, and as 
primitively so, by the 1l~re of my neighbor's body as by the care of my own. 
In treating the self as a dialectic of caring and cared-
tor, James is in a sense anticipating Heidegger•s notion of 
~orge. In Being and Time, Heidegger argued that the 
being of the individual was care. For Heidegger this care 
referred mainly to the unique temporality of the self. For 
Heidegger the self exists by projecting a future in the 
present in light of its past. The same is true of the 
Jamesian self. The same temporal structure can be seen in 
James• notion of the "specious present" in which all three 
dimensions of time find a place. 
Consciousness in caring changes the given into a motive 
or situation by its ability to evaluate the given in terms of 
some end that does yet exist and which is cared for. Action 
has its basis always in the caring of consciousness. Thus, 
human action from birth to death has its source in the 
process of care which consciousness primarily is. 
There is an ancient Latin fable which Heidegger quotes to 
show that there has always existed a primitive understanding 
Of human existence as a process of care. I think the fable 
is even more relevant to the Jamesian theory of self that we 
are exploring. For this reason, I will quote it at length. 
134 Ib1.'d., I 309 , p. . 
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Once when 'Care' was crossing a river, she saw some 
clay~ she thoughtfully took up a piece and began to 
shape it. While she was meditating on what she had 
made, Jupiter came by. •care' asked him to give it 
spirit, and this he gladly granted. But when she 
wanted her name to be bestowed upon it, he forbade 
this, and demanded that it be given his name 
instead. While 'Care' and Jupiter were disputing, 
Earth arose and desired that her own name be 
conferred on the creature, since she had furnished 
it with part of her body. They asked Saturn to be 
their arbiter, and he made the following decision, 
which seemed a just one: 'Since you, Jupiter, have 
given its spirit, you shall receive that spirit at 
its death~ and since you Earth have given its body, 
you shall receive its body. But since 'Care' first 
shaped this creature, she shall posess it as long as 
it lives. And because there is now a dispute among 
you as to its name, let it be 13~lled 'homo,' for it is made out of humus (earth). 
The most significant line in the fable is: "But since 
•care' first shaped this creature, she shall possess it as 
long as it lives." Note that even in the fable's traditional 
way of taking man as a compound of body and soul the priority 
of care is recognized. Caring is what forms the self and it 
is what personalizes both body and mind. To exist as a self 
is to care about one's objective mode of being. For James, 
as for Heidegger, the self is that being whose very being is 
an issue. A bare logical thinker inside an extended mass of 
flesh would be selfless and not entitled to the name person. 
The fable can be interpreted as suggesting that there are 
three levels involved in the being of a person: the 
material, the organic, and the personal. With each level 
135Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, tr. by John 
Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (SCM Press, London, 1962), p. 242. 
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something entirely new comes into existence. The personal is 
t reducible to the material or the organic. In the fable no 
if we let spirit signify the life principle, it represents 
~e organic level, and earth represents the material level. 
These levels by themselves can't be regarded as forming a 
self, for care is needed for this. Care is what forms and 
constantly sustains or changes the self. Care is the mark of 
~rsonhood. Only with care is there a transcendence of the 
mere organic level. 
People generally treat care as the mark of personhood 
even though they might not be reflectively aware of doing 
so. When the computer in the movie 2001 began acting as if 
it really cared for its own continued existence, the audience 
~gan viewing this computer as a person, as an end unto 
itself and no mere machine. Although this is a fictitious 
example, it does illustrate the importance of the presence of 
care in deciding if something is a person. With the advance 
of computer technology and the growing possibility of contact 
with alien beings, it may become necessary to develop some 
criteria for determining personhood that is not tied to the 
human anatomy. The presence of the process of caring, I 
submit, ought to play an essential role in deciding the issue 
of personhood in the event of such puzzle cases. 
James pointed out in his famous automatic sweetheart 
argument that robots could never be sweethearts no matter how 
much their behavior was like real sweethearts. In the case 
of sweethearts, it is not the behavior itself that is valued, 
bUt rather the care that one assumes lies behind the 
behavior. What is true of sweethearts is true of all 
selves. The presence of care is required for both. A robot 
not onlY won't do as a sweetheart, it won't do as a person, 
tor a self requires a stream of consciousness that is 
essentially a process of care. 
PART SIX 
THE CONCRETE FULL SELF 
The concrete full self is a subjective-objective 
temporal process. It exists as a dialectic of subjectivity 
and objectivity and we shall call it, Self-Constituting-
Historical-Existence. It is the only real self there is. 
Personal existence entails a continuous mutual influence 
between the self's subjective and objective dimensions. We 
will first examine the influence of the subjective dimension 
upon the objective dimension, and then we will show how the 
objective dimension in turn affects the subjective dimension. 
We will then explore reasons why the self's mode of existence 
must be that of an irreducible temporal process involving the 
mutual relationship of these dimensions. Finally, we will 
discuss the type of identity that this self is capable of 
having. 
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A. THE SPONTANEITY OF CARE AND THE CONTINUOUS CONSTITUTION 
OF THE ME , I~ ME 
we have already touched upon the constitution of the 
"ME." We must now explore this process in greater detail. 
BY caring for certain of its objects, the present "I" 
constitutes a "ME." One's total self is what one cares 
about, and it is the present pulse of consciousness that does 
the caring. Through care it selects which objects are to 
form the "ME." 
As noted above, no object is in and of itself 
personalized. All that belongs to the field of the "ME" does 
so through the medi urn of care. The "ME" is not some one 
specific item which is the same for all individuals but is 
instead whatever is an object of special interest to 
consciousness, i.e. the subjective dimension of the self. 
Through care the subjective dimension of the self creates and 
sustains the ME, i.e. objective dimension of the self. 
"This sort of interest is really the meaning of the word 
'my'," writes James, "Whatever has it is eo ipso a part of 
me." 13 6 He points out that this field of care may grow and 
alter its boundaries in countless ways. 137 At the heart of 
this field of care invariably lies the body and what 
13 6w · 11 · J P · · 1 I 1 1arn ames, r1nc1p es, , p. 308. 
137Ibid. 
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ministers to its needs. Other objects tend to get knitted on 
to this core of selfhood through care. All the objects of 
the material, spiritual and social areas of one• s "ME" are 
cared for by consciousness. This is the condition for the 
personalization of these diverse objects. The entire 
objective dimension of the self is a field of care, and this 
field is created and sustained through the acts of care of 
the subjective dimension of the self. 
Certain kinds of objects tend to become part of one's 
objective self. James believes, however, that any object can 
be a candidate for personalization through care. What is the 
target of care is solely a question of fact. 138 
This position with regards to one's objective self has 
the merit of allowing for the possibility of change. The 
"ME" is mutable. Growth and decay are possibilities of the 
objective dimension of the self. It is as James said "a 
fluctuating material." One's "ME" of ten years ago is 
probably not identical with one's present "ME." If there is 
a difference between my present "ME" and my "ME" of a decade 
ago, the difference stems from the fact that my consciousness 
no longer cares for the same objects in the same way after a 
passage of ten years. Many of the items that we cherished as 
children no longer stir the same emotion in us. A prized 
doll for example is likely to fade away from one's self-field 
138Ib;d. I 309 ..... , p. . 
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with the approach of adulthood. These alterations in one's 
caring attitude means changes in the "ME," and these changes 
maY be grave or slight. "Thus the identity found by the I. in 
its~," says James, "is only a loosely constructed thing, 
an identity 'on the whole,' just like that which any outside 
observer might find in the same assemblage of facts." 139 
With the passage of time various objects are added and 
dropped from one's self field. Care is the means of entry 
for these objects into the self-field. Those objects that 
continue to remain within the self-field do so because they 
are sustained by care. This present manuscript that I am now 
working on forms a part of my objective self. It is as James 
would say, "saturated with my labor," and I care for it. 
Years from now or perhaps even tomorrow, I may cease to be 
fascinated with this project, and it may slip away from my 
field of care and be no longer a part of the objective 
dimension of my self. I am always capable at any moment of 
choosing a new mode of existence, i.e. of adopting a new self 
through a transformation in care. James felt that such 
sudden conversions were rare, but he didn't doubt that the~ 
really occurred. In The Varieties of Religious Experiences 
he discusses the phenomenon of sudden conversion at length. 
Long term conversions are, however, more familiar to us. 
One of the goals of higher education is in fact to bring 
139 Ibid. I, p. 352. 
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about such long term conversions. If a new college graduate 
feels that he is the exact same person that he was four years 
ago, then the chances are that this institution did not serve 
him well. If, however, he feels that he is a different 
person, he feels this way because he recognizes the fact that 
he now has all sorts of new interests, i.e. his field of care 
has been transformed. New objects of care have been added 
and others dropped from his self-field. What we have here is 
a fluctuating field of care in which the same object being 
once treated as a part of me is now regarded, "as if I had 
nothing to do with it at all. n 140 
At class reunions one may find that it is difficult to 
renew the same old friendships. The difficulty here stems 
from the fact that the selves involved have not remained 
fixed and frozen during the intervening years. Your old pal 
may not have simply gone bald and put on weight; he may have 
also undergone a transformation in his very self. Your old 
school friend may now have a whole new set of values and care 
quite differently about things then he once did, and to the 
extent that this is so and to just that extent, he is a 
changed self. 
One • s "ME" is something that is created and conserved by 
care. When an i tern belonging to the "ME" ceases to be 
cherished by consciousness, this object ceases to form a part 
140Ibid. I, p. 279. 
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of the "ME." A spouse, for example, may form a part of one's 
•M~" but not so if the caring ceases. If a divorce is 
emotionallY traumatic for an individual, it is often because 
one is experiencing a partial loss of one's very self. In 
such situations a reorganization of one's objective self 
tends to occur. As a result, during such times one's sense 
of self is in a highly confused state. In other words, in 
such situations of sudden alteration in one's life one is not 
certain about what to value or care for, and as a result the 
self's own boundaries become vague. James writes, 
Sudden alterations in outward fortune often produce 
such a change in the empirical me as almost to 
amount to a pathological disturbance of self-
consciousness. When a poor man draws the big prize 
in a lottery, or unexpectedly inherits an estate; 
when a man high in fame is publicly disgraced, a 
millionaire becomes a pauper, or a loving husband 
and father sees his family perish at one fell swoop, 
there is temporarily such a rupture between all past 
habits, whether of an active or a passive kind, and 
the exigencies and possibilities of the new 
situation, that the individual may find no medium of 
continuity or association to carry him over from the 
one phase to the other of his life. Under these 
conditi£ii mental derangement is no infrequent 
result. 
The specific form of one's "ME" is a function of the 
caring selectivity of one's consciousness. One's "ME" has a 
certain form because consciousness cares for only certain of 
the objects it entertains. The body that one constantly 
141
rbid. I, pp. 357-358 n. 
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feels, i.e. one's lived-body, seems invariably to be the 
first and main object of this care. Around this privileged 
object the entire objective self is built up with its 
material, social, and spiritual areas. All the objects in 
the entire self-field are cared for by consciousness, and all 
are in some way related to one's body. "The nucleus of the 
•me'," says James, "is always the bodily existence felt 
-
w be present at the time.nl42 
The material, social and spiritual areas of one's "ME" 
are all formed in the same manner, i.e. through the process 
of care. A particular attitude, a beardless and flabby body, 
a brown suit and a woman named Shirley are all presently a 
part of my objective self but only because they are all cared 
for by my present subjective dimemsion. Same of these items 
may always be a part of my self-field, but if they are, it is 
because they are sustained in this field by care. Some time 
in the future I may forget that special attitude, grow a 
beard, get in shape, throw away my brown suit, and forsake 
the woman named Shirley. If ~here is stability in the self, 
it is because changes like this usually don't all occur at 
once but gradually over a long period of time. "Any man 
~comes, as we say, inconsistent with himself if he forgets 
his engagements, pledges, knowledges, and habits:" says 
James I "and it is merely a question of degree at what point 
142 b"d I 378 I 1 • , p. . 
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Shall say that his personality is changed."
143 
-e Let us now examine how care functions in the constitution 
of each of the three areas of one's "ME": material, 
spiritual, and social. In the case of the material "ME" the 
physical body is dominant. Other material objects that are 
related to the body tend to become also a part of one's 
material "ME" because they are cared for in the same way. 
ThiS is the case with one's family, clothes, property and 
creations. One's body may seem like a natural part of the 
•ME" and these others may seem like artificial extensions, 
but James does not believe that this is the case. Each is 
part of the "ME" by virtue of the same fact, it is cared for 
by consciousness. In and of itself the physiological body is 
s~ply an extended physical mass and totally non-personal. 
The importance of the role of care in selfhood is revealed by 
OOM quickly we regard as foreign that which was once a very 
~rt of our physical body. When the barber cuts our hair and 
~see it lying on the floor, we no longer view it as we once 
did when it rested atop our head. In Becoming, Gordon 
Allport points out that we don't think twice about swallowing 
our own saliva but if we were asked to spit into a cup and 
~en swallow it, we would find it to be a different matter 
altogether. 144 It is different despite the fact that the 
143Ibid. I, p. 358. 
144 Gordon Allport, Becoming, (London: Yale University 
Press 1955), p. 43. 
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same physical substance is present in both cases. What was 
once felt as warm and intimate is now regarded as foreign and 
repulsive. Allport's example illustrates the fact that it is 
not merely the nature of an object that determines whether it 
is a part of one's self. What is more important for entry 
into the self-field is how the object is grasped by 
consciousness: with or without care. James believes that 
this is why there have been men throughout history who "have 
been ready to disown their very bodies and to regard them as 
mere vestures, or even as prisons of clay from which they 
should some day be glad to escape.nl45 
James' observation here reminds me of the words of a 
dear friend whose life was cut short by multiple sclerosis. 
The words were her last words. In her will she wrote that 
she wanted that "awful thing set ablaze." That "awful thing" 
was her body which turned against her in the prime of her 
life and from which she too wished to escape. I suspect that 
at the time of her death her own sense of self no longer 
included those physiological parts over which she no longer 
had control. 
One's material goods also tend to form a part of one's 
Objective self. When one cares for his riches to a great 
extent, they too become a part of one's very sense of self. 
1 suspect that after the stockmarket crash of 1929 a number 
145Jarnes, Principles, I, p. 279. 
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of people committed suicide not because of fear of starvation 
bUt rather because of a loss of their wealth. Care for one•s 
material belongings can become so intense that one's very 
identity becomes wrapped up in them. A friend of mine once 
came to me with a gloomy face and told me that he had been 
•disfigured.n I then learned that his brand new car had been 
sideswiped. The man•s remark was rooted in a true sense of 
self-loss which he was experiencing. In such situations one 
tends to feel a shrinkage of one•s very self. On occasion, 
each of us in varying degrees experiences a sense of self-
loss with regard to our material goods that we lose or see 
destroyed. I once believed that I had lost forever a part of 
this very manuscript on a commuter train. In the hours it 
took to recover my paper, I experienced a real sense of self 
diminishment. Such experiences illustrate the fact that the 
self is a field that greatly transcends the boundaries of 
one•s body. If this were not the case, we would not feel na 
partial conversion of ourselves to nothingnessn when we lose 
these goods that we cherish. 146 This is why James feels 
that one•s property becomes, nwith different degrees of 
intimacy, parts of our empirical selves.n 147 
Care is also the common ingredient with regard to the 
elements of one•s spiritual nME.n One•s past subjective acts 
146
rb;d. I 281 
.... ' p. . 
147Ibid. 
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(perceptions, volitions, emotions, etc.) form a part of one's 
objective self through care. When the care fades for these 
past acts of subjectivity, they cease to be an intimate part 
of one's objective self. For example, the feelings one had 
as a child often seem when they are recalled years later to 
lack the warmth of recent feelings. They appear to the 
present subjective dimension as foreign. Since they are no 
longer cared for by consciousness, they are no longer 
regarded as a part of the same "ME." "My spiritual powers, 
again, must interest me more than those of other people, and 
for the same reason" says James. "I should not be here at 
all unless I had cultivated them and kept them from 
decay." 148 
It is also care that creates and sustains one's social 
•ME." Not all the images that we think others have of us 
form a part of our social self. It is only those images that 
one cares for that manage to be assimilated into one's 
objective self. I might, for example, be aware of the fact 
that certain individuals regard me as a poor golfer, but 
unless I cherish this particular image and value the approval 
of this golf group, their opinion has no bearing on my social 
me. As James pointed out, it's what image we care about, 
what we stake ourselves to be, that matters most. Concerning 
148 Ib'd 308 1 • I, p. . 
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thiS point James reveals the following about his own social 
self: 
I, who for the time have staked my all on being a· 
psychologist, am mortified if others know much more 
psychology than I. But I am contented to wallow in 
the grossest ignorance of Greek. My deficiencies 
there give me no sense of personal humiliation at 
all. Had I 'pretensions' t£4 ~e a linguist, it would have been just the reverse. 
Against this view it might be argued that a man is the 
social roles he plays whether he cares for them or not. A 
person might be in a profession he no longer likes, but he is 
still defined by this role and how well he performs it. In 
response to this, it can be said that a person may lose 
interest in his profession but still care about how others 
regard his performance in this profession and so still care 
about this particular social image. If this kind of regard 
is also lacking, it can be truly said that he is so isolated 
from his labor that his work really forms no part of his 
social nME.n Such cases, I suspect, are quite rare, but 
where they do exist they illustrate that it is not simply the 
roles we play but rather the roles we perform and care about 
that form our social nME.n James maintains that one has only 
as many different social selves as there are ndistinct groups 
Of persons about whose opinion he cares.n 150 As in the 
case of one's material and spiritual nMEn, it is care that 
constitutes one's social nME.n 
149Ibid. I, p. 296. 
lSOibid. I, p. 282. 
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So we see that all three areas of one's "ME" are 
constituted through care. The material, spiritual and social 
aspects of one's ME require a caring consciousness for their 
creation and conservation in existence. It is a caring 
consciousness which divides the universe into "two halves" 
which James notes we all call by the same names, "and those 
names are 'me• and •not me• ." 151 
The care which forms the objective dimension of the self 
is a function of consciousness, i.e. the subjective dimension 
of the self. Consciousness is basically a process of care. 
It is consciousness that establishes ends for the individual 
and through its selective character, chooses means to those 
ends. The term interest implies consciousness, and all 
interests that are commonly attributed to the organism 
including survival are really the interests of a particular 
consciousness. Without consciousness, normative judgements 
like "right reaction" are meaningless. The purely physical 
order of existence is completely lacking in goals or ends. 
"Matter has no ideals," says James. "It must be entirely 
indifferent to the molecules c, H, N, and o, whether they 
combine in a live body or a dead one." 152 
Caring is not a function of matter but of consciousness. 
Ends and goals imply care, and care implies consciousness. 
lSlibid. I, p. 278. 
152Jarnes, "Are We Automata," Mind 4(1879): 1 p. 6. 
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•sverY actually existing consciousness seems to itself at any 
rate to be a fighter for ends," says James, "but for its 
presence, (there] would be no ends at all." 153 
consciousness freely cares for certain of its objects. 
fhiS is what we mean by the spontaneity of care. We are not 
suggesting, however, that consciousness acts arbitrarily in 
its caring. Consciousness is not coerced into caring for 
anything, but it is influenced by the present situation it 
finds itself in and by its previous acts of care. Unless 
this process of care was so motivated there would be very 
little continuity to selfhood. Thus besides the spontaneity 
of care, we have also a sedimentation of care. One's past 
acts of care influence the direction taken by the present 
pulse of care. Because of the continuous acts of 
appropriation, the present segment of consciousness has its 
past objective self as part of its content. This historical 
content along with the present given situation affects how 
the present active pulse of consciousness constitutes its 
•ME." This constitution always entails varying degrees of 
Sedimentation and spontaneity. The given environment and 
one's past do not act deterministically for the present 
active pulse of consciousness interprets and regulates the 
influence of both. 
This section has tried to establish that for James the 
153 b"d 6-7. I 1 • pp. 
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objective dimension of the self is constructed through care, 
i.e. the activity of the subjective dimension of the self. 
we can symbolize this process in the following manner: 
I~ME. In the next section we will be exploring the 
influence one's past objective self upon the present active 
part of the self. We can symbolize this process in the 
following manner: I~ME. We will discover later on that 
these are not two separate processes but rather two phases of 
the same temporal process which the self is. 
B. THE SEDIMENTATION OF CARE AND THE CONTINUOUS 
SUBLIMINAL INFLUENCE OF THE PAST "ME," !~ME 
In the Jamesian theory of consciousness, one's past 
exerts an on-going influence on one's present existence. 
consciousness is accumulative, for in the act of 
appropriation the present pulse appropriates the past pulse 
and all that it had appropriated. In this way one's past is 
carried along into the present. This view of consciousness 
is not as counter-intuitive as it might first appear. James 
is not claiming here that we recall our entire past each and 
every moment. He is pointing out rather the often ignored 
fact that our past is continuously influencing our present 
consciousness without the need of any explicit act of 
memory. Our past experiences are available for explicit 
recall because they already form the fringe of our present 
consciousness. From the fringe, my past objective self can 
influence the direction of my present active consciousness 
without ever becoming focal. In this manner the "I" comes 
under the influence of the "ME." 
The following may serve as an illustration of James' 
position here. When one takes up bicycling as an adult, one 
may explicitly recall having ridden a bicycle as a child and 
compare the two experiences. It is clear, however, that 
Prior to any explicit recollection those past experiences 
must be already operative informing my present activity. If 
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thiS were not the case, I would have to relearn how to ride a 
bicycle, but I find this relearning isn't necessary. When I 
do recollect my childhood experiences with a bicycle, I 
recognize their bearing on what I am now already doing, i.e. 
mY adult bicycling. 
Nearly all our intentional actions are made possible by 
the fact that our past lies available for us in the present. 
when we talk, we don't have to recall our learning of each of 
our spoken words. Our entire vocabulary is available to us 
as the fringe of our present consciousness, and this 
sedimentation of language helps guide its direction. The 
same is true of all our skills such as swimming, typing, 
walking, etc. As I write this manuscript, my entire past 
studies of James are being brought to bear upon my current 
action. This is not all, however, for my entire past 
philosophical studies are also operative here, as well as my 
knowledge of the English language. In fact, much more of my 
past than I realize is presently influencing the work I am 
now engaged in. The same can be said of all purposeful 
activity. James writes, 
In the pulse of inner life immediately present now 
in each of us is a little awareness of our own body, 
of each other's persons, of these sublimities we are 
trying to talk about, of the earth's geography and 
the direction of history, of truth and error, of 
good and bad, and of who knows how much more? 
Feeling, however dimly and subconsciously, all these 
things, your pulse of inner life is c£~~inuous with 
them, belongs to them and they to it. 
154 James, A Pluralistic Universe, p. 129. 
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How one's past lives on as the fringe of one's present 
consciousness is not easy to conceptualize. Yet, it is clear 
that the facts of everyday experience suggest that this is 
the case. Each experience that we have is felt as either 
familiar or strange and this suggest that we are not isolated 
from our past but rather bring it with us and evaluate the 
present in terms of it. This is not explicit memory. 
Explicit memory is mainly a matter of bringing to the center 
of consciousness what was previously only on its fringe. 
past experience affects us without the need of conscious 
recall. Without being brought to center stage, while 
remaining in the wings, one's past is able to exert its 
influence upon the present active part of the self. Each new 
pulse of consciousness thus comes inheriting a specific past 
whose influence it feels. 
James illustrates the influence of this temporal fringe 
by examining the phenomenon of trying to recall a particular 
word. He notes that in one's effort to recall a word one is 
able to reject possible candidates for the word one is trying 
to recall. One would not be able to do this if the word or 
at least an approximate feeling of the word were not already 
a part of the fringe of one's present consciousness assisting 
him in his effort at its explicit recall. One's mental void 
in trying to recall one word is not the same when trying to 
recall a different word. The difference lies in what forms 
the fringe of the present consciousness. This is an example 
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of hOW one's past can affect one's present active self prior 
to any explicit recall. James writes, 
And the gap of one word does not feel like the gap 
of another, all empty of content as both might seem 
necessarily to be when described as gaps. When I 
vainly try to recall the name of Spalding, my 
consciousness is far removed from what it5 ~s when I 
vainly try to recall the name of Bowles. 
continuous appropriation by each new pulse of 
consciousness of the previous pulse of consciousness creates 
in effect a single unbroken stream of consciousness. 
consciousness is continuous and accumulative through 
appropriation. Each pulse of consciousness becomes a 
temporal segment of a single stream of consciousness. It is 
this fact that makes possible the temporal fringe described 
above, allowing a past to be brought to bear on a present. 
James writes, 
In principle, then, the real units of our immediately-
felt life are unlike the units that intellectualists 
logic holds to and makes its calculations with. They 
are not separate from their own others, and you have 
to take them at widely separated dates to find any 
two o~ them that sei~6 unblent •••• All real units of 
exper1ence overlap. 
James did not believe in the existence of an entity 
155 James, Principles, I, p. 243. 
156James, A Pluralistic Universe, pp. 129-130. 
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called the unconscious. His notion of the fringe of 
consciousness, however, functions in a similar manner in that 
through it one's past is silently and ceaselessly exerting 
itS influence on the present active self. The active center 
of consciousness is affected in a special way by what lies on 
itS margin. James writes, 
My present field of consciousness is a centre 
surrounded by a fringe that shades insensibly into a 
subconscious more •••• The centre works in one way 
while the margins work in another, and presently 
overpower the centre and are central themselves. 
What we conceptually identify ourselves with and say 
we are thinking of at any time is the centre~ but 
our full self is the whole field, with all those 
indefinitely radiating subconscious possibilities of 
increase that we can only feel wi59out conceiving, 
and can hardly begin to analyze. 
In his article "The Hidden Self" James discusses the 
influence of the marginal areas of one's consciousness that 
are dramatically revealed in case of post hypnotic suggestion. 
Here he refers to the past temporal fringe of consciousness 
as "the submerged consciousness." James writes, 
Ordinary hypnotic suggestion is proving itself 
immensely fertile in the therapeutic field~ and the 
subtler knowledge of sub-conscious states which we 
are now gaining will certainly increase our powers 
in this direction many fold. Who knows how many 
pathological states (not simply nervous and 
functional ones, but organic ones too) may be due to 
the existence of some perverse buried fragment of 
consciousness obstinately nourishing its narrow 
157
rbid., p. 130. 
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memory or delusion, 1g~ thereby inhibiting the 
normal flow of life. 
Many of the phenomena associated with the notion of the 
~conscious James examined in The Varieties of Religious 
Experience. Here he comes to the conclusion that the term 
-
•unconscious" is a misnomer and is better replaced by the 
term "subliminal." 159 Our past doesn't lie locked away in 
same entity called the unconscious but forms instead the 
fringe or margin of our present consciousness. 
The important fact which the 'field' formula 
commemorates is the indetermination of the margin. 
Inattentively realized as is the matter which the 
margin contains, it is nevertheless there, and helps 
both to guide our behavior and to determine the next 
movement of our attention. It lies around us like a 
'magnetic field,' inside of which our centre of 
energy turns like a compass-needle, as the present 
phase of consciousness alters into its successor. 
Our whole past store of memories floats beyond this 
margin, ready at a touch to come in~ and the entire 
mass of residual powers, impulses, and knowledges 
that constitute our empi6bcal self stretches 
continuously beyond it. 
The "I" continuou~ly feels the influence of its past 
objective selfhood. It constitutes its present "ME" for the 
158James, "The Hidden Self," Scribners Magazine Vol. VII 
PP. 361-373 included in A William James Reader, ed. by Gay 
Wilson Allen, p. 106. 
159 James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, p. 170. 
160Ibid., p. 187. 
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most part in conformity with this influence. In practice the 
constitution by the present "I" is almost always a matter of 
sustaining one's past "ME" rather than selecting a whole new 
•ME·" In principle, however, nothing prevents the "I" from 
embracing an entirely fresh objective self. One tends, 
however, to continue to care for the same body, clothes, 
emotions and social images that one has cherished in the 
past. One tends to act in character because one's past 
character traits maintain their influence while forming the 
fringe of our present active consciousness. 
The temporality of consciousness with its past and 
future fringes means the self enjoys more than a momentary 
existence. All three dimensions of time are involved in the 
~ing of the self. The self always experiences what it is 
about to become as the future of its present existence. 
One's future intentions form a part of one's being right here 
and now. I am always a being towards some future goal and 
this is a feature of my present self. James believes that I 
am not only my past but also what I stake myself to be. 
One's future possibilities reveal themselves as possibilities 
of sustaining or changing one's own past. One's past is 
carried forward into each moment of one's existence. If as 
they say, one's character is one's fate, it is so because 
there is no gap separating our present active self from our 
Past. Personal existence always involves a projection of a 
future in the present in light of a past. we are historical 
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beings because the self is intrinsically historical. That 
which is selfless is not really historical. A tree has its 
rings but they no longer exert any active influence. An 
accumulative consciousness through continuous appropriation 
makes possible the historical nature of the self. Like one's 
vocabulary on the horizon of one's present active 
consciousness there lies also one's past objective selfhood. 
This sedimentation of existence influences what the present 
consciousness is going to care for, i.e. it helps in the 
formation of the present "ME." Because of this we do not 
have to start from nothingness each moment in determining the 
manner of our existence. To a great degree and through a 
certain amount of inertia on our part, we tend to sustain our 
past objective self. Nonetheless, our objective self always 
tends to involve some degree of novelty and is at no time a 
completely stable and static field. This is due in part to 
the fact that one's utilized past is always an intrepreted 
past of a consciousness that is primarily concerned with the 
future of one's present self. 
Differences in one's past experiences and one's future 
expectations causes the world of one person to differ from 
that of another. Each of us brings his unique past to bear 
upon what he is now experiencing. My lived-present includes 
all that now makes my present experience what it is. I am 
constantly utilizing my past prior to any explicit recall of 
it. This is why it is impossible for two people to read 
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exactly the same novel. The experience that is had in 
reading a novel is in no small part due to what the reader 
himself brings to this experience. As Sartre once pointed 
out the images and expectations that each page conjures up in 
the mind of a reader is determined in part by the reader's 
past rather than solely by the novelist's words. One's 
present subjectivity is always functioning under the guidance 
of one's past objective selfhood. 
This section has tried to establish the fact that my 
present subjectivity is influenced by my past objective 
self. We can symbolize this process in the following manner: 
I~ME. So represented this process appears as the 
antithesis of the process that we began our discussion with 
in this section: I~ME. In what follows we shall see that 
we have not two opposite processes but rather a single 
process that can be analyzed into two phases. This single 
dynamic process, which is the Jamesian self, can be 
symbolized as follows: r< >ME. 
c. 
-
THE FULL SELF AS SELF-cONSTITUTING-HISTORICAL-EXISTENCE, 
I~ME 
According to James the concrete full self is partly 
object and partly subject. He calls it a "duplex," 161 but 
be does not mean the self is composed of two separate things. 
se means rather that the self in being partly known and 
~rtlY knower is something which involves more than one 
dimension or aspect. The self is that which has both an "I" 
and a "ME" dimension to it. These aspects of the self have 
no independent existence. ,They refer to each other and exist 
only in union. James writes, 
I call these 'discriminated aspects,• and not 
separate things, because the 1dentity of the I with 
me, even in the very act of discrimination, is 
perhaps the mosi6 ~neradicable dictum of 
commonsense, ••• 
In previous sections we have explored the nature of the 
objective and subjective dimensions of the self and in this 
section we have already treated the interrelationship of 
these dimensions. We are now in a position to understand why 
the self must be viewed as a subjective-objective temporal 
Process taken as an irreducible whole. This Jamesian self 
can be represented symbolically as follows: I~. 
161 James, Psychology, Briefer Course, p. 176. 
162Ibid. 
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Neither of the dimensions of the self can exist without 
the other, for caring implies a cared-for and vice versa. 
The present pulse of consciousness is personalized and 
functions as the "I" because it is part of a continuous 
process of care. Consciousness cares for certain of its 
objects and it is due to this care that these objects come to 
compose its ME. Each dimension of the self thus implies the 
existence of the other. The "I" and the "ME" are like 
abstractions in that they exist only in union. The self 
exists as a temporal process involving these dimensions and 
their interrelationship. Wherever there exists a self, there 
exists a dialectic of subjectivity and objectivity (I ,~> 
for this is what personal existence necessarily entails. 
Richard Stevens recognizes this "dialectic" feature of 
the Jamesian self. Unlike myself, however, he interprets it 
in Husserlian terms. He writes, "James's distinction between 
the "I" and the empirical "ME" parallels Husserl's 
distinction between the pure phenomenological ego and the 
human ego.n 163 From James' hostile treatment of Kant's 
transcendental ego, it is clear to me that James would not 
look too favorably upon Stevens interpretation of the 
subjective dimension of the Jamesian self. Unlike Husserl's 
transcendental ego James' "I" is always a dimension of a 
concrete empirical self that is totally immersed in the world 
163Richard Stevens, James and Husserl: The Foundations 
~Meaning, Martinus Mijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands, 1974, 
p. 178. 
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as an individual agent. 
For James, "Self" is a term that implies not only a 
concrete individual thing but also an agent. P. F. Strawson 
haS pointed out that our concept of person seems to be a 
primitive and irreducible concept which nonetheless involves 
the notions of agency and individuality. 164 This view is 
related to James' position which holds that the self is 
necessarily two dimensional. There is the agent aspect of 
the self, the "I" and there is the individuality aspect of 
the self, the "ME." James believes that a self necessarily 
involves, 
••• a stream of thought, each part of which as 'I' 
can (1) remember those which went before, and know 
the things they knew: and (2) emphasize and care 
paramountly for certain ones among 16gem as 'me' and appropriate to these the rest. 
James' distinction within the self between the "I" and 
the "ME" can be described in a number of ways: the I is the 
owner and the ME is the owned: or the I is the enduring 
subject and the ME is that which changes: or the I is the 
subject of responsibility and of praise and blame, and the ME 
is that for which I is responsible and is praised or blamed. 
The best way to describe the distinction, however, is that 
the I is the active caring dimension of the self and the ME 
164P. F. Strawson, Individuals, London: Methuen & Co., 
Ltd., 1959. 
165 James, Principles, I, p. 378. 
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iS the objects and events ordered or classified into a self 
bY this caring. 
Each of the above descriptions has the merit of taking 
into account the real ambiguous nature of the self. our 
ambiguous existence must not be falsified in order so we can 
easilY deal with it like any ordinary object of 
consciousness. To take for example either of the dimensions 
of the self and claim that this is what the self is, is to 
totally misrepresent the self. To take the ME as exclusively 
the real self is to remove agency from the notion of the self, 
thus rendering all human action nonpersonal. To take the I, 
the perishing pulse of subjectivity, as exclusively the real 
self is to empty it of objective historical content and so 
individuality is lost. At times it may be convenient and 
perhaps necessary to treat the self as if it were a thing, but 
~mustn't forget that this is a distortion of personal 
existence. A self is not a thing but is rather an individual 
agent and as such its existence is intrinsically two 
dimensional and so ambiguous. James writes, 
We may sum up by saying personality implies the 
incessant presence of two elements, an objective 
person, known by a passing subjective thought and 
recognized as continuing in time. Hereafter let us 
use the words ME and 1G6for the empirical person and the judging thought. 
To speak of agency and individuality with regards to the 
166
rb1'd. I 350 ' p. . 
152 
self is to speak of its spontaneity and sedimentation. The 
self is neither pure spontaneity nor pure sedimentation. It 
iS a mixture of both. I am free but I am not absolutely free 
for there is a sedimentation to my existence. The mode of 
existence of the self is that of a projecting of a future in 
the present in light of its past. The self is that mixture 
of sedimentation and spontaneity that each of us discovers 
when he reflects upon his own existence. Most of us feel 
that we are autonomous and yet we recognize that we are also 
to a great extent creatures of habit. 
Despite the momentary existence of the present pulse of 
consciousness, the self does not have a momentary existence. 
Each I perishes quickly and one's ME also changes. The self 
is, however, not just a particular I nor just a particular 
ME. The self is rather this entire on-going process which I 
call "self-constituting-historical-existence." A self is not 
just the present caring subjectivity and it is not just the 
present objective field of care. It is quite clearly both. 
The self is not simply a collection of static personality 
traits nor is it a pure ego. The self is rather a free 
agent that already has a specific character. It is a freedom 
with a past to which it listens but to which it is not 
absolutely bound. In fact, this "listening" is one of the 
ways it avoids being bound to the past. The self always 
finds itself already moving in a particular direction but it 
has no fixed destiny. 
, 
' 
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I am what I have been but I am also what I am intending 
to be and what I am currently. Personal existence always 
involves all three dimensions of the time. There is always 
the present "I" projecting a future "ME" in light of its past 
•ME·" The future "ME" and the past "ME" are all part of the 
objective dimension of the self. The subjective dimension 
exists only in the present, and it determines the degree of 
influence on one's past objective self on one's future 
objective self. 
The activity that I am presently engaged in can serve as 
an example of what I mean when I say that the self always 
involves all three dimensions of time. The work that I am 
now doing has a reference to both my past and my future. 
With regard to my past, my present labor on this manuscript 
leans on all those years of my philosophical studies. With 
regard to my future, my present labor is in no small way 
aimed at securing for me a future career in philosophy. 
Isolated from my past "ME" and my future projected "ME," my 
present self and its activity is unthinkable. The same is 
true of each moment of my personal existence for the self is 
always projecting a future in the present in light of its 
past. 
The temporality of the self is made possible by the fact 
that each present pulse of consciousness involves a temporal 
fringe that includes both an appropriated past and an 
anticipated future. It is due to this lived-present that the 
154 
•!" is able to project a "ME" which it views as the future of 
itS past "ME." 
This process which the self is can be signified the 
following way: I( >ME. The process is, however, more 
complicated than this formula might suggest. This formula 
does serve, however, to indicate that the subjective 
dimension affects the objective dimension and vice versa. 
If, however, we were to symbolically represent the process of 
selfhood in a way that more accurately reflects the flux of 
consciousness it would be as follows: 
Each new I constitutes a ME under the influence of a 
past ME which in turn was constituted under the influence of 
a previous ME. This chain of influence stretches back in 
time indefinitely through one's personal history. 
The above description is still not a complete portrayal 
of the subjective-objective temporal process which is the 
self. It isn't complete because it doesn't convey the fact 
that each new I not only appropriates the former ME but also 
the former I. The former I is appropriated and becomes 
available to reflection as if it was an objective element of 
the spiritual ME. This is the only manner in which past acts 
Of subjectivity manifest themselves. When we take this 
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factor into account, a symbolic representation of the self 
1ooks like the following: 
The dotted line indicates that the previous pulse of 
subjectivity is available to the present pulse of 
subjectivity as if it were an object and a part of one's 
spiritual ME. 
I~ME, is thus a way of representing in a simplified 
way a rather complex process. In chemistry complex chemical 
processes are often represented in a formula in such a way 
that only the basic steps of the process are clear. Here we 
are doing the same. The formula displays the main facts of 
selfhood but not all the facts. 
The self can also be represented in terms of its 
temporality in the following manner. 
T1 , T2 and T3 refer to three different temporal 
segments of the stream of consciousness. The dotted lines 
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refer to the act of appropriation by which a present pulse of 
thought appropriates its predecessor along with its objects. 
fhe vertical lines with their arrows indicate how the 
appropriated past ME affects how the present I projects a 
future ME. This diagram of the self has the merit of 
displaying the fact that the self exists every moment as a 
dialectic not only of subjectivity and objectivity but also 
as a synthesis of past, present and future. 167 One's past 
and future exist in the present as intentional objects of 
consciousness. 
As the above diagram indicates, the self is a subjective-
objective temporal process. It is an historical process that 
is to a certain extent self determining for it involves both 
sedimentation and spontaneity. All three phases of time come 
together in the self. This Jamesian view of the self 
accurately portrays the fundamental ambiguity involved in 
human existence. The self is no mere object of 
consciousness, to treat it so is to ignore the fact that 
consciousness itself is an aspect of the self. To treat the 
self as a thing means missing its spontaneity and 
temporality. As James makes clear, the self is neither 
purely subjective nor purely objective. Its existence is 
intrinsically ambiguous for its unique mode of existence is 
to be both subjective and objective at the same time. 
167This diagram has the merit of offering the detail 
factors left out of James• own diagram depicting the self's 
temporality. See Principles I, p. 324. 
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A self has a developing essence. Sartre once pointed 
out that in the case of man a fixed essence only comes with 
death. In actuality a self never attains a fixed essence for 
with death there is no longer a self to which to attribute an 
essence. If the self has an evolving essence, the evolving 
must itself always form a part of its essence. This means 
that the self is forever two dimensional, always involving 
both sedimentation and spontaneity. When this fact is 
neglected in any investigation of the self, one is no longer 
dealing with a self. One does not grasp the self by grasping 
one of its dimensions. One can not totally objectify the 
self because it is that which is more than objective. On 
this point Kierkegard was correct. Any attempt to reduce the 
subjectivity of the self to anything else but itself, is to 
lose the self altogether. Not unlike the falling snowflake 
that one grasps in vain to examine its intricate structure, 
the self resists being fully grasped objectively. This study 
has from the start refused the futile exercise of trying to 
reduce the subjectivity of the self to something else. We 
have avoided this move because it leads not to clarification 
of the self but to its destruction. It is time that it is 
realized that the ambiguous language used in talking about 
the self is based upon the genuine ambiguous existence that 
the self enjoys. 
This ambiguity of the self is bound up in its 
temporality. With the temporal fringe of consciousness there 
158 
iS a synthesis of spontaneity and sedimentation. This 
synthesis means the self has both a subjective and objective 
~pect to it. Personal existence involves not only a present 
pulse of subjectivity but also an objective sedimentated past 
and an objective intended future. The self is a subjective-
objective process due to its unique temporality, i.e. the 
fact that its mode of existence is that of a projecting a 
future in the present in light of its past. This temporality 
in turn is based upon the fact that consciousness is 
essentially a process of care. Without care there is no 
concern for the future and so no intending a specific future 
under the influence of a sedimentated past. It is care that 
grounds the unique temporality of the self. Thus, we see 
that the self's ambiguity, temporality and caring quality are 
all related. The Jamesian self is an ambiguous, temporal, 
caring self. 
D. THE PROBLEM OF PERSONAL IDENTITY 
with respect to the issue of identity, James saw selves 
as being no different from other phenomena. One's character 
can change over a period of years. One remains the same self 
to the extent that one's behavior is continuous enough to be 
reidentified as the same self -- again and again during the 
period of change. This is the case because, "there is 
nothing more remarkable in making a judgment of sameness in 
the first person than in the second or the third.• 168 
James avoided the difficulties of Burne with regard to 
personal identity because he recognized the fact that 
personal identity does not involve nor require the kind of 
absolute identity that Burne sought for it. For Burne the same 
cannot change, and persons change, then persons cannot remain 
the same, so personal identity is a myth. James regards 
Burne's absolute identity as something that is found nowhere 
in experience. James believes that every object we 
experience reveals itself as mutable and this also applies to 
the objective self. The very stream character of experience 
itself precludes the absolute identity that Burne sought for 
the self. 
James believed that self-identity is a matter of 
comparative identity. Comparative identity allows for 
168Ibid. I, p. 315. 
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sameness and change to coexist. For an object to be 
comparatively identical, it need only be subject to 
reidentification despite its alterations. Selves remain 
comparatively identical according to James for generally they 
are able to remain the same despite their various changes. 
In the very concept of a thing there is an allowance made for 
certain kinds of changes without the loss of identity. To 
know how to use a concept of a thing is to be aware of the 
changes this thing can undergo and still remain the same 
thing. A cherry tree may grow taller each year, produce 
cherries in June and lose its leaves in November and still be 
the same cherry tree. If, however, this tree were to produce 
apples one June, we would regard this type of alteration as 
involving a loss of identity for the concept of a cherry tree 
does not make allowances for this kind of change. 
As Terence Penelhum has pointed out, Hume's flawed 
account of personal identity stems from the fact that he did 
not recognize Locke's principle that the "same" is an 
incomplete term that functions only in conjunction with 
substantives and most substantive concepts (including that of 
the self) are designed to allow for certain kinds of 
changes. 169 For James also, sameness is to be found in our 
meaning intentions, i.e. it is a matter of our conceptions. 
169Terence Penelhum, "Personal Identity," The 
!ncyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 6, pp. 95-107. New York: 
Macmillan Co. & The Free Press, 1967, p. 96. 
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James position is consistent with the brilliant and 
1ucid account given by Terence Penelhum of the compatibility 
of identity and change in a particular sense of identity. 
unfortunately they do not use the same names to stand for the 
tWO notions of identity that each compares and contrast. 
what Penelhum calls comparative identity James calls 
numerical identity and vice versa. Despite differences in 
terminology, they both agree that there is a type of identity 
that allows for change and that this is the type of identity 
we have in mind when we speak of personal identity. Penelhum 
notes that there is nothing paradoxical about ascribing both 
change and identity to the same subject provided we are 
ascribing numerical identity (or what James calls comparative 
identity) rather than comparative identity (or what James 
calls numerical identity). 170 In other words, provided it 
is realized that we are not prescribing Hume 1 s absolute 
identity in such cases. Penelhum writes, 
There is, of course, one sense of the words "same" 
and "identical" in which sameness and change are 
incompatible. This is the sense of "same" in which, 
if applied to two distinct things, it means "alike" 
and, if applied to one thing at different times, it 
means "unaltered." This we might call the 
comparative sense of the word. It is to be 
distinguished from the numerical sense, in which two 
things said to be the same are said not to be two, 
but one. Clearly, one thing cannot be said to be 
both changed and the same if the comparative sense 
is intended, but this is not the sense we intend 
when we wonder whether we are entitled to consider 
someone the same throughout changes. Once this is 
noted, we can easily see that there is no need to 
assume that "to an accurate view" (Hume) an object 
has to be the same in the comparative sense to 
l?Oib'd 99 1 • p. . 
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remain the same in the numerical sense. If this is 
misse~, t?fense of paradox will be only too easy to 
susta1n. 
Like Penelhum, James approaches the problem of personal 
identity quite differently than Hume. First of all, James 
did not make the Humean mistake of ignoring the role of the 
body in personal identity. The problem of self-identity 
James realized, unlike Hume, is not the same problem as the 
identity of mind. Furthermore, James does not believe that 
the concept of personal identity must precede and guide the 
development of our concept of self. He sees no good reason 
why an account of the self ought to be shaped by an account 
of personal identity rather than vice-versa. It seems more 
logical to James to have an account of personal identity 
shaped by an account of self for the self is the thing whose 
identity is at issue. James' theory of personal identity is 
thus a consequent of his account of the self. In other 
words, James recognizes the principle that the "same" is an 
incomplete term that functions only in conjunction with 
substantives or things intended to be thought about. 
For James the question is not whether, but how we are 
able to reidentify ourselves and others. That we do so, 
James believes, is a matter of fact. According to James our 
ability to recognize ourselves is like the ability a cattle 
owner has when he "picks out and sorts together when the time 
for the round-up comes in the spring, all the beasts on which 
l?libid. 
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f inds his particular brand."
172 James writes, be 
As we think we see an identical bodily thing when, 
in spite of changes in structure, it exists 
continuously before our eyes, or when, however 
interrupted its presence, its quality returns 
unchanged, so here we think we experience an 
identical self when it appears to us in an analogous 
way. Continuity makes us unite what dissimilarity 
might otherwise separate~ similarity1,jkes us unite 
what discontinuity might hold apart. 
The self possesses no absolute unity. What unity it has 
is comparative and generic. The past and present selves 
compared are the same only to the extent they really are the 
same. "Where the resemblance and the continuity are no 
longer felt," says James, "the sense of personal identity 
goes too. n 17 4 
For James, self-identity is more of a relative identity, 
•that of a slow shifting in which there is always some common 
ingredient retained.n 175 He refers to Pope's story of a 
man who had his black worsted stockings darned so often with 
silk that they were finally transformed into a pair of silk 
stockings. To the owner of the stockings they kept their 
identity throughout this period and in the end they felt as 
172 
. . 1 I 317 Pr1nc1p es, , p. . 
173Ibid. 
174 Ibid., I, p. 318. 
175Ibid., I, p. 352. 
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warm and as intimate as they ever did. With regards to 
identity, the self is similar to this pair of stockings. The 
criteria of identity of persons has commonly been either 
memory or bodily continuity or both. James notes that since 
the body and memories are both subject to change, "the 
identity found by the I in its me is only a loosely 
constructed thing, an identity •on the whole' just like that 
which any outside observer might find in the same assemblage 
176 
of facts." 
James points out that alterations in the ME recognized 
by the I or by the Other may be slight or quite grave. It is 
common to hear the expression "He is so changed one would not 
know him," and James notes that it is only less often that an 
individual speaks of himself in this way. For the most part, 
however, we tend to think of selves as having the stability 
and lasting identity that we find in our furniture. 
Sometimes circumstances forces one to suddenly recognize that 
this is truly not the case. Imagine a man happily married 
for years to a woman whom he deeply loves. It is then his 
misfortune to go to war and be captured by the enemy and 
spend five years of his life as a prisoner of war. After the 
war he is released and comes home expecting to pick up his 
civilian life where it was interrupted by the war. Many 
soldiers in this situation have been greeted upon their 
return with the sad words, "Sorry dear, but I'm not the same 
176Ibid. 
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person you left behind." To the soldier his wife looks 
basically unchanged, and he is baffled and shocked by her 
statement. He is told by his wife that the person he cared 
tor and the person who cared for him no longer exists, but to 
him there she stands right before him just like the same old 
sofa. Eventually the soldier comes to accept the fact that 
selves can change in a way that sofas do not, for they can 
actually vanish altogether. For in the above case for all 
practical reasons this soldier's bride has vanished. It is 
time we realize that the models that we currently tend to use 
in our understanding of the self (for example: furniture) 
may be more than misleading; they may be harmful. 
James' "judging thought" makes possible both personal 
identity (unlike Hume) and the dissolution of personal 
identity (unlike Kant). Through appropriation by the present 
pulse of consciousness, an individual may maintain a sense of 
identity by repossessing enough information about himself. 
There is always, however, a possibility that an individual 
may not be able to do this. Selves disappear. People 
forget, undergo amnesia, sink into insanity and manifest 
multiple personalities and sometimes are transformed into 
neural vegetables. Such drastic alterations in selfhood are 
described by James in The Principles of Psychology, The 
~rieties of Religious Experiences, and in an article 
titled "The Hidden Self." The Jamesian account of the self 
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iS able to account for these mutations in selfhood in a more 
adequate way than either Hume or Kant. 
In the Jamesian account what identity the self possesses 
iS an identity based upon (1) the functional identity of the 
pulses of one's consciousness and (2) the constituted 
identity of the ME. These factors account for the 
experienced identity of the self. They do not give to the 
self an absolute identity that some feel it has, but James 
insists that we have no reason to believe that the self 
possesses an absolute identity, nor that it even needs such 
an identity. It is this imagined need that gave birth to 
fictions like the soul and the transcendental ego, as well as 
aume's attitude of skepticism. James is determined to avoid 
all three of these fruitless alternatives. His 
~enomenological account of the experienced identity of the 
self does just that. 
The functional identity of the pulses of one's 
consciousness refers to the fact that each new pulse of 
consciousness carries on the same function as subject of 
experience. Each new pulse of consciousness inherits the 
title of "I" and functions as the "I" while appropriating the 
entire past stream of consciousness to the body that it 
Presently feels. This act of appropriation is what makes 
possible whatever sameness the self is experienced as having. 
James' description of the identity of the self involves 
167 
no permanent substratum of change. Personal identity is not 
a case of inherence in a lasting entity like a soul or 
transcendental ego. In his treatment of the self, James 
holds the character of flux and flow to be primordial. There 
is no permanent ego above or behind the flux. What identity 
the self has is constituted in and with the flux. It is to 
be found in the immediate felt continuity and resemblance of 
the pulses that form a single unified stream of 
consciousness. The present pulse of subjectivity 
appropriates its predecessor which exhibits the same warmth 
and intimacy as it. There exists within the stream of 
consciousness a continuous and immanent self-relatedness. 
constant accumulative appropriation of earlier by subsequent 
pulses of thought is what makes possible self-identity. 
James notes that yesterday's and today's pulses of 
consciousness have no substantial identity for when one is 
here the other has already perished. These pulses of 
consciousness have, however, a functional identity for they 
are aware of the same past in the same way and know and react 
to one's by-gone ME in the same caring manner. "Successive 
thinkers, numerically distinct, but all aware of the same 
past in the same way," says James, "form an adequate vehicle 
for all the experience of personal unity and sameness which 
we actually have.n 177 
177James, Psychology, Briefer Course, pp. 202-203. 
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one's present pulse of caring consciousness is in no 
need of anything to make it an "I." It is always felt as the 
verY core of one's existence for one exists through it. Its 
identity with the past stream of subjectivity is made 
possible through the continuous acts of appropriation by 
which one's past subjectivity is transformed into the 
spiritual ME of the present pulse of consciousness. In a 
verY real sense the "I" dimension of the self exists only in 
the present, for only the present pulse of consciousness is 
able to function as the subject of experience. The title of 
•I" is truly given up and passed on to the next pulse of 
consciousness with the practical result being that the 
subject is always moving forward in time. "Each Thought is 
thus born an owner, and dies owned," states James, 
•transmitting whatever is realized as its Self to its own 
later proprietor." 178 To say that each new pulse of 
consciousness inherits the title "I" means that it functions 
in such a way that it is capable of serving as the referent 
of the concept "I." The present pulse of consciousness is 
for James not only the knower but also the source of interest 
and effort and so rightfully inherits the title "I." 
As mentioned above, the identity of the self is based 
Upon two principal conditions: (1) the functional identity 
Of the pulses of one's consciousness and (2) the constituted 
identity of the "ME" by one's caring consciousness. We have 
178 
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just examined the first condition, let us now look at the 
179 
second. 
The experience of sameness in the "ME" as in the case of 
anY object of consciousness is the result of the mind's 
intention to think the same as before. This sense of 
sameness is the source of all experienced sameness. Whether 
things in themselves are actually the same makes no 
difference for without the mind's ability to intend an object 
as the same as before no object would be so experienced. A 
thing may change considerably during the course of time but 
if consciousness intends it as the same object, then it is 
experienced as the very same object that was encountered 
before despite the changes. Of course, consciousness is only 
going to intend the object as being the same if the changes 
are consistent with the natural changes of an object of that 
kind. A tree, for example, may lose its leaves and still be 
regarded as the same object, but if it starts walking about 
it is not likely to be regarded by consciousness as the same 
object that was experienced before this change occurred. In 
any case, no matter what changes do actually occur in the 
object, if consciousness intends it as the same object, then 
it is experienced as the same object. James says that the 
179In The Origins of Pragmatism (2£. cit.) A. J. 
Ayer gives a brilliant detailed analysis of the first 
condition but barely touches upon the second condition. If 
Ayer had given equal attention to both conditions, he might 
~t have wrongfully chastised James for ignoring the role of 
e body in the experience of personal identity. 
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principle of constancy in the mind's meanings can be 
expressed as follows: 
The same matters can be thought of in successive 
portions of the mental stream, and some of these 
portions can know that they mean the same matters 
which the other portions meant. One might put it 
otherwise by saying that the mind can always in!8Bd, 
and know when it intends, to think of the Same. 
The identity of the ME is the result of this sense of 
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sameness. Consciousness has the ability to think a 
thing as being the same as was thought before. The identity 
of the ME is the main source of the feeling of an identical 
self. Here the body is the dominant factor. As stated 
above, all the objects that form a part of one's objective 
self involve some reference to the body. Sameness in the ME 
requires sameness in the body. The body is, however, 
something that changes. The cells of the body, for example, 
are continuously being replaced by new cells. Immutability, 
oowever, is not what is required here. What is required is 
that consciousness intend this changing physical mass as 
being the same body and thus the same old objective core of 
its self. What sameness the ME is experienced as having is 
contingent upon the intention of consciousness to think the 
same ME. "The sense of sameness," says James, "is the 
lSO ' ' 1 I 434 Pr~nc~p es, , p. . 
181see James Edie's brilliant and lucid account of the 
~ole of "the sense of sameness" in James• account of personal 
ldentity. 22· cit. 
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verY keel and backbone of our thinking.• 182 The sense of 
one's personal identity reposes on it. In other words the 
functional identity of the pulses of consciousness is a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition for the experience 
of personal identity. An objective identity must also be 
present within the ME aspect of the self. James writes, 
The sense of personal identity is not, then, this 
mere synthetic form essential to all thought. It is 
the sense of a sameness perceived by thought and 
predicated of things thought-about. These things 
are a present self and a self of yesterday. The 
thought not only thig~s them both, but thinks that 
they are identical. 
In order to fully understand the sameness that is to be 
found in the objective dimension of the self, we must first 
examine James' notion of the sense of sameness more fully. 
This function of consciousness is regarded by James as being 
the source of all experience of identical objects. 
Unfortunately, James did not make explicit his doctrine of 
the sense of sameness until many pages after his chapter on 
the self. It is to his chapter on conception that we must 
turn to more fully understand his view of self-identity. 184 
182 . . 1 Pr1nc1p es, I, p. 434. 
183Ibid., I, p. 315. 
184James Bayley regards James' chapter on conception as 
the key to understanding his theory of personal identity. 
Unfortunately Bayley employs James' notion of conception to 
reduce the Jamesian "I" to a collection of organic movements 
that are tied together simply by the concept self. No doubt 
James would regard this as another extreme case of "anti-
8Piri tualist fevor." _Q£. cit. 
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In his chapter on conception James pointed out that 
~hether there exists any real identity in the things 
themselves or not, we would never notice an identity if we 
had no sense of sameness. We choose "the point of view of 
the mind's structure alone." 185 James was well aware of 
the fact that for any object to be experienced as "the same," 
its various perspectival apearances which consciousness 
grasps in separate temporal moments must be treated by 
oonsciousness as being aspects of the same object. The 
notion of something that remains identical amidst the 
variation of its appearances and is evidently independent of 
them is accomplished through the "sense of sameness." 
James believes that we are masters of our meanings and 
sameness is found in the world of the meant. Due to the 
•principle of constancy" in the mind's meanings, one is 
always able, and always conscious of being able, to think 
about the same one thought of before. Although he denied we 
ever get the same sensation twice, James insisted we do 
encounter the same objects of thought all the time. For 
James, things can be experienced as "the same" only by a mind 
Which can grasp them and hold them before itself through the 
flux of temporal experience. Here James is offering us his 
version of the principle of intentionality. According to 
this phenomenological principle, consciousness can grasp, in 
a real, intentional act, an objective meaning to which it can 
185 
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always return. As Herbert Spiegelberg has pointed out, the 
•sense of sameness" is just James' term for the intentional 
character of consciousness that allows me to constitute 
objects as being the same not only through my own temporal 
experience for me, but also as being the same for anyone that 
186 thinks them. 
James notes that although the thing we mean to point at 
maY change considerably without our knowledge of the 
alterations, in our meaning itself we are not deceived; our 
intention is to think of the same. Sensations may never 
repeat themselves but this is not the case with the "object 
of thought." James writes, 
Each conception ••• eternally remains what it is, 
and can never become another. The mind may change 
its states, and its meanings at different times; may 
drop one conception and take up another, but the 
dropped conception can in no intelligible sense be 
said to change into its successor ••• Thus amid the 
flux of opinions and physical things, the world of 
conceptions, or things intended to be thought about, 
stands 1B;iff and immutable, like Plato's Realm of Ideas. 
But of course James is no Platonist. Unlike Plato, 
James regards conceptions as historically acquired tools of 
the human world. He writes, 
'lol. I 
I 
••• this translation (of the perceptual into the 
conceptual order of the world) always takes place 
for the sake of some subjective interest, and ••• the 
186Herbert Spiegelberg. The Phenomenological Movement, 
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965), p. 161. 
187P . . 1 I 437 r~nc~p es, , p. . 
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conception with which we handle a bit of sensible 
experience is really nothing but a teleological 
instrument. This whole function of conceiving, of 
fixing, and holding fast to meanings, has no 
significance apart from the fact that the conceiver 
is a !aeature with partial purposes and private 
ends. 
In The Meaning of Truth James spoke of certain special 
conceptions which he refers to as "apperceiving ideas." 
These concepts, James believes, arose as "spontaneous 
variations" and have become permanent fixtures in human 
thought because of their usefulness in handling the flux of 
experience. James regards these apperceiving ideas as, 
••• definite conquests made at historic dates by our 
ancestors in their attempts to get the chaos of 
their crude individual experiences into a more 
shareable and manageable shape. They proved of such 
sovereign use as denkmittel that they are now a part 
of the very structure of our mind. We cannot play 
fast and loose with them. No experience can upset 
them. On the contrary, they apperceiv189very experience and assign it to its place. 
James treats consciousness as the realm of meaning. He 
holds that sameness is to be found neither in the constantly 
changing physical world nor in our fleeting states of 
consciousness. Sameness can be had only on the level of the 
objectively meant. On this level it is important to note 
188 rbid., I, p. 456. 
189william James, The Meaning of Truth, (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1975), p. 42. 
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that James regards the concept of self as one of our most 
primitive and colossally useful denkmitte1. 190 
Now that we have a clearer understanding of what James 
means by the "Sense of Sameness" we must now examine the role 
it plays in self-identity. The ME (the objective dimension 
of the self) is regarded by James as a highly complex 
object. Yet James believes that to recognize one's ME as 
being the same through a period of time is an achievement on 
par with the recognition that this desk is the same one I 
experienced yesterday. In the case of the desk it is not 
necessary that it be microscopically inspected to make sure 
that there has been no physical changes at all in order for 
me to experience it as the same desk; nor is necessary that 
my perspectival perceptions of the desk be identical for both 
days in order for me to experience it as the same desk. Such 
analysis is unnecessary for the experience of sameness in the 
case of the desk and the same is true of the experience of 
self-identity. Such operations are unnecessary; it is only 
necessary to analyze my meaning-intention itself. And 
according to James I can always mean the same again. Like 
the desk, the ME is an object constituted in consciousness 
and to constitute an object is to intend it as distinct from 
every other and as being the same as itself through a 
temporal flux. Although the ME is regarded by James as being 
a very complex field of cared-for objects, there is one 
190 '11' J p t' w~ ~am ames, ragma ~sm, 
University Press, 1975), pp. 84-85. 
(Cambridge: Harvard 
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primarily interesting object from which this whole field of 
care seems to radiate and that object is called the body. 
The body is that ever present object which consciousness with 
rare exceptions continually judges to be the same ME. It is 
important to note that for James the body in itself does not 
guarantee self-identity. There is no experience of an 
identical ME in the absence of those functions of 
consciousness known as care and the sense of sameness. The 
identity of the objective self requires that the body be 
cared for and judged to be identical. James writes, 
It belongs to the great class of judgments of 
sameness and there is nothing more remarkable in 
making a judgment of sameness in the first person 
than in the second or the third. The intellectual 
operations seem essential alike, whether I say "I am 
the same," or whether I say "the pen is the same, as 
yesterday." It is as easy to think the ~~~osite and 
say "neither I nor the pen is the same." 
James' meaning is clear. The ME is discovered to be the 
"same" through a series of experiences in the same way in 
which any other object of consciousness can always again be 
experienced as the "same" as was meant in an earlier 
experience. He writes, 
The sense of our personal identity, then, is 
exactly like anyone of our other perceptions of 
sameness among phenomena. It is a conclusion 
grounded either on the resemblance in a fundamental 
respect, or on the conti~~ity before the mind, of 
the phenomena compared. 
19lp . . l I r~nc~p es, , p. 315. 
192Ibid., I, p. 318. 
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James regards "absolute identity" as being one of those 
terms that are presupposed by all others and something we 
never encounter in experience but instead attain to the 
conception of it: 
••• [by] the direct perception of a difference 
between compounds (i.e. physical objects), and the 
imaginary prolongation of the direction of the 
difference to an ideal terminus, the notion of which 
w: fix and 1§3ep as one of our permanent subjects of d1SCOUrse. 
No absolute identity is to be found in the ME. Like 
every other aggregate, it changes with the passage of time. 
The numerous cases of mental breakdown, and those rare cases 
of multiple selves, and even the manner in which most of us 
view our own distant past clearly indicates that the ME is 
anything but a stable and permanent thing. Hence James calls 
it a "fluctuating material." He is thus quite serious when 
he claims that one's body by itself is no guarantee of one's 
identity as a person. The body must be judged to be 
identical and mine and this judgement is made only if the 
body is viewed with a high degree of care. Upon these 
conditions rest the maintenance of self-identity: when they 
vanish so does the self. Maintenance of self-identity is a 
continuous task in which failure is always possible. The 
identity of the ME is thus based upon care and the sense of 
sameness and in both cases the body plays a vital role for it 
193
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iS felt with the highest degree of warmth and intimacy and is 
moreover that ever present object in the field of experience. 
consequently, the body functions as the core of the ME to 
~hich all its other elements (material, social and spiritual) 
are arranged and bound. The objective dimension of the self 
(i.e. ME) is then a network of interrelated cherished objects 
which has the lived-body as its center, and it is due 
primarily to this center that there is a sense of self-
identity through the temporal flow of one's life. As James 
points out, we feel the whole cubic mass of our body 
continuously and "it gives us an unceasing sense of personal 
existence. n 194 
Let us now summarize our findings on the identity to be 
found in the Jamesian self. For James, self identity always 
entails two kinds of sameness: (1) Sameness in the self as 
knower and (2) Sameness in the self as known. 195 The first 
is provided by the functional identity of the pulses of one's 
consciousness and the second by the constituted identity of 
the ME. Each factor contributes to the identity of the self 
for each of these dimensions is an aspect of the same self. 
Together these factors, however, do not give to the self "a 
sort of metaphysical or absolute Unity in which all 
differences are overwhelmed." 196 Yet, they do give to the 
194 rbid., I, p. 316. 
195James, Psychology, Briefer Course, pp. 201-202. 
196rbid., p. 202. 
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self, the identity, "which the facts require us to 
suppose. " 19 7 James writes, 
If in the sentence 'I am the same that I was 
yesterday,' we take the 'I' broadly, it is evident 
that in many ways I am not the same. As a concrete 
ME, I am somewhat different from what I was: then 
hungry, now full; then walking, now at rest; then 
poorer, now rich; then younger, now older; etc. And 
yet in other ways I am the same, and we may call 
these the essential ways. My name and profession 
and relations to the world are identical, my face, 
my faculties and store of memories, are practically 
indistinguishable, now and then ••• the past and 
present selves compared are the same just so far as 
they are the same, and no farther. They are the 
same in kind. But this generic sameness coexist 
with generic difference just as real; and if from 
the one point of view Il§W one self, from another I 
am quite as truly many. 
197rbid., p. 203. 
198Ibid., pp. 201-202. 
PART SEVEN 
THE JAMESIAN SELF: AN APPRAISAL 
In this section we will be discussing the merits of the· 
Jamesian theory of the self. In so doing we will be 
comparing the Jamesian theory to the traditional alternative 
~eories with respect to the following issues: (1) care, (2) 
temporality, (3) agency and (4) sociality. The goal of this 
section is to show that the Jamesian approach leads to a 
richer and more adequate concept of the self than any of its 
four traditional rivals. 
These four issues, care, temporality, agency and 
sociality, have not been chosen arbitrarily. It is through a 
careful consideration of each of these experiential features 
of our personal existence that we come to realize the 
enormous contribution James has made to our understanding of 
selfhood. There are at least five reasons for taking this 
approach in our appraisal of the Jamesian self: (1) It is 
clear that an adequate theory of the self will be one that 
will not only not neglect these four experiential facts of 
human existence but will explain their inter-relationship in 
a single unified self. (2) These are the four features of 
our personal existence that have often been neglected by past 
Philosophers whose search for the self was dominated by a too 
narrow concern for the epistemological subject. (3) All four 
features (care, temporality, agency and sociality) are 
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emphasized in the Jamesian theory of the self. (4) Important 
objections can be raised regarding James• treatment of each 
of these four aspects of our personal existence. (5) The 
major uniqueness of the Jamesian theory of the self lies in 
itS bold attempt to account for all four of these attributes 
of personhood and show their inter-relationship in a single 
concrete existing self. 
A major weakness that is common in the traditional 
theories of the self is a tendency not to confront and deal 
with all the various experiential facts involved in selfhood. 
Each of the traditional approaches (Spiritualists, 
Transcendentalists, Associationists and Behaviorists) began 
with too narrow a perspective on the problem of selfhood. 
Their weakness can to a certain extent be traced to the 
narrowness of their focus. The Spiritualists started this 
trend by focusing upon the thinking attribute of our being 
to the exclusion of all else. Associationists and 
Transcendentalists, after pointing out the inadequacy of the 
Spiritualist's position, continued to make the same mistake 
of ignoring the non-cognitive dimension of the self. After 
recognizing the fruitlessness of all the above narrow 
explanations, the Behaviorists went on to develop their own 
one dimensional approach to the problem of the self in which 
the subjective dimension of the self is methodologically 
bracketed and then forgotten. 
Unlike the above, the Jamesian aproach to the problem of 
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the self is not based upon any preconceived notion of what in 
the final analysis must be the self's irreducible core. His 
iS basically a phenomenological approach in that it strives 
to be as faithful as possible to how the self manifests 
itself in experience. He is willing to sacrifice the 
"sentiment for simplicity" and to "reinstate the vague in our 
experience" in order to discover the meaning of self. As a 
result of his rigorous and unbiased approach, James 
discovered a self that is more dynamic and more complex than 
any of the traditional theories had envisioned and moreover a 
self that is experiencable. 
The great merit of the Jamesian theory of the self is 
that it addresses itself to all the experiential facts of 
selfhood without retreating to unexperienced entities or 
principles to account for them. Four basic experiential 
facts of selfhood which the Jamesian theory takes into 
account and which are not fully treated in any of the four 
major alternative approaches mentioned above are as follows: 
(1) Care is an essential feature of the self. (2) The self 
is historical and has a unique temporal structure. (3) The 
self is essentially an agent. (4) The self is essentially 
social. 
Throughout this essay we have been exploring James• 
reasons for regarding each of these four points as 
representing an essential feature of the self. The Jamesian 
theory of the self is constructed in such a way as to 
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accommodate all four of these facts. In this section we will 
be comparing James' position to each of the four traditional 
theories with regard to each of these four points. Our aim 
here is not to give a full scale critique of each of the 
major alternative theories of the self. Such a project would 
go beyond the scope of this study. Instead, our aim in this 
section is to show, one, that an adequate theory of the self 
must account for these four basic facts of selfhood and two, 
that the Jamesian theory is more adequate than its 
traditional rivals because it does a better job in this 
regard. In our appraisal of the Jamesian self we will also 
examine certain major objections that have been or can be 
raised regarding James' treatment of each of these four 
features of selfhood, and we will determine to what extent, 
if any, they weaken the case for the Jamesian self. 
A. CARE 
The words ME, then, and SELF, so far as they arouse 
feelings and connote emotional worth, are objective 
designations, meaning ALL THE THINGS which have the 
power to produce in a stream of consci~~§ness 
excitement of a certain peculiar sort. 
According to the Jamesian theory presented here, 
oonsciousness is a process of care and it is consciousness 
qua caring that is the ground of selfhood. Only where there 
is care can a self be said to exist. Care is the sign of 
selfhood. 
The significance of care has been strangely ignored by 
most philosophical descriptions of the self. It may simply 
~ another case of the most obvious feature being left 
unexamined because of its very pervasiveness. Or the reason 
for this failure may have its roots in western Philosophy's 
great emphasis upon the powers of reason and their suspicion 
of the value of subjective feelings. The primary focus of 
this tradition has been the theoretical side of human 
existence. The emphasis being here on the "I think" rather 
than the "I do." Breaking with this tradition, James 
recovered the practical side of human existence and 
discovered the role of care in selfhood. 
The self is, if it is anything at all, that which one 
cares most deeply about. This is perhaps the first thing 
199P . . 1 I 304 r1nc1p es, , p. • 
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that experience teaches us about the self. That self-love 
characterizes our existence is a fact that all men 
intuitively recognize. "Our language is laden with 
evidence," writes Gordon Allport. For he believes, "The 
commonest compound of self is selfish, and of ego, egoism. 
pride, humiliation, self esteem, narcissism are such 
prominent factors that when we speak of ego or self we often 
have in mind only this aspect of personality." 200 It is 
this aspect of selfhood that tends to be taken for granted 
and left philosophically unexplored. James, however, saw 
this factor in our existence as significant and in need of 
analysis. 
The altogether unique kind of interest which each 
human mind feels in those parts of creation which it 
can call me or mine may be a moral riddle, but it is 
a fundamental psychological fact •••• Each of us 201 dichotomizes the Kosmos in a different place •••• 
Why is self-love so common? Why is there this enormous 
correlation between the phenomenon of care and the self? 
People are all the time telling us to, "Look out for number 
one," but no one really needs to be taught this. we all do 
it quite naturally. The infant is egoism personified. This 
natural caring attitude is nonetheless easily lost sight of 
by philosophical investigators seeking the self, especially 
when they assume the object of their search is a spiritual 
substance or a pure principle of subjectivity. There is, 
200 d 11 . Gor on A port, Becom~ng, New Haven: 
University Press, 1955. pp. 44-45. 
Yale 
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however, no such blindness in James. As John Smith has 
pointed out, for James, the manifestation of selfhood first 
appears, "not in an intuitive apprehension of an ego, but in 
the discovery that we have an interest in certain parts of 
what we encounter and that we are ready to ignore the 
t n202 res • 
On the face of it, the question, why is there a strong 
correlation between the self and care? may seem ridiculous. 
one is tempted to reply, of course each individual cares for 
his self, self-preservation is an instinct that all organisms 
possess. But the two phenomena are not really the same. The 
self-preservation found in the animal kingdom involves no 
real self and no real care. Here the term self-preservation 
refers to a set of reflex reactions and the behavioristic 
"stimulus-response account" seems appropriate. This fact 
suggests that it is quite conceivable that a being similar in 
appearance to man could have evolved in which all its 
behavior was guided by its brain without consciousness being 
present and so without care or any sense of self. One has 
only to think of all the complex acts the body already 
~rforms without a conscious awareness, to rediscover the 
uniqueness of the presence of care. I have in mind here the 
various complex operations of our internal organs. In light 
Of these observations, the question, why is there a strong 
202John Smith, Themes in American Philosophy, New York: 
Harper & Row, 1970, p. 77. 
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correlation between the self and care? does not seem 
ridiculous. The nature of the relationship between caring 
and the self now appears as something requiring a more 
~netrating phenomenological exploration. 
The relationship between care and the self James 
examined from a new perspective. Scientific revolutions are 
often born out of merely taking a different perspective on an 
issue, or viewing an old problem in a new context, or asking 
a whole new set of questions. Copernicus and Darwin are 
prime examples of this. James leaps past the obvious 
question: How come this thing called the self generates so 
much care? He ponders instead the question: Could it be 
that it is care which is responsible for the generation of 
the self? He concludes that caring is not the result of 
•mineness," but is rather the root of it. His 
phenomenological analysis of the phenomenon of selfhood leads 
him to the discovery that care is a constitutive factor in 
the formation of one's material, social, and spiritual ME. 
All objects that enter and form a part of my total historic 
~do so through the medium of care. I don't care for these 
objects because I sense somehow they have a reference to some 
•inner principle of subjectivity," rather I identify with 
these objects because I care for them. 
To have a self that I can care for, nature must 
first present me with some object interesting enough 
to make me instinctively wish to appropriate it for 
its own sake, and out of it to manufacture one of 
those material, social or spiritual selves which we 
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spriritualists embrace in their investigation of human 
existence. This, however, represents only one dimension of 
selfhood and it is not at all clear that it is even its 
primary dimension. Even the self of the professional 
philosopher is not so one dimensional. Even Hume played his 
backgammon. James does not view the subjecthood of the self 
as primary. For him, all knowing is for a doing. Both truth 
and meaning in James' Pragmatic philosophy are grounded in 
terms of action and consequences in the real world. I'm 
confident that James would applaud the comment of John 
Macmurray: "Against the assumption that the Self is, at 
least primarily, a 'knowing subject,' I have maintained that 
its subjecthood is a derivative and negative aspect of its 
agency." 20 5 
Care also did not find its way in the Associationists' 
account of the self. After correctly criticizing the 
substantial soul theory, Hume continued down the 
Spiritualists' same narrow path of equating identity of self 
with identity of mind. As in the case with Descartes, the 
epistemic self became Hume's sole concern. As a result, Hume 
ended up with a self that was a bundle of passive unrelated 
impressions and ideas. The practical effect being that the 
Single soul substance was displaced by a chain of little 
substances each having the same independent status of the 
205John Macmurray, The Self as Agent (London: Faber 
ana Faber Limited, 1953), pp. 11-12. 
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original Cartesian substance. What Hume failed to fully 
appreciate was that certain impressions involve a special 
warmth and intimacy. In other words, consciousness cares 
roore for some of its objects than others, and it especially 
cares for that object called the body. If one ignores the 
role of care in selfhood, one is easily led to also ignore 
the role of the most cared for object, the body. If the 
dynamic telic nature of consciousness is lost sight of, one 
can easily be misled into identifying the self with all the 
contents of consciousness, or finding this distasteful, 
concluding the self must be a fiction. 
Care also plays no role in the transcendentalist's 
theory of the self. There can be no great warm regard for an 
empty ego. The phenomenon of self-love or self-esteem can't 
refer to love or esteem for the barren ego that Kant presents 
us with. One does not identify with a pure principle of 
subjectivity for one can't care for that which transcends all 
possible experience. Kant would admit that his 
transcendental ego forms no part of the cherished objective 
self, but he would insist nonetheless that it does constitute 
the self as knower. James points out that it is unnecessary 
and foolish to posit a second mysterious self hiding behind 
the self that we do in fact experience and care for. There 
may be unknown conditions that are required for the 
Possibility of experience, but whatever they may be they are 
no more deserving of the name "self" than the oxygen one 
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breathes which one may also view as a condition for 
consciousness. The experiential cherished self is the only 
real self and it is the self as both knower and doer. 
To sum up, then, we see no reason to suppose that 
•self-love• is primarily, or secondarily, or ever, 
love for ~fi~'s mere principle of conscious 
identity. 
The role of care in selfhood may have been ignored by 
same because of an urge to treat the self in a "scientific 
fashion" that does not involve questions of value or analysis 
of feelings. Here we have the restrictive and inadequate 
methodology of Behaviorism. Their sterile approach can never 
uncover the field of the personal for a self always 
represents a particular value system. To reveal what matters 
to you, is to reveal your very selfhood. Care can not be 
washed away or distilled with the hope of finding some 
substantial residue called, "self." When an individual is 
confused about his or her own values, we sometimes say that 
the person is suffering from an identity crisis. Far from 
~ing metaphoric, these words describe the situation quite 
accurately. Differences in care, alterations in what one 
Values, does in fact mean self-transformation. The quality 
and quantity of my self-field is determined by the direction 
and degree of my caring involvement with the objects 
Presented in consciousness. Where there is no such 
involvement, there is no self. In the account of the 
206 
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Behaviorists there is no place for a caring consciousness 
that through its efficacy both creates and maintains a self. 
aut to view man as an automaton, to explain away his behavior 
in terms of reflexes and conditioned reinforcement, and to 
treat all consciousness and feeling as epiphenomena is an 
effort not in the direction of solving the mystery of 
selfhood but of reducing it to something it is not, i.e. 
something that their quantitative measuring tools can handle 
with ease. Here is the "sentiment of rationality" once again 
forgetting its humble origin in the prereflective world of 
lived-experience. 207 
But what is this abstract numerical principle of 
identity, this 'NUMBER ONE' within me, for which, 
according to proverbial philo~8Rhy, I am supposed to 
keep so constant a 'lookout'? 
James considers in turn whether it be physiological 
adjustments, or the principle of pure subjectivity, or the 
chain of thoughts, or the soul or the pronoun I. He reaches 
the conclusion that the self for which he feels "hot regard" 
can't be any of these items. He points out that even if he 
was given all these things he would "still be cold, and fail 
to exhibit anything worthy of the name of selfishness or 
devotion to 'Number One.'"209 
207James, "The Sentiment of Rationality" in The Will 
~ Believe and Other Essays on Popular Philosophy and Human 
Immortality. New York: Dover Publications, 1956. 
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If none of these, what is it I care for in self-love? 
what is that which I cherish and seek to preserve and 
increase at all cost? It is always my total empirical 
selfhood, my historic me, which is nothing mysterious, but is 
rather a collection of objective facts. "Its own body, 
then first of all, its friends next, and finally its 
-
!firitual dispositions, must be the supremely interesting 
objects for each human mind."210 
-
A theory of the self which ignores the dominant role of 
care will not be able to deal with all the features of 
selfhood (material, social and spiritual) or account for 
their unity in a concrete individual. The fundamental ground 
of the self's temporality, agency and sociality is 
consciousness qua caring. It is through care that the self 
projects a future, has ends to motivate action, and is 
sensitive to its own image in the minds of others. Care is 
one of the experiential facts of selfhood that the Jamesian 
theory handles more adequately than the major tradi tiona! 
~counts of the self. 
It was James' rigorous faithfulness to phenomena as 
they manifest themselves in experience, i.e. his phenomeno-
l~ical approach, which prevented James from ignoring the 
dominant role of care in the field of the personal. But 
~rhaps there are good reasons for not giving care the 
central role that the Jamesian theory does. Perhaps the 
210
rbid., pp. 307-308. 
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traditional theorists of the self recognized these reasons. 
~et us now consider three such possible reasons, which may be 
formulated as a critique of the role played by care in the 
Jamesian theory of the self: (1) It turns the self into a 
by-product of an emotion and consequently trivalizes it or 
reduces it to the status of an illusion. (2) It ignores the 
fact that each of us seem to have certain elements in our 
self that we actually despise rather than cherish. (3) It 
makes the self non-public and graspable only in the first 
person. 
Let us now examine the first charge. It can be stated 
in the following manner. In making care the central 
constitutive factor in selfhood, James is making the self a 
mere product of emotionality. In so doing, he turns the self 
into a mirage, deprives it of any real agency and extends its 
boundaries to an absurd degree. Is the charge valid? There 
are many Jamesian statements that can be cited that seem to 
support the objection. 
This sort of interest is really the meaning of the 
wor~1imy.• Whatever has it is eo ipso a part of me. 
The fact remains, however, that certain special 
sorts of things tend primordially to possess this 
interest, and form the natural me •••• The phenomenon 
of passion is in origin and essence the same, 
whatever be the target upon which it is discharged; 
and what the target 2i2tually happens to be is solely a question of fact. 
211 Ibid., p. 308. 
212Ibid., p. 309. 
196 
In its widest possible sense, however, a man's Self 
is the sum total of all that he can call his, not 
only his body and his psychic powers, but his 
clothes and his house, his wife and children, his 
ancestors and friends, his reputation and works, his 
lands and horses, and yacht and bank account. All 
these things give him the same emotions. If they 
wax and prosper, he feels triumphant: if they 
dwindle and die away, he feels cast down -- not 
necessarily in the same degre2 1~or each thing, but in much the same way for all. 
The words, ME, then, and SELF, so far as they arouse 
feeling and connote emotional worth, are objective 
designations, meaning ALL THE THINGS which have the 
power to produce in a stream of consci~~~ness 
excitement of a certain peculiar sort. 
What is this "excitement of a peculiar sort" which all 
these objects elicit? Is it simply an emotion? Does James 
ever specify in any clear consistent way what this 
"excitement" is that personalizes a certain portion of one's 
field of consciousness? James' vocabulary seems to suggest 
that it is something like an emotion, but the truth is he 
never clearly defined the care which personalizes. He has 
referred to this special mode of care as: "the sting of 
interest," "love," "emotional involvement," "sense of 
importance," "intimacy," "animal warmth" and "excitement of a 
Peculiar sort." On the face of it, it seems a case can be 
made for claiming that James makes the self a product of an 
emotion. There is evidence, however, which suggest that this 
213Ibid., pp. 279-280. 
214 Ibid., p. 304. 
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was not James' basic intention. If one considers first his 
quasi-behavioristic theory of the emotions and second his 
description of the fifth trait of thought as selectivity, one 
is led to believe that the care which personalizes the 
objects in the field of consciousness is not a particular 
emotion but is rather the interest which is present always in 
consciousness as the ground of its selectivity. In other 
words, care is not a particular feeling such as fear or love 
or hate but is rather consciousness itself viewed in terms of 
its selectivity which according to James is on going. James 
writes, "If one must have a single name for the condition 
upon which the impulsive and inhibitive quality of objects 
depends one had better call it their interest." 215 
We may be here going beyond certain explicit remarks of 
James. This, however, should cause us no concern since it is 
not the purpose of this essay to merely restate James' 
explicit position. From the start, our goal has been rather 
to present a Jamesian theory of the self that is based upon 
his valuable insights regarding the nature of consciousness 
and the self, the inter-relationship of these insights, and 
their necessary implications. It is James' confusing and 
even overwhelming richness which we must both draw upon and 
amend. 
In the Jamesian posture, care is not a particular 
emotion such as is fear, love or hate. Care is a term that 
215Ibid., II, p. 1164. 
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refers to the volitional focus within consciousness. To 
attend, to select, or to think is to care. The care which 
forms one's objective self is nothing other than the 
interested and choosing feature of consciousness which James 
refers to as the fifth trait of thought. The following words 
of James are from his section dealing with the selectivity of 
consciousness. 
But in my mind and your mind the rejected portions 
and the selected portions of the original world-
stuff are to a great extent the same •••• There is, 
however, one entirely extraordinary case in which no 
two men ever are known to choose alike. One great 
splitting of the whole universe into two halves is 
made by each of us; and for each of us almost all of 
the interest attaches to one of the halves; but we 
all draw the line of division between them in a 
different place. When I say that we all call the 
two halves by the same names, and that those names 
are •me• and •not-me216espectively, it will at once be seen what I mean. 
He does not abandon this position when it comes to his 
chapter on the self. In fact, he reasserts it and refers 
~ck to the section dealing with the selectivity of 
consciousness. James makes the following statement in his 
chapter on the self. 
This is as strong an example as there is of that 
selective industry of the mind on which I insisted 
some pages back (p. 284 ff). Our thought, 
incessantly deciding, among many things of a kind, 
which ones for it shall be realities, here chooses 
one of many possible selves or characters, and 
forthwith reckons it no shame to fail i~ 1;ny of those not adopted expressly as its own. 
216 rb;d., I 277 ~ , p. . 
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consciousness is not regarded by James as a chain of 
passive witnesses or simple awareness; for him it's a roaring 
river of care. Care is always present in experience in 
various degrees. It not only helps constitute one's self, it 
also helps constitute one's life-world. James' notion of the 
intentionality of consciousness is primarily teleological. 
ae views it as intrinsically purposeful. It involves 
interests, goals and choice. Gary Kessler in his article, 
•pragmatic Bodies Versus Transcendental Egos" points out that 
it is this feature of James• theory of consciousness which 
•signals an important difference between James' notion of 
intentionality and Husserl's." 218 James is in fact closer 
to Sartre's view of consciousness as being a "for-itself" and 
•a passion for being." Here in the Jamesian posture toward 
the self we call this feature of consciousness "care." 
We must now consider an obvious objection to identifying 
care with the volitional focus of consciousness. Since this 
selectivity is involved in all the intentional objects of 
consciousness does this not imply the absurd position of 
identifying one's self with one's world? One might pause 
here and ask oneself, But is such a position so manifestly 
absurd? Is there not a sense in which one identifies with 
one's entire world? Isn't there a sense in which each of us 
personalizes his or her world? Isn • t there a sense in which 
one's world is a reflection of one's self? This is suggested 
in the following words of James: 
218Gary Kessler, "Pragmatic Bodies Versus Transcendental 
Egos," Transactions of Charles Peirce Society, Vol. 14, 
Pp. 101-119, Spring 1978. p. 109. 
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We may, if we like, by our reasoning unwind things 
back to that black and jointless continuity of space 
and moving clouds of swarming atoms which science 
calls the only real world. But all the while the 
world we feel and live in will be that which our 
ancestors and we, by slowly cumulative strokes of 
choice, have extricated out of this, like sculptors, 
by simply rejecting certain portions of the given 
stuff. Other sculptors, other statues from the same 
stone! Other minds, other worlds from the same 
monotonous and inexpressive chaos! My world is but 
one in a million alike embedded, alike real to those 
who may abstract them. How different must be the 
world~ 1~n the consciousness of ant, cuttle-fish, or crab! 
Nevertheless, James does not incorporate all the objects 
of consciousness into the self. The world remains divided 
into self and non-self despite the ubiquitousness of care. 
The objective self is simply those objects which evoke an 
extremely intense and enduring form of care. One's body and 
other objects in practical relation to it tend to be the only 
part of one's world to illicit this habitual and intense form 
of care. In this way, it can be said that care is 
constitutive of both the self and world without equating one 
with the other. It is because the same creative force is at 
~rk in determining both the meaning of self and world, that 
~have a self which is a "fluctuating material" and a 
situation in which the boundaries between self and world are 
vague and shifting all the time. For James the "sting of 
interest" is fundamental for both the sense of the real world 
or belief and the sense of self. The distinction between the 
219 
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tWO seems to be simply that the world includes all that is 
continuously related to the self in a spatial, temporal, or 
causal manner and not only that portion of reality for which 
one has a "hot regard. n The embodied self remains the 
•anchor" of reality but it is not the whole of reality. The 
feeling of emotional involvement and interest is called for 
bY both the self and the lived-world. The self is simply 
that portion of the world which generates the most intense 
form of care. 
One might still claim, however, that this intense and 
enduring form of care ought to be regarded as an emotion even 
if the other modes of care are not. There are good reasons 
for not treating James' personalizing care as an emotional 
state. (1) Personalizing care is always present in 
consciousness but we are not always in agitated states. 
(2) Personalizing care involves a sense of worthwhileness, 
of interest, of importance but these are not necessarily 
~esent in what we call an emotion. (3) Personalizing care 
involves a sense of warmth and importance that makes for 
efficiency and unity while emotional excitement tends to 
cause just the opposite. For example, a healthy self-regard 
tends to be viewed as a positive factor for doing well on a 
test, but being in an emotional state tends to be viewed as a 
negative factor here. 
Gordon Allport takes a similar view in his distinction 
~tween what he calls propriate states (i.e. ego-involved 
states) and emotional states. He writes: 
Each lasting sentiment in personality is a propriate 
state, but only on occasion does a sentiment erupt 
into emotion. An Amundsen planning for decades to 
fly over the North Pole is constantly ego-involved 
but rarely agitated. It is true that all propriate 
striving is felt to be important and laden with 
value -- in this sense it is an affective state: but 
the sense of warmth and importance makes for 
efficiency and unity, not for the disruption and 
disintegration that often accompany emotional 
excitement •••• We cannot, ther2~3re, permit the two 
conditions to be confused •••• 
we must take a similar position in our Jamesian theory 
with regard to care and emotionality. They are not to be 
confused in our theory of the self. 
Thus we see that it is not true that the Jamesian theory 
makes the self a mere product of emotionality. Care is not 
the same as an emotion but is rather the ground of all 
emotions, actions and relations that form one's personal 
life. The first objection to the role given to care in the 
Jamesian theory is without merit. 
We must now consider another possible objection to the 
role played by care in the Jamesian theory of the self. In 
~e form of a question it could be stated as follows: "How 
can care be the ground of my objective self, if there are 
~pects of my self which I truly dislike?" How do persons 
account for those sections of their selfhood that they 
despise and loathe if care is regarded as that which forms 
220 Allport, Becoming, p. 59. 
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the objective self? It seems that nearly all of us have such 
uncherished features that are recognized nonetheless as 
elements of the self. I'm not particularly fond of the shape 
of mY nose, but I still view it as mine. My disliking it, 
doesn't mean I disown it. Doesn't such an example serve as 
testimony against the Jamesian view that it is only through 
care that objects form a part of the self. 
Robert Ehman believes this is a real flaw in James' 
theory. He writes, " ••• James fails to account for our 
feeling of the relevance of our self of certain items in 
which we have no interest and to which we may fail to respond 
• 11 n221 emot1ona y •••• 
This second objection is actually related to the first 
objection which we have just considered. It is based on the 
presumption that the care which personalizes is an emotion, 
that particular emotion called love. As we have already 
shown, it is not. Thus there is no inconsistency in saying 
that care is the author of selfhood and at the same time 
agreeing that there are features of my self that I don't 
like. The opposite of personalizing care is not hate or a 
feeling of dislike. Care means interest, worth and 
mportance and more than objects of love fall into this 
category. A person is in fact interested in, values and 
221Robert Ehman, "William James and the Structure of 
~e Self," New Essays in Phenomenology, ed. by James Edie, 
Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1969. pp. 260-261. 
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regards as important those things which he hates for one 
reason or another. A person must be interested in and view 
as important the object of hate if one is going to sustain 
that emotion in consciousness. If care has an opposite, it 
would have to be described as something like absolute 
disinterest and perfect insulation. In other words, it would 
have the characteristic of a thing, that is simply 
•en soi" in the Sartrian sense. 
Thus we see that this second objection loses its force 
as soon as we understand that the term "care" in our Jamesian 
theory is used in a special technical sense so that it no 
longer means simply "like" or "love" but rather refers to the 
impulsive and teleological character of consciousness itself, 
i.e. James' special brand of intentionality. 
There is another possible objection to the role of care 
in the Jamesian theory. This objection could be stated as 
follows: In making care the ground of selfhood the Jamesian 
theory turns the self into something non-public, something 
that can be grapsed only in first person experience and never 
by the Other. The objection is not valid because care 
manifest itself in one's concrete actions. 
Care is not something beyond the notice of the Other. 
James defines this caring character of consciousness in such 
a manner that its presence can be scrutinized by the Other. 
"Our interest in things means the attention and emotion which 
the thought of them will excite and the actions which their 
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presence will evoke." 222 In short, real care will be 
reflected in one's observable behavior. Just as James 
defines true belief as a willingness to act, so also one 
manifest what one really cares for through action. We don't 
have to rely on the testimony of the subject to determine the 
constituents of his particular concrete self. In fact, due 
to self deception or what Sartre calls bad faith, the Other 
maY know my self-field more accurately, especially if the 
other is an intimate friend or relative, my therapist or my 
scrupulous biographer. Prior to Sartre, James held that one 
reveals his true self in his undertakings. His actions 
define his cared-for-self not only to the Other but to 
himself as well. Here lie the seeds of his later pragmatic 
doctrine. In the Jamesian theory, the self is primarily an 
agent. Regarding its agency more will be said later. 
The Jamesian self unlike a soul or a transcendental ego 
is very public. All the objects that are cared for by 
consciousness and form a part of the Jamesian self are out 
there in the world. It is true that the caring consciousness 
itself is non-public in the Jamesian theory. Here we have 
what James calls "absolute insulation." This aspect of the 
other's self I don't have direct access to. But outside of a 
few believers in mental telepathy I don't know of anyone who 
seriously doubts the radical privacy of consciousness itself, 
and I know of no good evidence that suggest that James is 
222 
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mistaken on this point. Although it is true that the 
objective elements of the self are ordered around a 
subjective center, we mustn't forget that this subjective 
center loses its meaning apart from its objective 
circumference. In other words, I cannot care without caring 
for something, something that belongs to the shared-lived-
world. 
We see then that this third objection to the role of 
care in the Jamesian theory is invalid. The emphasis on care 
does not result in an insulated and non-public self. The 
Jamesian self is public and graspable by the Other. It is as 
public as a conscious being can be and a great deal more 
public than a soul or a transcendental ego. 
In this section we have discussed the role of care in 
the Jamesian theory of the self. We have shown why it should 
~ treated as an experiential feature of selfhood. We have 
shown how this experiential fact was not fully grasped by any 
of the four major alternative theories of the self. we have 
discussed possible objections for giving care the role that 
it has in the Jamesian theory, and we have found each of 
these objection lacking in merit. Given the above, I think 
its fair to conclude that of the theories we have discussed 
and with respect to this one basic experiential fact of 
Selfhood, the Jamesian theory is superior. 
B. TEMPORALITY 
Experience is remoulding us every moment, and our 
mental reaction on every given thing is really a 
resultant of ~~3 experience of the whole world up 
to that date. 
The self manifest itself in experience as having a 
mutable and accumulative existence in time. The self is an 
historical process such that for it there is always a future 
appearing as the temporal horizon of this self's concrete 
past. A self exists by projecting a future in the present in 
light of its past. Or as Kierkegaard put it, the self lives 
forward but understands backward. This temporal feature of 
selfhood is to a degree intuitively grasped by all men. Yet, 
it is strangely deemphasized in most theories of the self 
where it is usually discussed only in connection with the 
problem of reidentification of selves. The Jamesian theory on 
the other hand, recognizes the primacy of the self's unique 
temporali zation and tries to account for it with a dynamic 
theory of consciousness that is faithful to the "fact of 
coalescence of next with next in concrete experience.• 224 
The historical, dynamic nature of the self was not 
really attended to in the traditional theories of selfhood. 
The Spiritualists, Transcendentalists and Associationists 
223Ib;d., I 228 
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aespite their differences were all obsessed with finding 
-ithin the self a core that was impervious to change, 
development, or growth. In pursuit of this goal, each of 
these approaches to the self tended to ignore the historical 
character of the self. James on the other hand was obsessed 
onlY with faithfully describing the self just as it revealed 
itself in experience. In this way, James came to recognize 
that the self exhibited a mixture of sedimentation and 
spontaneity. For James, the flux and flow quality of the 
self is primordial and to ignore it is to lose sight of the 
nature of the self altogether. 
one need only ponder one's life in the following manner 
suggested by James to realize that the self is nothing frozen 
in time. 
From one year to another we see things in new 
lights. What was unreal has grown real, and what 
was exciting is insipid. The friends we used to 
care the world for are shrunken to shadowsi the 
women, once so divine, the stars, the woods, and the 
waters, how now so dull and commoni the young girls 
that brought an aura of infinity, at present hardly 
distinguishable existencesi the pictures so emptyi 
and as for the books, what was there to find so 
mysteriously signi2~5ant in Goethe, or in John Mill 
so full of weight? 
The soul and the transcendental ego are both appealing 
concepts in that they seem to offer us a persisting permanent 
self that stretches unaltered all the way from the moment of 
conception to the moment of death (and for those who identify 
225Principles, I, pp. 227-228. 
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the soul and the self beyond even death). But before we 
embrace either of these solutions, we ought to consider 
whether experience reveals the self as having such enduring 
~rmanence. I for one, can't imagine much in common between 
mY present self and the self of my infant days that was 
reported to me by my parents or between either of these and 
the possible future self of my senile days when I may not be 
capable of even recognizing the members of my own family. 
When I reflect upon my experiences, I don't discover any 
absolute core of permanence. I find rather a flux of 
~rceptions, feelings, thoughts and desires. Amid this flux 
there does appear to be one comparatively stable structure 
and that is the feeling of embodiment. My body seems to be 
in one way or another related to all my experiences. Yet, 
even here there is not found that core of absolute 
~rmanence. My body changes. Its cells are constantly being 
replaced by new cells. It both grows and decays. That old 
photograph of my ten pound body, for example, doesn't seem to 
have many affinities with any of my wedding photographs. In 
my own case I can't find the persisting permanent self that 
is spoken of by both the Spiritualists and the 
Transcendentalists. 
The Associationists rightly recognized that there was no 
absolute permanence to be found in experience. They, 
however, wrongly believed that there ought to be if there is 
9oing to exist a self. Hume concluded that the self was a 
fiction. He should have concluded that the self is a dynamic 
process involving both sedimentation and spontaneity, that it 
iS mutable and capable of both growth and decay, that it is 
in short, historical. 
James offers us the following penetrating description of 
the self's mutability: 
In the first place, although its changes are 
gradual, they become in time great •••• Well from 
infancy to old age, this assemblage of feelings, 
most constant of all, is yet prey to slow mutation. 
Our powers, bodily and mental, change at least as 
fast. Our possessions notoriously are perishable 
facts •••• The identity which the I discovers, as it 
surveys this long procession, can only be a relative 
identity, that of a slow shifting in wh~~g there is 
always some common ingredient retained. 
The Behaviorists can not provide a satisfactory account 
of the historical character of the self because for them 
there is no retention of the past or projection of a future. 
For the Behaviorists, events merely leave an altered physical 
organism. Just as a nail once bent tends to bend again when 
hit without memory or projection. The bent nail example is 
B. F. Skinner's own way of illustrating the effect of 
experience on man. Skinner maintains that there can only be 
a response to a present reinforcer. Distant goals, Skinner 
insist are achievable only by means of a series of 
conditioned reinforcers not because there is a self that can 
Project into the future a different state of affairs than is 
226 Ib1"d., I 351 , p. • 
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given in the present. In the hands of Behaviorists like 
Skinner the self loses all its historicity and becomes a 
chain of "it" processes. Their view of consciousness as a 
mere ephiphenomena prevents them from recognizing 
sedimentation and spontaneity as real aspects of being a 
self. The Behaviorists are committed to treating the self as 
just another thing in the physical world where time is a 
series of nows and each now is equivalent to any other now. 
The self is, however, not a thing, and its existence is not 
confined to a "now" but is rather spread out through all 
three dimensions of time simultaneously. 
James grounds the self's historicity in the 
temporalistic and caring character of consciousness. The 
continuous acts of appropriation by the present active pulse 
of consciousness makes possible the accumulative and stable 
character of the self. Here we have the self's 
sedimentation. Care, the selective character of 
consciousness makes possible the growing dynamic character of 
the self through both its interpretation of its past and its 
projection of its future. Here we have the self's 
spontaneity. The self reveals itself in experience as 
continuously involving both sedimentation and spontaneity. 
It is a free force that always finds itself moving in a 
particular direction which it can sustain or alter for it has 
no destiny. The Jamesian self conceived as a subjective-
Objective temporal process (I< ,ME) takes into account the 
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experiential growth and decay as well as the stability that 
is exhibited by the self. The Spiritualists and the 
Transcendentalists treat the self more or less as if it was a 
finished product from the moment of its appearance while the 
Behaviorists view it as a finished product once it is 
thoroughly conditioned by its environment. Each of the 
alternative views fail to appreciate the fact that 
"Experience is remolding us every moment ••• " 227 and that 
"The problem with ••• man is less what act he shall now choose 
to do, than what being he shall now resolve to beco~e." 228 
James on the other hand offers us a theory of the self that 
recognizes the fact that the self is more a "becoming" than a 
"block of being." 
To use the term "becoming" to describe the self is to 
emphasize the fact that the self is future orientated. The 
temporal character of the self is reflected not only in the 
past horizon of consciousness but also in consciousness's 
projection of a future horizon. James refers to one's 
projected future self as one's potential self. Thus a person 
identifies not only with one's past ME but also with one's 
future ME. He notes that with regard to each of the three 
areas of the ME, material, social and spiritual, each of us 
distinguishes between the present and actual and the future 
and potential. Also pointed out is the fact most of our 
227Ibid., I, p. 228. 
228Ibid., I, p. 277. 
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attention and energy is directed towards the future ME for we 
are beings who live forward. To understand a particular 
concrete self, it is not enough to know its past; one must 
also know its dreams and aspirations, i.e. its projected 
future ME. Like Sartre, James believes each self is a being-
towards-some-ideal, a project in the making. The future ME 
that consciousness projects forms a genuine part of one's 
present existence. This future directed character of the 
self was ignored by the Behaviorists who saw only the past 
history of reinforcement and by the Spiritualists and 
Transcendentalists who sought only permanence for the self. 
Unlike these alternative theories the Jamesian theory 
recognizes the fact that the self is more than a sedimentated 
past, it is also an intended future. A self is always "on 
the way," always "becoming." As Craig Eisendrath has pointed 
out, the Jamesian self is primarily a "scheme of intention" 
and what it is intending "is its own future.• 229 
Like Merleau-Ponty, James recognized that the self was 
not a "thing" nor a "transcendental subject" but rather that 
which seemed to possess features of both for it manifested 
itself as a "becoming," as if it lay between being and non-
being. Because of these unique features Merleau-Ponty has 
called the self "time." James does not refer to the self as 
time, but he does claim that the "specious present" which is 
229craig Eisendrath, The Unifying Moment (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 128. 
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the present pulse of subjectivity is the ground of all 
experiential time for through it all three dimensions of time 
are felt simultaneously. James recognized, with Merleau-
Ponty, that time can not be derived from its parts. All 
three dimensions, past, present and future, must be felt 
together in what James calls the specious present and Merleau-
Ponty calls the field of presence. James describes it this 
way: "In short, the practically cognized present is no 
knife-edge, but a saddle-back, with a certain breadth of its 
own on which we sit perched, and from which we look in two 
directions into time." 230 Both James and Merleau-Ponty, 
who studied James extensively, recognized that the self is 
not a substance but is rather a subjective-objective temporal 
process. 
To say that the self is historical means among other 
things that it has a unique stream of past experiences that 
are currently influencing its present activity including its 
activity of experiencing. Non-reproductive memory, i.e. 
sedimentation, is always guiding our spontaneity and its 
projection of a future. James was fond of quoting 
Kierkegaard's remark, "We live forward, we understand 
backward." 231 Like Kierkegaard, James believed that the 
self is stretched out through time. Our sedimentated past is 
presently affecting the meaning of everything in our present 
230
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situation. our present experience of the world is a function 
of our sedimentated interests, concepts, and habits of 
perception. We tend to ignore the influence of our 
sedimentated past when we don't actively recall it and 
reflect upon it, but the influence of past experiences is 
continuous and growing and so the self is accumulative. To 
illustrate this point let us ponder how it was possible for 
me to write the previous sentence. The sentence would never 
have been written had I not available to me in the present a 
sedimentated vocabulary, grammar, rules of punctuation, a 
specific knowledge regarding the self, an awareness of what I 
wrote in the preceding sentence, and the already acquired 
physical skill of writing itself. Though I need all this 
past to write the sentence, recollection is not required for 
the self is so intrinsically historical that its past is 
always already there in its present. Each mental state is 
for James " ••• a record in which the eye of Omniscience might 
read all the frozen history of its owner." 23 2 
It is hard to imagine this condensation of our past in 
our lived present. We have no good models or metaphors to 
describe it. James does, however, offer us the following: 
"There is thus a sort of perspective projection of past 
objects upon present consciousness, similar to that of wide 
landscapes upon a camera-screen." 233 Though this enormous 
232 
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accumulative character of experience is hard to conceive, it 
is nevertheless clear that selfhood is inconceivable without 
it. 
Robert Ehman is in agreement with James here. He 
writes, "The nature of our past experiences now affects the 
meaning that objects have for USi and unless we had already 
learned certain concepts, acquired certain interests, and had 
certain emotional reactions to things, we would not now 
experience them in the manner that we do." 234 
There is a special phenomenon which testifies to the 
mutability of the self in a dramatic way. The phenomenon 
that I have in mind is that abnormality known as multiple 
personalities. Such cases of selfhood are unexplainable by 
those theories of the self that stress permanence above all 
else. Cases of multiple personalities suggest that a single 
body can on rare occasions enjoy the presence of more than 
one self. Assuming such strange happenings are possible and 
the empirical evidence for it is growing stronger all the 
time, it weakens the case for those theories that ignore the 
dynamic character of the self. 235 First of all, two selves 
per body suggest that the.self is not to be identified with 
the physiological mass known as the body. Second, two selves 
per body suggest th•at the self is not to be identified with 
234Ehman, "William James and the Structure of the 
Self,"££· cit., p. 268. 
235see R. D. Laing, The Divided Self and John Perry, 
"Can the Self Divide?", Journal of Philosophy, (September, 1972). 
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the soul for souls are by definition unsplitable and come one 
to a body. Third, two selves per body suggest that the self 
is not to be identified with the pure ego for like the soul 
it too is by definition unsplitable and comes one to a body. 
The phenomenon of multiple selves favors none of the 
traditional approaches to selfhood but instead suggests a 
process view of the self such as James offers us. 
Let us now consider how the Jamesian account could 
handle the case of multiple selves. It is possible in the 
Jamesian theory for the field of the Me to hold uncompatible 
objects. Since in principle any object can enter the self 
field by being cared for by consciousness, it is possible for 
the contents of one's objective self to come into conflict. 
The incompatibility of certain parts of my empirical ME may 
lead to a splitting of the ME. The normal tendency is toward 
integrating and unifying the various parts of the "me", but 
one can imagine situations where the reverse happens and a 
fissure is created in one's objective self. Imagine if you 
will a woman who has conflicting aspirations, one towards 
being a nun and another towards motherhood. It is 
conceivable that if both aspirations are nourished and grow 
in equal strength that a split in the self may occur so that 
multiple personalities would be the result. Such an event 
could be represented symbolically in the following way: 
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I~\ ~ME I ( ,ME I~ME 
Normal Conflict Split Personality 
( 1) (2) (3) 
Figure three shows how it is possible for a single body 
to support more than one self. Here each I( )ME represents a 
self, i.e. a single unified subjective-objective process. 
The split would be the result of the formation of conflicting 
fields of care. 
The above is not meant as a scientific solution to the 
mystery of multiple personalities. Our intention here is 
only to show that the existence of such phenomena would not 
invalidate the Jamesian self as it would those traditional 
theories that exaggerate the permanence to be found in 
selfhood and fail to appreciate the historical and dynamic 
character of the self. 
From what has been said so far it should be apparent 
that the Jamesian theory does a better job of recognizing the 
dynamic temporal character of the self when compared to any 
of the traditional alternative views. To the extent that it 
better attends to this particular experiential fact of 
selfhood, the Jamesian theory offers us additional evidence 
of its superiority. But before passing judgment in this 
regard, we must consider certain major objections concerning 
James' treatment of the self's temporality. 
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Although one of the merits of the Jamesian theory is 
that it recognizes and takes into account the historical 
character of the self, certain objections can be raised 
regarding the principles it employs to account for the self's 
unique temporal structure. The main problem concerns the 
theory of appropriation by pulses of consciousness. 
Regarding his theory of appropriation, James is at times both 
vague and inconsistent. Here once again we must make an 
effort to amend his confusing richness while constructing a 
sound theory of the self based on James' insights and the 
interrelationship of these insights and their necessary 
implications. 
In the chapter on the self, James describes the act of 
appropriation by the present pulse of consciousness as not 
being automatic but involving a judgment of identity based on 
a feeling of warmth and intimacy. Here he writes that each 
new pulse of consciousness, "knows its own predecessor, and 
finding it 'warm,' in the way we have described, greets it, 
saying: 'Thou art mine, and part of the same self with 
me.•n 236 But in the same chapter he also describes it as 
being an automatic process. "But the essence of the matter 
to common-sense is that the past thoughts never were wild 
cattle, they were always owned. The Thought does not capture 
them, but as soon as it comes into existence it finds them 
already its own.n 237 Which position are we to regard as 
236P ' ' 1 I 322 r~nc~p es, , p. . 
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representing James' ultimate position regarding the act of 
appropriation? 
James' treatment of consciousness in his chapter on the 
stream of thought which preceded his discussion of the self 
suggest that the act of appropriation is automatic. The 
third trait of thought declares that consciousness is always 
continuous. If the act of appropriation was not automatic 
but involved a judgment in which rejection was always 
possible, then the third trait Qf thought is false. 
Consciousness, then, does not appear to itself 
chopped up in bits. Such words as 'chain' or 
'train' do not describe it fitly as it presents 
itself in the first instance. It is nothing 
jointed1 it flows. A 'river' or a 'stream' are the 
metaphors by which it is most naturally described. 
In talking of it hereafter, let us call it the 
stream of though2~ 8of consciousness, or of subjective life. 
James treatment of our experience of time which came 
after his discussion of the self also suggest that the act of 
appropriation is automatic. According to James' famous 
doctrine of the "specious present" there is always a 
retention of the past and a projection of the future in each 
living present. If the act of appropriation was not 
automatic but involved a judgment in which rejection was 
always possible, then James' doctrine of the specious present 
is false. 
238 Ib1'd., I 233 
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These lingerings of old objects, these incomings of 
new, are the germs of memory and expectation, the 
retrospective and the prospective sense of time. 
They give that continuity to conscious~3§s without 
which it could not be called a stream. 
The following words from Essays in Radical Empiricism 
also seem to suggest the pre-reflective character of the act 
of appropriation. 
The conjunctive relation that has given most trouble 
to philosophy is the co-conscious transition, so to 
call it, by which one experience passes into another 
when both belong to the same self. About the facts 
there is no question. My experiences and your 
experiences are 'with' each other in various 
external ways but mine pass into mine, and yours 
pass ina yours in a way in which yours and mine 
never pass into each other •••• Personal histories are 
processes of change in time, and the change i~folf 
is one of the things immediately experienced. 
The view that the act of appropriation is pre-reflective 
and automatic is the position that is most compatible with 
James' other theories concerning the self, consciousness, and 
time. It is therefore the position adopted in our Jamesian 
theory of the self. 
But though the accumulation of experience is an 
automatic process, the ,sedimentation that is thus available 
to us is still open to interpretation. In other words, how 
we wish to view our appropriate past is still up to us. 
239 Ibid., I, pp. 571-572. 
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we must now look at another apparent inconsistency in 
James theory of the act of appropriation. James seems to 
maintain at the same time that consciousness always reveals 
itself as a stream and that consciousness consist of 
continuous pulses of appropriating thought. How can he hold 
both these views? Marcus Peter Ford thinks James is wrong in 
adopting both views. He writes, "He [James] realized that 
according to his analysis the self must be a series of 
thoughts, each in some manner really distinct from past 
thoughts of the same self, and yet he could not 
introspectively verify that individual thought exist ••• 
According to experience "thinking goes on." There is a 
stream of thoughts, not a chain." 241 
James is really not being inconsistent here. If new 
pulses of thought are constantly appearing and appropriating 
past pulses of thought, consciousness "becomes" a flowing 
stream. The stream exist from the standpoint of the present 
pulse of appropriating thought. Without pulses of 
appropriating thought, consciousness could not manifest 
itself as a stream and our experience would be of unrelated 
impressions without even the feeling of succession. In other 
words, the stream of thought presupposes the existence of an 
appropriating present pulse of consciousness. 
Regarding the present pulse of thought and how its 
appropriation makes possible the stream character of 
241Marcus Peter Ford, William James• Philosophy, 
(Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1982), p. 22. 
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consciousness, James writes: 
It appropriates to itself, it is the actual focus of 
accretion, the hook from which the chain of past 
selves dangles, planted firmly in the Present, which 
alone passes for real, and thus keeping the chain 
from being a purely ideal thing. Anon the hook 
itself will drop into the past with all it carries, 
and then be treated as an object and appropriated by 
a new Thought in the 2~2w present which will serve as living hook in turn. 
Thus we see that it is the present pulse of consciousness 
which serves as the anchor for the entire past stream which 
would vanish but for its act of appropriation. It is through 
appropriation that consciousness becomes a stream and it is 
the present pulse of consciousness that does the 
appropriating. Thus I see no problem with James maintaining 
that there are continuous pulses of appropriating thought and 
also that consciousness reveals itself as a stream. 
There is another difficulty concerning James' theory of 
appropriation which we must consider. In the form of a 
question it reads as follows: "How can the present pulse of 
consciousness which has no knowledge of itself and is as James 
says 'the darkest in the whole series,' appropriate anything 
to itself?" This is one difficulty that James clearly 
anticipated. His solution to the problem is simple. "Its 
(the present pulse of thought) appropriations are therefore 
less to itself than to the most intimately felt part of its 
242 
. . 1 323 Pr1nc1p es, I, p. . 
224 
present Object, the body •••• n 243 He states the same 
position once again in a footnote. "The sense of my bodily 
existence, however, obscurely recognized as such, may then be 
the absolute original of my conscious selfhood, the 
fundamental perception that I am. All appropriations may be 
made to it, by a Thought not at the moment immediately 
cognized by itself." 244 
We have shown that the difficulties discussed above are 
not disastrous for James' theory of appropriation. 
Nevertheless, the act of appropriation remains for us a rather 
obscure process. 245 This is as it should be for we lack 
"knowledge about" the appropriating present pulse of 
consciousness. Subjectivity itself is only felt as we live 
through it. When we try to grasp the present appropriating 
thought in reflection, we transform this pulse of subjectivity 
into a mere object. That the condition of all objectivity is 
not subject to objectification should not surprise us. This 
is why it is "the darkest of the whole series." James 
acknowledges the obscurity of the act of appropriation. He 
writes, "The only point that is obscure is the act of 
appropriation itself." 246 But James adds that this process 
is much less obscure than the imagined soul or transcendental 
243 Ibid. 
244 Ibid., p. 324 n. 
245 A. J. Ayer regards this as the "chief weakness" of 
James' account of the self. 2£· cit., p. 278. 
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ego which is not even felt and moreover it does the job that 
they were invented to explain. 
It is impossible to discover any verifiable features 
in personal identity, which this sketch does not 
contain, impossible to imagine how any transcedent 
non-phenomenal sort of an Arch-Ego, were he there, 
could shape matters to any other result, or be known 
in time by any other fruit, then just this production 
of a stream of consciousness each •section' of which 
should know, and knowing, hug to itself and adopt, 
all those that went before -- thus standing as the 
representative of the entire past stream; and which 
should similarly adopt the objects a12~'dy adopted by 
any portion of this spiritual stream. 
Unlike its traditional rivals, the Jamesian theory does 
not try to disguise the intrinsic historical character of the 
self. James feels that it is time we recognize rather than 
camouflage the "becoming" character of the self. Experience 
reveals the self as being not pure permanence but rather a 
dynamic temporal process involving both sedimentation and 
spontaneity. This dynamic process is made possible through 
continuous acts of appropriation by consciousness. we have 
shown that the major objections to the theory of appropriation 
are without merit. We have admitted that there is a certain 
unavoidable obscurity regarding the act of appropriation by 
the present pulse of subjectivity, but in so doing we have 
noted that this obscurity is nothing compared to the mystery 
surrounding the alternative explanations which posit 
unexperiencable permanence. With regard to the experiential 
247 Ibid., p. 322. 
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feature called temporality, the Jamesian theory of the self 
' 
must be regarded as more adequate than the traditional 
alternative explanations. 
The Jamesian theory not only does a better job of 
recognizing the primordial role of care in selfhood, it is 
also superior in its treatment of the undeniable temporal 
character of the self. We must now evaluate the Jamesian 
theory in terms of another experiential feature of selfhood, 
agency. 
C. AGENCY 
Our acts, our turning places, where we seem to 
ourselves to make ourselves and grow, are the parts 
of the world to which we are the closest, the parts 
of which our knowledge is most intimate and 
comple~~B Why should we not take them at their face-
value? 
At the heart of James' conception of the self is the 
notion of creative effort. Like P. F. Strawson, James sees 
an intimate connection between the concept of self and the 
notion of agency. He felt that the traditional view of the 
self as primarily owner of experiences, as an enduring 
substance which somehow binds all experiences together is 
mistaken. Yes, the self is the knower, but it is this 
because it is primarily an actor. In contrasting various 
features of selfhood with the self's creative effort James 
writes, "But the effort seems to belong to an altogether 
different realm, as if it were the substantive thing which we 
are, and those were but externals which we carry.n 24 9 
The notion of agency is implicit in James' criteria for 
determining the presence of mind. His criteria is "the 
pursuance of future ends and choice of means for their 
attainment." 250 Agency is for James the indubitable 
248 . James, Pragmat1sm, (1907 edition), pp. 287-288. 
24 9 . . 1 II Pr1nc1p es, , p. 1181. 
250 Ibid., I, p. 21. 
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expression of the Self. 
The self is not simply an object that appears in 
reflection, and it is not simply a collection of personality 
traits. The self is an agent. All purposeful human action 
is action of a self. To deny this is to make all such acts 
impersonal and beyond praise or blame as the beating of one's 
heart. This "beyond dignity" approach is embraced by B. F. 
Skinner and the Behaviorists, but there are others who do so 
unwittingly when they neglect to emphasize the active 
character of the self and treat it as if it were simply 
another object in an anonymous field of experience. 251 
James has steadfastly insisted that the self has causal 
efficacy and is a real active and spontaneous force in the 
world. The self functions dynamically. Its actions include 
bodily self-seeking, social self-seeking, and spiritual 
self-seeking, and each of these are acts of an actual self 
motivated by a projected potential self. The self is not a 
shell created by the past acts of some non-personal agent. 
The self is a social, historical, and caring agent. Here the 
commonsense view must prevail: the self is a doer as well as 
a knower. James would applaud the following observation of 
Professor Macmurray, "The field of our enquiry, then, is the 
251unfortunately this view of the self as an object for 
an active but impersonal consciousness is attributed to James 
by Bruce Wilshire in his vJilliam James and Phenomer1ology: A 
Study of "The Principles of Psychology." Wilshire ignores a 
great deal of James in order to bring James into the 
phenomenological camp of Husserl. What he ignores here is 
this: for James consciousness is personal and the self is 
the source of creative effort. 
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field of the personal, and we have to survey it from the 
standpoint of action, which is the distinguishing 
characteristic of the personal." 252 
The myth of the non-active self arises when 
consciousness is artificially separated from the self. 
consciousness can be analyzed in this manner but this 
analysis doesn't destroy the fact that consciousness is 
always personalized consciousness and exist only as the 
subjective dimension of that irreducible reality known as the 
self. It is always the self which acts in the world. An 
agent is never an impersonal transcendental consciousness nor 
that purely physical mass called the body. This becomes 
clear once we realize that {1) consciousness can act upon its 
environment only by means of the body, and (2) the body qua 
body has no ends and thus no reason or motivation to act at 
all without consciousness supplying ends. An agent is always 
an embodied consciousness in the world, which is to say an 
agent is always a self. It is the self which acts on its 
environment guided by its own interests and the ends which it 
has formulated for itself. To those who deny self agency 
James replies that there is no other kind of agency. In 
Aristotelian terms James believes our ideas function as final 
causes. Thus it is only within "the total fact of personal 
activity" that "final and efficient causes coalesce." 253 
It is at the core of the self that James locates "the 
252 Jon Macmurray, Persons in Relation, London, Faber 
and Faber Limited, 1961, p. 24. 
253 James, Some Problems of Philosophy, p. 107. 
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source of effort and attention.• 254 Here is the place 
•from which appear to emanate the fiats of the will."2SS 
It is because consciousness is essentially teleological that 
the self is an active and creative force in the world. The 
self's freedom lies in selecting those objects or parts of 
objects to which it will attend. "Each of us dichotomizes 
the Kosmos in a different place.• 256 It is the interest 
and selectivity of consciousness which forms one world of 
meaning out of many possible worlds. 
[consciousness] functions exclusively for the sake 
of ends that do not exist at all in the world of 
impressions we receive by way of our senses, but are 
set up by our emotional and practical subjectivity 
altogether. It is a transformer of the world of our 
impressions into a totally different world, -- the 
world of our conception; and the transformation is 
effected in the interests of our vol~~~onal nature, 
and for no other purpose whatsoever. 
James would not deny that consciousness serves a 
biological end. He would deny, however, that its function is 
merely that of contributing to survival. For consciousness 
no sooner comes than it creates its own ends, and these ends 
greatly surpass that common concern for survival. Moreover 
it brings with it the power of determination and moral 
254 
' ' 1 I 285 Pr1nc1p es, , p. . 
255Ibid. 
256 Ibid., I, p. 278. 
257James, "Reflex Action as Theism" (1879) in The Will 
to Believe (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), pp. 94-95. 
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effort, and thus making it possible for an ideal to 
oecasional displace a concern for survival. 
Gary Kessler has argued that it is this teleological 
character of the Jamesian consciousness which kept James from 
making the idealist turn of Husserl and led him to emphasize 
the body and practical action which in turn led him to his 
famous theory of pragmatism. Kessler writes: 
In Husserl the emphasis is on the meaning -
bestowing function of the transcendental ego. In 
James the emphasis is placed on the freedom of the 
individual interacting with the world. He argues 
that the line between the activity of the mind as a 
meaning - bestowing agent and its passivity as a 
receptor of sense impressions should not be drawn 
where ideas interact with experience, but rather 
where the mind chooses to attend to certain 
sensations and to ignore others. This signals an 
important difference between James' notion of 
intentionality and Husserl's, James sees 
intentionality as primarily teleological. It 
involves purpose, choice, goals, and interests. It 
is only.a s~gst step from this position to 
pragmat~sm. 
For James, the effort of willing is the effort of our 
impulsive, habitual and obsessional stream of consciousness. 
It is the effort of clearing away all the conflicting ideas 
and leaving one purpose solely in command. Volitional effort 
is effort of attention. Action is the result of consistent 
controlled thought. "The essential achievement of the will, 
in short, when it is most 'voluntary' is to attend to a 
258 Kessler, p. 109. 
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difficult object and hold it fast before the mind." 259 We 
don't will ourselves to act; we will ourselves to focus our 
thought, to attend to an idea, and this in turn leads to 
physical action. The self is the agent because through its 
structure of interests it is the source of "selective 
attention," i.e. the source of our ability to resolutely 
sustain attention to an idea. 
Ideas naturally tend to lead to action and bodily 
movement. When they don't, its because of the presence of 
conflicting ideas. Our freedom and our agency lies in the 
power of the self to focus its attention on objects that may 
at the moment be regarded as unpleasant and so difficult to 
attend to. James illustrates his point with the example of 
the difficulty of getting out of a warm bed on a cold 
morning. 260 usually in such situations, after pondering 
the competing alternative courses of action open to us, we 
simply find ourselves standing on the cold floor with our 
thoughts occupied with the responsibilities of the day. our 
rising from our bed followed naturally from our attending to 
this idea rather than the competing and highly tempting idea 
of the warm bed. Consciousness naturally tends to express 
itself in bodily movement for the body is its way of being-in-
the-world. 
James theory of a selective and creative consciousness 
259Princip1es, II, p. 1166. 
260 b'd I 1132 I 1 ., I, p. . 
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must be understood not in a Kantian sense, but rather in 
conjunction with the special role he attributes to the body. 
The self is not a disembodied ego that constructs its world 
through a priori categories. The self is immersed in the 
world and it is only because it is so situated that there 
exist for it concrete possibilities for action. The initial 
basic structuring of the experienced world is grounded in the 
body. 
The world experienced (otherwise called the 'field 
of consciousness') comes at all times with our body 
as its centre, centre of vision, centre of action, 
centre of interest. Where the body is here~ when 
the body acts is 'now'~ what the body touches is 
'this'~ all other things are 'there' and 'then' and 
'that'. These words of emphasized position imply a 
systematization of things with reference to a focus 
of action 2g£d interest which lies in the body; •••• 
James sees the body as the condition for practical 
action. It is the body which labors, points, gestures and 
talks. The self's agency in the world is always through 
bodily action. Even our knowing activities in this world are 
not purely epistemological for our knowledge always is based 
upon the needs and interests of the embodied self. 
261 
So far as 'thoughts' and 'feelings' can be active, 
their activity terminates in the activity of the 
body, and only through first arousing its activities 
can they begin to change those of the rest of the 
world. The body is the storm center, the origin of 
co-ordinates, the constant place of stress in all 
James, Essays in Radical Empiricism, p. 86 n. 
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that experience-train. Everything circ~g~ around 
it, and is felt from its point of view. 
John Macmurray shares James' view regarding the need for 
a philosophical recovery of the body. He writes: 
The effect of transferring the center of reference 
to action, and at the same time its sufficient 
justification, is that man recovers his body and 
becomes personal. When he is conceived as an agent, 
all his activities, including his reflective 
activities, fall naturally into place in a 
functional unity. Even his emotions, instead of 
disturbance to the placidity of thought, take their 
place as necessary motive which sustain his 
activities, including his activity of thinking. 263 
Actions not words reveal one's self to the other and to 
oneself. One finds out who he is only as he acts in the 
world with others. James points out that our self-feelings 
in this world, "depends entirely on what we back ourselves to 
be and do." 264 Deeds testify to my true field of care and 
so it is in my actions that my self becomes manifest to the 
other and to me. James eloquently declares the primacy of 
action in the following passage from his Principles of 
Psychology: 
No matter how full a reservoir of maxims one may 
possess, and no matter how good one's sentiments may 
be, if one has not taken advantage of every concrete 
opportunity to act one's character may remain 
262Ibid. 
263 Macmurray, ££· cit. p. 12. 
264p . . 1 I r~nc~p es, , p. 296. 
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entirely unaffected for the better. With mere good 
intentions, hell is proverbially paved •••• Every time 
a resolve or a fine glow of feeling evaporates 
without bearing practical fruit is worse than a 
chance lost: it works so as positively to hinder 
future resolutions and emotions from taking the 
normal path of discharge. There is no more 
contemptible type of character than that of the 
nerveless sentimentalist and dreamer, who spends his 
life in a weltering sea of sensibility an~65motion, but who never does a manly concrete deed. 
James views the self as an agent because experience 
reveals our conscious states as positing ends and directing 
our actions in terms of those ends. James mainly argues for 
his agent view of the self by comparing it to a parallelist 
view of the self. He gives a number of reasons for rejecting 
the conscious automaton theory \·lhich treats consciousness as 
a mere epiphenomenon. We have discussed these reasons in an 
earlier section. The following constitute a summary of 
James' reasons for believing that the self is a real agent in 
the world: (1) The efficacy of consciousness is directly 
experienced. ' (ala Descartes.) Here we have knowledge by 
direct acquaintance of it rather than "knowledge about it." 
(2) The efficacy of consciousness is the only way to account 
for the enormous correlations between pleasure and beneficial 
activity and between pain and detrimental activity. (3) The 
efficacy of consciousness is the only way to account for the 
enormous correlation between the feeling of effort and non-
automatic responses. (4) The emergence of novelty in the 
world suggest that the self is a real agent. (5) Our 
265Ibid., I, p. 129. 
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inability to completely comprehend the relationship between 
thought and matter is not adequate evidence of its non-
existence and so it is not a disproof of the self's agency. 
(6) A theory of the self must not ignore how this notion 
functions in one's daily life and the value it carries there 
and consequences that flow from it. 
None of the major traditional alternative approaches to 
the self recognized agency as the distinguishing 
characteristic of the self. The Spiritualists, the 
Transcendentalists and the Associationists regarded the self 
as primarily the "knower" rather than as the "doer." 
Although each of these philosophical camps recognized that 
the self was an agent, they each constructed their theories 
of the self as if it was primarily the spectator of the world 
rather than a participant in the world. Their general 
neglect of the self's agency began when a meditative 
Descartes turned his thoughts inward and pronounced, "I am a 
thinking thing." In giving primacy to the "I think" this 
philosophical tradition lost sight of the "I do." 
The Spiritualists recognized the efficacy of the self 
and James says at one point that this is what makes the soul 
theory more attractive than some of the other alternatives. 
But though he finds it attractive, James rejects the notion 
of a spiritual substance because it is inexperiencable and 
superflous. The soul theory also creates additional problems 
regarding the self's agency in the world. In viewing the 
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self as primarily mind, i.e. essentially the knower to whom 
the world appears, the self's agency in the physical world 
became problematic. The soul being an independent and 
radically different kind of substance than that which 
composes the physical world makes it very difficult to 
develop an adequate account of the self's agency in the 
world. It is not a question of finding the point where these 
two contrary substances interact as Descartes apparently 
thought with his "pineal gland" hypothesis. The problem is 
that given the character of each substance (for example one 
in space the other not) a point of interaction seems 
impossible. The Spiritualists recognize the agency of the 
self, but they formulate it in such a way that its agency in 
this world becomes problematic. 
The Associationist's "brick-and-mortar" approach to 
experience also made the discovery of an active self 
impossible. Hume analyzed the self in terms of a passive 
succession of discrete ideas and impressions. Despite some 
excellent critical insights concerning the problem of 
personal identity, Hume failed to give an adequate account of 
the self. His basic assumption that experience is atomistic 
made it impossible for him to find the dynamic self that 
James discovered. Hume did not realize that in explaining 
away self identity in terms of our "feigning" such a unity 
into our discrete impressions, he was already assuming an "I" 
which required a greater continuity and activity than was 
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allowed by his account of the self. Hume's disjointed self 
could not account for the initiative and creative effort that 
are called for by the "feigning." James, however, recognized 
creative effort as lying at the very core of the self and 
because of this unlike Hume he gave the body a privileged 
place in his account of the self. Hume still under the 
influence of the Spiritualist's tradition that he criticized, 
regarded the problem of the self as being mainly the identity 
of mind. In so doing, he too put the emphasis on the "I 
think" rather than the "I do." Had Hume's analysis focused 
upon the body, he might have realized that the self is not 
that sought for single impression which remains always 
identically the same, but is rather the source of purposeful 
activity. 
The agency character of the self is also not dealt with 
adequately in the Transcendentalists' account. James viewed 
Kant as tacitly accepting Hume's "atomistic" theory of 
experience and inventing his transcendental string to tie it 
up. James rejected the Kantian Ego not only because it 
couldn't be found in the stream of experience but also 
because it wasn't an active enough self. James saw the 
notion of activity as lying at the very core of our sense of 
self, and he did not view this activity in the Kantian sense 
as being primarily epistemological. The transcendental ego 
is in no position to do the work of a real self which James 
sees as making judgments about how to act. 
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The soul truly explains nothing: the 'synthesis': 
which she performed, were simply taken ready-made, 
and clapped on to her as expressions of her nature 
taken after the fact: but at least she has some 
semblance of nobility and outlook. She was called 
active: might select: was responsible, and permanent 
in her way. The Ego is simply nothing: as 
ineff2~6ual and windy an abortion as Philosophy can 
show. 
James' message is clear: the self is where the action 
is. The self is much more than the subject of experience: it 
is also an agent in the experienced world. The self is not 
transcedent, but is rather situated in the world. The self 
conceived simply as "the knower," as a non-agent is a myth. 
There is no "knower" that is not also "doer." The self 
exists only in its agency, and even its cognitive acts have 
their ultimate basis in the self's agency in the lived-
world. "My thinking," says James, "is first and last and 
always for the sake of doing, and I can only do one thing at 
a time." 267 
Where the Spiritualists, Transcendentalists and 
Associationists recognize the self's agency but fail to account 
for it and appreciate its importance, the Behaviorists refuse 
to recognize it at all for it is precluded by their single 
mechanistic explanation of behavior. In their deterministic 
closed universe there is no room for real agency for here all 
action is actually re-action and nothing lies outside the 
endless physical chain of cause and effect. In clarifying 
266 Ibid., I, p. 345. 
267 Ibid., II, p. 960. 
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James' position, we have already discussed the Behaviorist's 
position with regard to the self's agency. But the 
Behaviorists raise a major problem concerning James's view of 
the self as agent. It is the same old problem that has 
plagued all believers of an efficacious consciousness. James 
doesn't explain how consciousness and matter interact. We 
must now consider whether this is disastrous for his theory 
of an active self. 
Although the six reasons stated on page 235 can be 
viewed as accumulative evidence for believing that the self 
is a real agent and consciousness is efficacious, they do not 
tell us how consciousness is efficacious. In other words, 
James position is mainly defined in reference to the opposing 
deterministic view of the self that sees consciousness as an 
impotent epiphenomenon. James was well aware of the lack of 
a positive account of his interactionist view. He felt, 
however, that an understanding of this process lies beyond 
the scope of human reason. Before it, says James "our 
reason can only avow its impotence.n 268 
But James insist that man is more than a rational 
spectator, that he is also an active participant in the 
world. He points out that rationality in its theoretical 
form is itself a sentiment involving a passion for 
simplification and distinguishing whose justification lies in 
268 James, "The Feeling of Effort," 
and Reviews, ed. by R. B. Rerry, New York: 
& Company, 1920, p. 216. 
Collected Essays 
Longmans, Green 
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removing doubts concerning the consequences of future 
actions. James therefore believes that if reason alone can't 
decide the issue of human freedom or an efficacious 
consciousness this is no reason to deny it. He notes that if 
we deny the existence of all that we can not explain then the 
scientific community is going to have to dispense with its 
notion of physical causality for that too has not been 
satisfactorily explained. 
In the "Dilemma of Determinism" James shows why the 
question of human freedom is insoluble from any strict 
theoretical point of view. Science which only deals with 
facts can't speak with authority regarding the existence of 
human freedom for the whole issue concerns the reality not of 
facts but rather the reality of future possibilities. Here 
the theoretical point of view must be supplemented by the 
practical point of view which is in fact the natural point of 
view of the self as agent. It is from this practical point 
of view that James proclaims the self to be a free agent in 
the following passage: 
I thus disclaim openly on the threshold all 
pretension to prove to you that the freedom of the 
will is true. The most I hope is to induce some of 
you to follow my own example in assuming it true, 
and acting as if it were true. If it be true, it 
seems to me that this is involved in the strict 
logic of the case. Its truth ought not to be 
forced willynilly down our indifferent throats. It 
ought to be freely espoused by men who can equally 
well turn their backs upon it. In other words, our 
first act of freedom, if we are free, ought in all 
269James, 11 The Dilemma of Determinism .. 
£Eagmatism, ed. by Alburey Castell, New York: 
Publishing Company, 1966, pp. 37-38. 
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inwar~6~ropriety to be to affirm that we are free. 
James believes that an adequate theory of the self will 
take into account the entire range of human experiences which 
include not merely cognitive acts and the sentiment of 
rationality, but also actions based upon interests of a 
practical, aesthetic, ethical or religious nature. Only a 
theory of the self as agent can welcome and embrace these 
various interests of the whole man. It is for this reason 
that James believes we ought to reject those theories of the 
self which deny or underplay the agency character of the 
self. 
After a crisis of spirit in his own life, James 
struggled with the question of human freedom. It is clear 
from what he wrote in his diary on April 30, 1870 that this 
issue of self agency was much more than an academic question 
for James. He writes, 
My first act of free will shall be to believe in 
free will •••• I will go a step further with my 
will, not only act with it, but believe as well; 
believe in my individual reality and creative 
power. My belief, to be sure, can't be optimistic 
but I will posit life (the real, the good) in the 
self-governing resistance of the ego to the world. 
Life ~ha1270be built in) doing and suffering and creat1ng. 
270 James, The Letters of William James, edited by his 
son Henry James, Vol. I, Boston: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 
1920, p. 148. 
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James' view of the self as agent is not unlike Merleau-
ponty's position. James too sees the self as both the knower 
and the doer as both situated in the world and yet surpassing 
it in that it employs its imagination and agency to transform 
and complete its world. The self has the power to contribute 
something to the completion of a universe as yet unfinished. 
James remarks that the following consideration is forced upon 
him at every turn: "The knower is an actor and coefficient 
of the truth on one side, whilst on the other he registers 
the truth which he helps to create." 271 
Our initial and basic understanding of the notion of 
agency comes from our direct acquaintance with it in our own 
personal existence. Each of us experiences himself or 
herself as a real agent. James believes this is true even of 
the preachers of determinism who "the moment they forget 
their theoretic abstractions, live in their biographies as 
much as any one else, and believe as naively that fact even 
now is making, and that they themselves, by doing 'original 
work' help to determine what the future shall become." 272 
In this section we have shown that one of the great merits of 
the Jamesian account of the self is that it fully recognizes 
the fact that the self is primarily an agent in the world and 
not a mere spectator of it. With respect to this aspect of 
selfhood we have shown that he gives a more adequate account 
271 . James, Collected Essays and Reviews,££· Clt., 
pp. 66-67. 
272James, Some Problems of Philosophy, New York: 
Longmans, Green & Company, 1948, p. 152. 
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than the Spiritualists, Associationists, and 
Transcendentalists who treated the self as primarily the 
knower of the world and the Behaviorists who treated the self 
as just another passive thing in a totally determined world. 
It was James• recognition of the essential roles played by 
both a selective consciousness and a lived-body that led 
James to a more adequate account of the agency character of 
the self. 
D. SOCIALITY 
The innermost of the emp~7~cal selves of a man is a 
Self of the social sort. 
Once the emphasis shifts from self as subject to self as 
agent, it becomes clear that the self is not isolated but 
rather exists in a dynamic intersubjective world in which 
relations with other personal agents become a part of his 
expanding and complex self-field. The size and character of 
one's social ME is a reflection of one's agency in the shared-
lived-world. 
James' claim that the innermost of the empirical selves 
of a man is a self of the social sort, should not be viewed 
as denial of his earlier position that the nuclear self is 
"spiritual." We must remember by "spiritual" James simply 
means the active element in the self that which welcomes or 
rejects, which turns out to be not the soul but rather an 
embodied consciousness. Thus in stating that the innermost 
part of the objective self is social, James is simply 
pointing out the fact that the active self, "that which 
welcomes or rejects" must be specified not only materially 
and spiritually but socially as well. The self as agent 
involves all three MEs for personal activity always takes 
place within a community. For James there is no self outside 
273 
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of "ethical republics.n 274 Every self is a member of some 
nsocius." 
That our sense of self is based to a great extent upon 
what we think others think of us, is something that James 
fully recognized. The Jamesian theory stresses the 
tremendous significance that social images play in one's 
sense of identity. James realized that we become in varying 
degrees the roles we adopt in our social relationships. 
These roles (father, mother, lawyer, doctor, carpenter, 
student, etc.) help to define us not merely to others but 
also to ourselves. Moreover, many of the character traits we 
attribute to ourselves we learn from others. If a person is 
told enough times he is ugly, he will naturally come to 
regard himself as ugly. The other's image of me becomes a 
part of my self-field because as Sartre points out, I am not 
simply a being-for-itself, I am also a being-for-others. For 
James, this relation to the other is an essential and not 
merely an accidental feature of my being. 
If no one turned round when we entered, answered 
when we spoke, or minded what we did, but if every 
person we met 'cut us dead,' and acted as if we were 
non-existing things, a kind of rage and impotent 
despair would ere long well up in us, from which the 
cruellest bodily tortures would be a relief; for 
these would make us feel that, however bad might be 
our plight, we had not sunk t~7~uch a depth as to be unworthy of attention at all. 
274James, "The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life" in 
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For James, the distinguishing characteristic of the self 
iS agency and agency implies a community of agents. We are 
not mere spectators of existence we are participants. To 
denY this is to condemn oneself to solipsism. As an agent 
the self only exists in dynamic relation with the Other. It 
is in relation to the Other that the self is constituted. 
The self exist in its intersubjective relationships. 
The self is that which is always separate from the Other 
but never isolated from the Other. Each and every self is at 
the same time separate from the other personal agents of his 
society and related to them. A self always involves an 
essential relatedness to others. Personal existence is 
characterized by a "being-with." The self is never a monad. 
Every self has its social dimension. James points out 
that even the most humblest outcast tends to hope for 
recognition from some "ideal tribunal." "Complete social 
unselfishness, in other words, can hardly exist~ complete 
social suicide hardly occurs to a man's mind." 276 No self 
is completely asocial. Even the religious hermit has his 
ideal potential social self, that is, he cares about his 
image in the mind of God, "the Great Companion." 277 
James offers us the following description of the self in 
its social mode: 
Properly speaking, a man has as many social selves 
as there are individuals who recognize him and carry 
276 Ibid., I, p. 302. 
277Ibid., I, p. 301. 
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an image of him in their mind. To wound any one of 
these his images is to wound him. But as the 
individuals who carry the images fall naturally into 
classes, we may practically say that he has as many 
different social selves as there are distinct groups 
of persons about whose opinion he cares. He 
generally shows a different side of himself to each 
of these groups •••• From this there results what 
practically is a division of the man into several 
selves; and this may be a discordant splitting, as 
where one is afraid to let one set of his 
acquaintances know him as he is elsewhere; or it may 
be a perfectly harmonious division of labor, as 
where one tender to his children is ster~7So the soldiers or prisoners under his command. 
Perhaps the most dramatic demonstration of the social 
character of the self is given in the experience of being in 
love. In such a state it seems nothing else matters but 
one's image in the mind of the beloved. When one is rejected 
by such a cherished person, a real eclipse of the self is 
experienced. Here is the void of unrequited love. Those who 
have had the experience recognize the truth of James' words. 
"To his own consciousness he is not, so long as this 
particular social self fails to get recognition ...... 279 
The shrinkage and collapse of the self on such occasions 
clearly suggest there is a large social dimension to the 
self. Who knows how many lovers have taken their own life 
because they felt the largest part of their self had already 
been destroyed? If one denies the essential social character 
of the self, how can one account for such extreme acts of the 
self? 
278 Ib;d., I 281 282 • ' pp. - . 
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The social character of the self does not only manifest 
itself in the behavior of one who is in love, it is evident 
in the behavior of all selves. The attitudes of others 
towards us form such a large part of our empirical self field 
that there is hardly a human action that does not suggest a 
social self of some sort. One powerful social self is what 
is commonly called one's honor. It is his image in the eyes 
of his own "kind," and James notes that it is one of the most 
powerful forces that we experience. 280 It is due to this 
kind of social self that soldiers go bravely to their death, 
firemen rush into burning buildings and scholars spend years 
on books that will provide little or no financial reward. 
The motivation for such acts may be numerous and varied, but 
one of the things which is at stake in each of these cases is 
this, " ••• his image in the eyes of his own 'set' which exalts 
or condemns him as he conforms or not to certain requirements 
that may not be made of one in another walk of life." 281 
To deny the intrinsic social character of the self is to 
render as inexplicable a whole range of human behavior 
similar to that described above. 
The above should not be viewed as a denial of the 
possibility of altruistic acts. It is only a denial that 
such acts have no reference to one's sense of self. Altruism 
is not the consequence of bracketing one's own self~ it is 
280Ibid., I, p. 283. 
281 Ibid., I, p. 282. 
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rather the result of a self-field that has expanded to 
include among its cherished objects the welfare of certain 
others. The difference between an altruist and an egoist is 
the difference between a small and a large expansive self-
field. This fact is reflected in the language we use to 
describe someone who acts in an egotistical fashion. 
conspicuous ego involved behavior tends to illicit the remark 
"you are being small." Egotistical selves do in fact tend 
to be tiny by comparison with altruistic selves. As James 
points out, all narrow people "intrench their Me" while 
sympathetic people "proceed by the entirely opposite way of 
expansion and inclusion."282 
The traditional theories of the self generally neglected 
the essential social character of the self because of their 
obsession with the "I think" rather than the "I do." The 
egocentricity of modern philosophy is in part due to a 
conception of the self as primarily subject. In reflection 
we suspend our basic relation to the world which is practical 
and we isolate ourselves from our essential network of social 
relations. If the self is examined from this narrow and non-
primordial perspective, one is easily led to believe that the 
self is primarily the subject of experience, and as such 
isolated from the Other. 
James' phenomenological approach to the self reveals 
that the self is not an isolate at all but is rather 
282 b'd I I ~ . , , p. 298. 
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intrinsically social. Those images in the minds of others 
actually form a large part of my objective self. It is these 
images that make me bloom with pride or make me shrink in 
shame~ it is not my "pure principle of subjectivity." These 
social images constitute a large part of my total empirical 
selfhood. James asks, "In what capacity is it that I claim 
and demand a respectful greeting from you instead of this 
expression of disdain?" 283 Do I make this claim as a bare 
subject of experience? as a soul substance? as a 
transcendental unity of apperception? as simply the owner of 
experience? James shows that it is not as a bare I that I 
feel entitled to a respectful greeting but as a self with a 
concrete social content. A respectful greeting is expected 
because this self "belongs to a certain family and 
'set,•" 284 and "has certain powers, possessions, and public 
functions, sensibilities, duties, and purposes, and merits 
and deserts." 285 It is the particular social character of 
my self that your disdain negates and contradicts. It is the 
social dimension of my self, my concrete historic ME, that 
your disdain has pricked and collapsed. One's social images 
do not lie outside one's self but are a part of the self, and 
this is why their good fortune causes pride and their 
misfortune brings shame. 
2831b1'd., I 306 ' p. . 
284 Ibid. 
285 Ibid. 
252 
The Spiritualists and the Transcendentalists were from 
the start in no position to appreciate the enormous social 
character of the self for their permanent fixtures, the soul 
and the transcendental ego, precede society's influence. 
Their selves are essentially isolates for whom being-with-
others is a mere accidental feature of their existence. They 
do not realize that one's existence is not enclosed within 
the boundaries of a monadic ego or substance. The self 
exists as a field that is always stretched out towards others 
with their power of approval or disdain, and these attitudes 
of others towards one are actually incorporated into one's 
self-field to form a part of one's very being. Unlike the 
Spiritualists and Transcendentalists, James takes relations 
seriously. In his radical empiricism, relations are viewed 
as real as the things they relate. 
Because of this extraordinary phenomenological 
faithfulness to experience, James was able to discover that 
the self exists in the groups to which it belongs, and in the 
relation of love and in relation to an Ideal Spectator which 
for those who pray is the only adequate Socius. 286 
The Associationists also did not recognize the enormous 
social character of the self. Like the Spiritualists and the 
Transcendentalists, Burne viewed the self primarily in terms 
of the mind. When Burne's search for a permanent subject of 
knowing proved fruitless, he concluded that the self was a 
286 Ibid., I, p. 301. 
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fiction. If Burne's analysis had focused upon the body and 
its actions, he would have had to notice the enormous social 
character of the self. In concentrating on the mind rather 
than on the embodied consciousness the traditional approaches 
lost sight of the social dimension of the self for minds are 
private in a way bodies never are. In order to grasp the 
social character of the self, one must give full recognition 
to the bodily existence of the self. 
Unlike classical modern philosophy, today's behaviorists 
have not neglected the enormous social character of the 
self. On the contrary, they view the self as entirely social 
in nature. According to B. F. Skinner the self is merely a 
repertoire of behavior which is prescribed by a given set of 
social contingencies. Social Behaviorists like George Mead 
believe a self arises in a social setting where an organism 
takes the attitude of the other towards himself. Mead and 
his disciples maintain that a self arises when language, a 
purely social invention, is turned inward and one begins to 
have internal dialogues. Unless the organism adopts the 
attitudes of others toward himself through internalized 
conversations, there is no development of a self. For these 
Behaviorists the social me is not one of three dimensions of 
the empirical self, it is rather the only dimension. For 
them the social self is the only self. 
The question tha~ now arises is this: Did Mead 
exaggerate the social character of the self or did James not 
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fully appreciate the total social nature of the self? This 
question leads us into a consideration of George Mead's 
criticism of James. Mead puts forth the Behaviorist 
objection to the Jamesian self in the following passage from 
his highly influencial work Mind Self and Society: 
Cooley and James, it is true, endeavor to find the 
basis of the self in reflexive affective 
experiences, i.e. experiences involving "self-
feeling;" but the theory that the nature of the self 
is to be found in such experiences does not account 
for the origin of the self, or of the self-feeling 
which is supposed to characterize such experiences. 
The individual need not take the attitudes of others 
toward himself in these experiences, since these 
experiences merely in themselves do not necessitate 
his doing so, and unless he does so, he cannot 
develop a self; and he will not do so in these 
experiences unless his self has already originated 
otherwise, namely, in the way we have been 
describing. The essences of the self, as we have 
said, is cognitive: it lies in the internalized 
conversation of gestures which constitutes thinking, 
or in terms of which thought or reflection proceeds. 
And hence the origin and foundation 2~7 the self, like those of thinking, are social. 
Because of a number of similarities in their positions 
on the self, a comparison between James and Mead might be 
helpful here. It should also be noted that the similarities 
are due to James' great influence on Mead. James' distinction 
between the "me" and the "I" was adopted by Mead in his 
theory of the self. His interpretation of these dimensions 
of the self is, however, quite different from James.· Mead 
287 d M' d S 1f d S . t Ch' George Mea , 1n e an oc1e y, 1cago, 
University of Chicago, 1934, p. 174. 
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agrees with James that the "I" never appears in consciousness 
as an object and that what shows itself in introspection is 
always the objective self, the ME. He also agrees with James 
that the "I" is the source of creativity and novelty as well 
as that which unifies experience. Despite these basic 
agreements, the differences are great although they may at 
first sight seem small. In other words, they are seemingly 
tiny differences with big consequences for selfhood. While 
for James the "I" is immanent in the stream of consciousness 
as the present pulse of Thought and is felt and known by 
direct acquaintance1 Mead regards the "I" as necessary for 
consciousness but transcendent to it and forever 
unexperienced. While for James the "ME" is material, 
spiritual, and social1 Mead regards the "ME" as entirely 
social. 
According to Mead, James underestimated the social 
character of the self. Mead insist that a self arises not as 
a result of a caring consciousness but as a consequence of an 
organism taking the attitude of the other towards himself. A 
Jamesian response to Mead might go as follows: Why would an 
organism bother itself about the attitude of the other toward 
it, if it didn't already have a special caring attitude with 
regard to its own existence, an attitude quite unlike any 
which the other takes toward it? In other words, the process 
which Mead describes to account for the emergence of self 
seems to require the more primordial process which James 
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claimed was responsible for selfhood and which Mead rejects. 
In the absence of care, it is difficult to see how the 
approving or disapproving attitudes of my fellow human beings 
could begin to touch me or be incorporated into my self-
field. Mead claims that the self first arises when language 
is turned inward and one begins to have internal dialogues. 
It is difficult to see how the self can be a consequence of 
these internal dialogues, for unless the coversing parties 
already exist there is not going to be any dialogue. The 
self can not be a consequence of an internal dialogue for in 
such a dialogue it is the self conversing with itself. Mead 
seems to think that the self only exists in and through 
reflection. But the self is not the effect of introspection 
but rather it is the self which reflects upon itself. 
In the case of Mead the relationship between the I and 
the ME is not at all clear. He does not seem to realize that 
the concrete full self is an irreducible whole involving both 
these dimensions. Although Mead speaks of the "I" and the 
"ME" aspects of the self, nearly everything he says about the 
self concerns only the "ME" aspect. Mead admits that the "I" 
is the active part of the self and a necessary phase of the 
self, but he has little else to say about it because he 
insists it transcends experience like the Kantian ego. It is 
not even clear if the "I" of Mead is really a free active 
force or simply the place where different environmental 
factors come together. On this point he is rather ambiguous, 
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but the general behavioristic thrust of his thought is toward 
a reductionist approach to both mind and self which sees both 
phenomena as a product of language which is the gift of one's 
social environment. 
James does not believe like Mead that Society is 
responsible through language for the existence of mind and 
self. James also does not believe that all thinking goes on 
in the form of language. He points out that there is much 
evidence that deaf mutes have thought processes that are not 
dependent upon the language symbols of society. James points 
out that it is difficult to see how something so complex as 
society and language could arise from an organism that lacked 
both mind and self. Although James feels that the whole 
issue of origin here is like that dilemma concerning the 
chicken and the egg, he tends to lean towards the view that 
sees the social world as being due to the accumulated 
influences of individuals of their examples, their 
initiatives, and their decisions.288 
The mutations of societies, then, from generation to 
generation, are in the main due directly or 
indirectly to the acts or the examples of 
individuals whose genius was so adapted to the 
receptivities of the moment, or whose accidental 
position of authority was so critical that they 
became ferments, initiators of movements, setters of 
precedent or fashion, centers of corruption or 
destroyers of other persons, whose gifts, had they 
h~d fr:e P~g~, would have led ·society in another 
d1rect1on. 
288James, "Great Men and Their Environment" in The Will 
to Believe, pp. 163-189. 
289rbid., p. 170. 
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The self of Mead tends to passively reflect the social 
environment in which it is situated. For Mead the 
distinguishing characteristic of each self is not agency but 
the individual perspective from which it receives and 
reflects its environmental influences. As in B. F. Skinner's 
treatment of personhood, Mead's "I" is not a genuine source 
of novelty: it is only the place where various old data comes 
together in new ways. James regards such a treatment as an 
unjustifiable diminishment of the self. James writes, 
"Determinists, who deny it, [human freedom] who say that 
individual men originate nothing, but merely transmit to the 
future the whole push of the past cosmos of which they are so 
small an expression, diminish man. He is less admirable, 
stripped of this creative principle." 290 
Because of the wedge that Mead drives between the I and 
the ME, and his subsequent neglect of the "I," the self is in 
effect reduced to a static set of personality traits. The 
agency character of the self is lost sight of and the self 
becomes merely something that an organism encounters in 
reflection when he takes the attitude of the other towards 
himself. From a Jamesian perspective, Mead's view does an 
injustice to our basic pre-reflective understanding of the 
self as an agent. Unlike James, Mead did not recognize the 
privilege position of the body in selfhood. Mead's ME is 
290 . 59 James, Pragmat1sm, p. . 
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entirely social in character and the body which forms a part 
of Mead's self is the body as seen from the outside and 
judged by others~ it is not the directly felt active body of 
James. 
James agrees with Mead that images we think others hold 
of us form a large part of the objective self. But unlike 
Mead, James realizes that the self is much more than these 
images and that these images only form a part of the self 
because a caring consciousness cherishes them and as a result 
identifies with them. In other words, the social dimension 
of the self is grounded in those other dimension of selfhood 
that we have already discussed and labeled as care, 
temporality and agency. What Mead fails to realize is that 
it is not as a mere organism that I take an interest in these 
images that others have of me, but rather it is because I am 
a caring, temporal_agent in the world that these social 
images matter to me. What James recognizes and the 
Behaviorists do not is simply this: A genuine social 
relation already presupposes the existence of personal beings 
for if the relation is social it takes the form of !-thou or 
!-you but never it-it. 
Unlike Mead, James recognized the futility of a 
reductionist approach to the self. To view the self as a 
mere organism is to already lose sight of the meaning of 
personal existence. In The Divided Self, R. D. Laing puts 
forth the same view: 
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One's relationship to an organism is different from 
one's relation to a person. One's description of 
the other as organism is as different from one's 
description of the other as person as the 
description of side of vase is from profile of face; 
similarly, one's theory of the other as organism is 
remote from any theory of the other as person. One 
acts towards an organism differently from the way 
one acts towards a person. The science of persons 
is the study of human beings that begins from a 
relationship with the other as person and P2~!eeds 
to an account of the other still as person. 
The Jamesian self is social. We have argued in this 
section that with regard to this experiential feature of the 
self, James gives a more adequate account of the self than 
the Spiritualists, Transcendentalists and Associationsists 
who tended to neglect the social character of the self, and a 
more satisfying account than the Behaviorists who tended to 
exaggerate the social nature of the self to the point of 
neglecting its other experiential features. In our 
discussion of the Behaviorist position, we have shown that 
the objection that the Jamesian self is not social enough is 
without merit. The Jamesian theory recognizes the fact that 
the self is intrinsically a social being without betraying 
that equally important truth, that the self is a caring, 
historical, active being. 
291R. D. Laing, The Divided Self, p. 21. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION OF PART VII 
In this section we have argued the merits of the 
Jamesian theory of the self. we have compared the Jamesian 
theory with four different major alternative theories with 
regard to their treatment of four separate experiential 
features of selfhood. These four experiencable traits of 
selfhood are as follows: (1) Care is an essential feature of 
the self. In other words, each and every self unlike any 
"thing" exhibits an existence that is clearly "for-itself." 
(2) Temporality is an essential feature of the self. In 
other words, each and every self unlike any "thing" exist 
historically in such a manner that it is continuously 
projecting a future in the present in light of its past. 
(3) Agency is an essential feature of the self. In other 
words, each and every self unlike any "thing" initiates 
action that is guided by its own ends. (4) Sociality is an 
essential feature of the self. In other words, each and 
every self unlike any "thing" is intrinsically related to the 
Other in such a manner that its images in the minds of others 
forms a part of its very being. 
In this section we have argued that Jamesian theory of 
the self avoids the narrow one sided approach of both 
Behaviorism and classical modern philosophy. James 
recognized that the accounts of Descartes, Hume and Kant paid 
too little attention to the non-cognitive dimension of the 
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self and that the Behaviorist's account paid too little 
attention to the subjective dimension of the self, which 
James regarded as one's concrete, temporal, telic, volitional 
stream of consciousness. 
The Jamesian theory of the self, unlike any of its 
traditional rivals, is designed in such a way as to 
accommodate all four of the above mentioned experiential 
features of personal existence. Furthermore, with its 
emphasis upon care, it is able to account for the inter-
relationship of each of these aspects of selfhood. It is 
because the self is primarily a process of caring that it is 
historical, social and active. Without a caring 
consciousness there is no projection of a future in light of 
a past; there is only the given. Without this temporality of 
the subject, self agency is unthinkable for there could be no 
motivation to act where the given is not contrasted with an 
alternative future state of affairs. Finally, without 
caring, historical agents there can be no social realm 
whatsoever. Care, temporality, agency and sociality are each 
attributes of personal existence and each entails the 
presence of all the others. The self can not be caring, or 
historical, or social or active without being all these all 
at once and in its entirety. The self reveals itself in 
experience not as a mere epistemological subject nor as a 
mere physical organism but always as a caring, historical, 
social agent. The Jamesian account is the theory that is 
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most faithful to how the self manifest itself in experience. 
The self conceived as an irreducible subjective-
objective process of care is a conception of the self as 
intrinsically ambiguous. The ambiguity of the self manifest 
itself in a number of ways: (1) It has both a subjective and 
a objective dimension; (2) It is continuously remoulding 
itself; (3) It includes a wide and changing field of 
multifarious objects of care; and (4) It exists in its 
complex social network of relationships. As a result of 
James' "reinstatement of the vague" here, we have a 
conception of the self which is far from simple. But if 
ambiguity is what truly characterizes personal existence, it 
is time that a theory of the self recognize this as one of 
its positive features. The Jamesian self is not neat and 
tidy like a soul or an ego or a machine but neither is it 
reductive of the scope and the richness of personal 
existence. 
SUMMARY 
I began this study by noting that each of us knows the 
meaning of the term "self" until we are asked to define it. 
It should now be clear to all my readers why James regarded 
an account of the self as "the most difficult of philosophic 
tasks." 292 It is a philosophical problem of enormous scope 
and difficulty for it lies at the point where a number of 
metaphysical issues intersect. This is why metaphysics 
leaked into his psychology at every joint. No one has dealt 
with the compounding mysteries of the self more honestly and 
more insightfully than William James. 
Let us briefly review our major findings concerning the 
Jamesian self. The self is a subjective-objective temporal 
process. In other words, personal existence entails the 
togetherness of a subjective dimension and an objective 
dimension and their continuous interdependence. Thus the 
being of the self can by symbolized as follows: I< )ME. Here 
the "I" indicates the present pulse of care, and the "ME" 
stands for the entire field of objects (material, social, and 
spiritual) that through care are selected and organized into 
the objective self. The arrows represent the continuous 
mutual influence between these dimensions of the self. The 
self is this process as an irreducible whole, and it is only 
within this process that there is found an "I" and a "ME." 
292 
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I have labeled this Jamesian self Self-constituting-
Historical-Existence in order to emphasize the fact that 
unlike any "thing" its existence involves both sedimentation 
and spontaneity. With this conception of the self, personal 
existence is portrayed as primarily a process of caring. The 
primary object of care and thus the objective core of the 
entire self-field is the body. It is because it is an 
embodied process of care that the self is essentially 
temporal, social, and active. In other words, the self is a 
social and historical agent because it is the being that 
cares. All these essential features of the self are a 
reflection of the fact that personal existence is 
intrinsically ambiguous. The ambiguity of selfhood is rooted 
in the fact that the self is both a dialectic of subjectivity 
and objectivity and a temporal synthesis of past, present, 
and future. The identity that this ambiguous being enjoys is 
not the kind that is impervious to change, growth, or decay. 
Rather the self has a "loosely constructed identity" based on 
two principle conditions: (1) the functional identity of the 
pulses of consciousness and (2) the constituted identity of 
the "ME," a constitution made possible through: ( 1) care, 
(2) the sense of sameness, and (3) that always present and 
relatively stable structure in experience known as the body. 
The Jamesian account of the self that I have presented 
here is not one that James fully developed or one that he 
consistently and unambiguously professed throughout his long 
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philosophical career. It is, however, the only consistent 
account of personal existence that can be constructed from 
all his valuable but loosely organized insights concerning 
consciousness and selfhood. It is moreover the one account 
that is most consistent with all his writings on the self and 
the one that is implied in his critique of alternative 
theories of the self. Finally, the Jamesian view of the self 
presented here is one that is consistent with his basic 
philosophical doctrines. Thus, I don't subscribe to the view 
that James developed various unrelated and often conflicting 
philosophical doctrines in his numerous books and essays. 
His philosophical psychology, his radical empiricism, his 
pragmatism, and his religious thought are all part of the 
same philosophical vision, and at the heart of this vision is 
the unwavering belief in a creative and historical self. 
I have argued here that this Jamesian conception of the 
self is one that leads to a wider, richer and more accurate 
portrayal of personal existence than is found in the 
traditional alternative views. It is a theory of the self 
that takes into account all the basic experiential facts of 
personal existence. Moreover, it performs this task without 
appealing to any unverifiable principles and without 
introducing any trans-empirical entities. 
James broke with the tradition that glorified absolute 
permanence. Unlike the traditional treatments of the self, 
James• account did not attempt to camouflage the intrinsic 
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historical character of the self. He recognized that the 
flux and flow quality of the self was primordial and that the 
self reveals itself as a dynamic temporal process involving 
both sedimentation and spontaneity. 
James also broke with the tradition that stressed the 
theoretical side of the self in order to recover the 
practical side of personal existence. Instead of the 
Cartes ian pronouncement "I think," James declared, "I do." 
With this shift of emphasis from contemplation to action, 
James recovered both the body and the lived-intersubjective-
world. 
With James the shift towards the "I do" occurs because 
at the very core of his view of the self is the notion of 
creative effort. Agency is the undubitable sign of 
selfhood. He insist that the self is not just an 
epistemological observer of the worldi it is an active 
participant in a world as yet unfinished, and a world 
moreover that welcomes his finishing touches. For James, the 
world and the self interpenetrate each other and thus, each 
are co-determinants of reality. 
A major consequence of James' position is that the 
dignity of the self is reaffirmed. The Jamesian conception 
of the self does not thwart our natural aspirations for 
freedom and purpose in life. Nor does it deny us the 
possibility of ethical progress. James offers us a theory of 
the self that allows for the transformation of both the 
268 
individual and the community to which he belongs. In short, 
the Jamesian theory of the self makes " ••• a direct appeal to 
all those powers of our nature which we hold in highest 
esteem." 293 
James wrote about the self like his life depended upon 
it, and in a certain sense it did. He was a man who for most 
of his life suicide was a "living option." His search for 
the meaning of self was no mere passing academic inquiry. On 
the contrary, we find in James a man passionately and 
relentlessly struggling throughout his life to find the 
meaning of personal .existence. we are all the beneficiaries 
of this long and arduous search for the sense of self. 
James was a firm believer that one's own individualized 
experience must be the ultimate court of appeal in one's 
search for truth. When the truth that is being tracked down 
concerns the self, this rule seems especially appropriate. 
Thus, James is continually inviting his reader to consult his 
own experience of selfhood in judging the soundness of his 
portrayal of the self. Here is where the reader finds James 
most convincing. Where the traditional theories of the self 
seem to offer somewhat plausible accounts of the self of the 
Other, James offers us a portrait of that self that each of 
us is most familiar with i.e. one's very own self. At least 
293James, "The Sentiment of Rationality" in The Will 
to Believe, p. 89. 
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that is this reader's reaction when reading James' 
penetrating descriptions of personal existence such as the 
following: 
••• the knower is not simply a mirror floating with 
no foothold anywhere, and passively reflecting an 
order that he comes upon and finds simply existing. 
The knower is an actor, and coefficient of the truth 
on one side, whilst on the other he registers the 
truth which he helps to create •••• In other words, 
there belongs to mind, from its birth upward, a 
spontaneity, and a vot294 It is in the game, and not a mere looker-on; •••• 
James has not said the last word on the nature of the 
self. In fact, he would deny the possibility of there ever 
being a final accounting of the self. He recognized that 
there is always more to an issue than can be captured at one 
time and from one perspective. He believed in the attitude 
called "a-ready-to-take-back-ness." For James, all positions 
are to be regarded as provisional. Thus, I will not claim 
that James has given us the final and definitive accounting 
of the self. No, he has simply made an enormous contribution 
to our understanding of the self, a contribution that has yet 
to be surpassed. 
294James, "Remarks on Spencer's Definition of Mind as 
Correspondence" in Collected Essays and Reviews, ed. Ralph 
Barton Perry, New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1920, 
pp. 67-68. 
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